

JOINT INDEPENDENT AUDIT COMMITTEE

MONDAY, 22 NOVEMBER 2021

TEAMS

AGENDA

OPEN SESSION

1. **INTRODUCTION**
2. **DECLARATION OF INTEREST**
3. **MINUTES OF THE OPEN SESSION OF THE JOINT INDEPENDENT AUDIT COMMITTEE 19 JULY 2021**
(Attached)
4. **MATTERS ARISING**
(Action list attached)
5. **SUMMARY OF RECENT EXTERNAL INSPECTION, INVESTIGATION AND AUDIT REPORTS**
Head of Corporate Development
(Paper attached)
6. **JOINT STRATEGIC RISK REGISTER**
Head of Corporate Development
(Paper attached)
7. **MID-YEAR TREASURY MANAGEMENT REPORT**
Head of Finance
(Paper attached)
8. **EMERGENT AUDIT PLAN 2022/23 – 2024/25**
Report of Internal Audit Manager
(Paper attached)
9. **EXTERNAL AUDIT UPDATE**
Director of Finance
(Verbal update)
10. **DATE AND TIME OF NEXT MEETING**
TBC, Venue TBC.
11. **EXCLUSION OF THE PRESS AND PUBLIC – EXEMPT BUSINESS**

The Committee is asked to pass a resolution to exclude the press and public from the meeting during consideration of the following items on the grounds indicated.

Agenda item number

**Paragraph of Schedule 12A to the
Local Government Act 1972**

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**NORTHUMBRIA
POLICE**

NORTHUMBRIA POLICE MINUTES

Title Joint Independent Audit Committee (JIAC)	Meeting number 02/2021
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Date 19 July 2021	Location Teams Video Conference	Duration 14:00 – 16:00
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Present:

Committee Members	N Mundy K Amlani J Guy P Wood	Chair
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Officers:	R Durham D Ford P Godden M Tait	OPCC Chief of Staff and Monitoring Officer Deputy Chief Constable Head of Corporate Development Department Joint Chief Finance Officer
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Invitees:	R Bowmaker J Greener W Keenen K Laing C Waddell R Rooney	Internal Audit, Gateshead Council Senior Manager, Mazars Chief Constable (<i>present for item 1.3</i>) Head of Finance Department Partner, Mazars Governance and Planning Adviser (<i>Secretary</i>)
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OPEN SESSION**1. INTRODUCTION**

N Mundy opened the meeting, noting this would be his last as JIAC Chair. He expressed great gratitude to all members for their support during his time as a committee member, and later as JIAC chair, stating it had been a privilege to serve on the committee for a number of years.

Additionally, N Mundy acknowledged this would be R Rooney's last meeting as Secretary prior to commencing maternity leave; N Mundy thanked her for her secretariat support and wished her well.

2. DECLARATION OF INTEREST

N Mundy highlighted himself and C Waddell continue to sit on the South Tees NHS Trustee Board as Chair and Auditor respectively. J Guy advised she is a charitable trustee of Victims First Northumbria.

3. MINUTES OF THE OPEN SESSION OF THE JOINT INDEPENDENT AUDIT COMMITTEE 22 FEBRUARY 2021

Agreed as a true and accurate record.

4. MATTERS ARISING

Action list updated.

5. ANNUAL GOVERNANCE STATEMENT 2020/21

a. Senior Managers Assurance Statement

R Bowmaker advised all assessments have been returned with satisfactory evidence, with the exception of one partial assurance return in relation to performance monitoring and management and management and staffing structures. N Mundy noted there were no concerns from the committee and praised the high level of assurance provided.

Update noted.

b. Review of the Effectiveness of Internal Audit

R Bowmaker outlined the report, noting a review of the effectiveness of internal audit for 2020/21 was undertaken and agreed by the Joint Governance Group (JGG) on 5 July 2021.

N Mundy requested an update regarding specialist IT auditors; R Bowmaker noted Gateshead Council is in a much stronger position in this area and now has three IT auditors cleared to undertake policing work, with a fourth onboarding in due course. R Bowmaker confirmed it is intended the 2021/22 audit plan will run to schedule. N Mundy thanked R Bowmaker for the update, acknowledging the encouraging position.

Update noted.

c. Internal Audit Annual Report

N Mundy noted the report should be read with cognisance to the pressures the pandemic has had on meeting the audit plan.

R Bowmaker advised of the 23 planned audits, final reports have been issued for 15; work is in progress for the remaining eight audits. Of the 15 completed audits, 14 concluded systems and procedures were operating well, with one providing a satisfactory conclusion. R Bowmaker noted there have been no specialist operations during 2020/21, and controls are overall considered to be effective.

P Wood acknowledged the consequences of Covid have had an impact on what would have otherwise been a successful year regarding completion of audits; N Mundy echoed this sentiment noting good performance given the circumstances.

Update noted.

d. Annual Governance – Primary and Thematic Assurance Review 2020/21

M Tait outlined all primary and thematic assurances were reviewed by the JGG on 5 July 2021; the Committee were provided with further detail regarding primary assurances as per agenda item 5d(i)-(viii).

M Tait provided an overview of thematic assurances, noting wellbeing has been considered this year.

Update noted.

i. Governance Arrangements

P Godden provided an overview of governance arrangements within Northumbria Police and between Northumbria Police and the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner (OPCC).

N Mundy queried governance arrangements in place for external inspection reports. P Godden confirmed a strategic lead is identified for all areas for improvement (AFI) and

recommendations as a result of inspection reports with governance provided via the Strategic Monthly Board Meeting (SMBM); external inspection updates are also provided to the Executive Board and OPCC Scrutiny Meeting.

P Wood queried how the force gathers public opinion regarding governance. P Godden explained there are a number of scrutiny panels and the Strategic Independent Advisory Group (SIAG) on which there are representatives from the public. Regarding public engagement, P Godden noted several surveys are carried out across the year with the public which informs policing priorities. R Durham highlighted a number of engagement opportunities regarding service provision from the OPCC.

Update noted.

ii. An assessment of the role of the CFO in accordance with best practice

M Tait outlined the report, with N Mundy noting the effectiveness of the joint CFO role. J Guy highlighted whilst there do not appear to be any areas for concern regarding the role, the Force and OPCC should be mindful of any potential conflict.

Update noted.

iii. External Auditor Assurance

K Laing confirmed Mazars last annual audit letter for both the Chief Constable and PCC, as presented to JIAC on 16 November 2020, can be used for the purpose of monitoring governance arrangements.

N Mundy queried if there are any anticipated issues regarding completion of the 2020/21 audit letters; K Laing confirmed at present there are no timing issues anticipated.

Update noted.

iv. HMICFRS and Other External Inspections

P Godden provided an overview of how AFIs and recommendations as identified from external inspection reports are monitored. P Godden noted significant progress has been made, however highlighted the volume of new reports coming into the force for further action mean the number of ongoing AFIs and recommendations at any one time remains similar throughout the year.

Committee members acknowledged the sources of assurance provided over the last 12-month period have been much clearer and transparent; D Ford expressed thanks that the effort made in this area has been recognised.

P Wood highlighted a number of recommendations noted as out of date by HMICFRS, and the process by which these are monitored and removed from the monitoring portal; D Ford noted HMICFRS have acknowledged certain recommendations have been superseded but advised the dedicated HMICFRS Force Liaison Lead is working with Northumbria Police to prioritise accordingly.

Update noted.

v. Legal and Regulatory Assurance

R Durham outlined various methods of demonstrating legal and regulatory assurance, noting the addition of the Specified Information Order 2021; the order sets out information that PCCs are required to publish on their website to allow the public to hold them to account. R Durham advised for Northumbria PCC, this information will include the complaints process and a high-

level overview of the HMICFRS PEEL inspection findings. D Ford noted the PCC website should be used as a real opportunity for public engagement.

N Mundy applauded the opportunity for positive public interaction.

Update noted.

vi. Risk Management Arrangements

P Godden provided an overview of the arrangements in place within Northumbria Police to manage risk and confirmed all risks are reported through the governance structure, with an appropriate executive lead allocated for each.

Update noted.

vii. Performance Management and Data Quality

P Godden outlined performance and information management arrangements within the Force, noting implementation of a Business Intelligence System and a Performance Taskforce to further strengthen arrangements. P Godden noted both areas performance and information management are subject to internal audit by Gateshead Council.

N Mundy queried whether Northumbria Police follows national standards regarding cyber security. D Ford outlined a number of national arrangements Northumbria Police is linked into to ensure standards are met; this includes D Ford acting as North East Representative at the Police Information Board.

Update noted.

viii. CIPFA Financial Management Code Self-Assessment

K Laing advised Northumbria Police has completed the CIPFA Financial Management Code self-assessment requirement; the assessment is divided into seven sections, of which Northumbria Police has rated itself green against each, however there were three areas within the sections where areas for improvement were identified. K Laing noted these areas will be disclosed within an action plan within the AGS'.

C Waddell suggested revision of Section 3F – Long to Medium Term Financial Management, Financial Resilience Assessment from amber to green as the tools required to carry out the assessment are not yet available to police forces; this was corroborated by J Guy, noting the narrative around this section should reflect this.

Agreed: To amend the RAG rating against section 3F from amber to green.

6. DRAFT JIAC ANNUAL REPORT 2020/21

Agreed: The JIAC Annual Report.

7. EXTERNAL AUDITORS PROGRESS REPORT

C Waddell provided an update on audit progress, acknowledging it is disappointing to have not met the anticipated timeline for completion of audit this year; a backlog of work and resourcing difficulties following the impact of the pandemic have had a significant impact on ability to meet the audit schedule.

J Guy sought assurance from C Waddell that as much as possible has been done to deliver against schedule; C Waddell explained various avenues have been explored in an attempt to meet deadlines.

C Waddell delivered a presentation outlining the new approach to Value For Money (VFM) arrangements, noting both the timing, and specific criteria for audit has changed; a copy of the presentation will be provided to members.

Action: C Waddell to provide members with a copy of the VFM presentation.

N Mundy thanked C Waddell for delivery of the presentation, noting it may serve as a useful tool when inducting new Committee Members to the JJAC.

Update noted.

8. CC AUDIT STRATEGY MEMORANDUM

J Greener outlined the ASM, noting it is on track to meet expected timelines for completion.

J Greener highlighted there are two significant risks for the CC and that work is ongoing regarding VFM arrangements.

Update noted.

9. PCC AUDIT STRATEGY MEMORANDUM

J Greener advised the PCC ASM is similar in form to the CC ASM with the exception of different experts used in specific areas when preparing the PCCs financial statements to those used for the CCs financial statements.

Furthermore, the PCC has an additional significant risk noted relating to the valuation of property, plant, and equipment.

Update noted.

10. SUMMARY OF RECENT EXTERNAL INSPECTION, INVESTIGATION AND AUDIT REPORTS

N Mundy highlighted a number of external inspections referenced within the report generate a number of best practise examples for inspected forces; he queried whether Northumbria Police considers and implements these best practise recommendations. P Godden confirmed whilst the force looks at all best practise recommendations made, there is no formal evaluation. P Godden noted ongoing liaison takes place with HMICFRS to facilitate learning from other forces.

J Guy queried if there is a peer review system in place to assist the force in assessing itself against national recommendations. P Godden noted the College of Policing (CoP) have been used previously to assist, however Northumbria Police often makes use of other forces knowledge and experience in specific inspection areas; D Ford corroborated this, noting external expertise will be used where possible.

K Amlani noted the 38 outstanding recommendations, querying if this number includes old recommendations which have been superseded by more recent activity; P Godden advised these recommendations are those which are in the process of active management.

P Wood highlighted concerns raised by the PCC regarding the length of time recommendations and AFIs relating to the PEEL 2018/19 inspection have remained open. P Godden and R Durham both confirmed significant progress has been made to address open AFIs and recommendations. R Durham noted the PCC has a duty to highlight the timeliness of closure from a governance and accountability perspective; however she is comfortable with the work undertaken to address.

Update noted.

11. JOINT STRATEGIC RISK REGISTER

P Godden outlined the report, noting the risk register follows the structure implemented in 2020. At present, there are 14 risks at force level, and four owned by the PCC; an annual review of the register was conducted earlier in 2021.

P Godden highlighted the main changes since previous reporting are in risk 1 – Finance, and risk 12 – Workforce where the overarching risk has been split into two separate risks. In addition, risk 4 – Information and Data Management (Force) and risk 5 – Information and Data Quality (Force) have been revised slightly.

Regarding ICT risks, N Mundy queried when the Force can expect to reduce its RAG rating further. P Godden noted ICT risks have been reduced in the previous six months following an ongoing work; as such, there are no plans to revise the RAG rating at present.

N Mundy noted the improved position regarding risk management.

Update noted.

12. TREASURY MANAGEMENT ANNUAL REPORT 2020/21

K Laing presented the report noting both borrowing and investment income have reduced due to two emergency cuts in base rates. In addition, K Laing highlighted all new borrowing has been done on a short term basis.

Overall, K Laing noted a positive position against the budget.

Agreed: For the Treasury Management Annual Report 2020/21 to be presented to the PCC.

13. DATE, TIME AND VENUE OF NEXT MEETING

Chief Constable (CC) Keenen joined the meeting to thank N Mundy on behalf of the whole of Northumbria Police for his service as JIAC Committee Member and Chair. CC Keenen noted N Mundy's role within the JIAC has helped to carry the force to a better position through his ability to hold Northumbria Police to account with professionalism and artistry; N Mundy was invited to meet with CC Keenen in person once restrictions allow to further congratulate him on his achievements.

N Mundy thanked CC Keenen for his kind words, noting it had been a privilege to be a part of Northumbria Police and to work with a wide range of colleagues in his role as JIAC Committee Member and Chair. N Mundy noted the last 16 months of restrictions have afforded new opportunities to work in new ways and have highlighted how well connected different services are.

N Mundy confirmed the next meeting will take place on 27 September 2021, 2pm. The venue remains TBC.

JOINT INDEPENDENT AUDIT COMMITTEE – ACTION LOG

SOURCE Meeting / date / minute ref.	ACTION	ASSIGNED TO	UPDATE Cleared or update
01/2021 Minute 8	<u>ANNUAL AUDIT LETTERS (CC&PCC)</u> To present key changes to approach to reporting at the next JJAC.	C Waddell	Update provided at July meeting. Cleared.
01/2021 Minute 12	<u>SUMMARY OF RECENT EXTERNAL INSPECTION, INVESTIGATION AND AUDIT REPORTS</u> To provide an update on ICO audit recommendations relating to internal audit to the next JJAC.	R Bowmaker	Email containing assurances provided to JJAC Committee on 24 June 2021. Cleared.
02/2021 Minute 7	<u>EXTERNAL AUDIT PROGRESS REPORT</u> To provide members with a copy of the VFM presentation.	C Waddell	Mazars are no longer involved in the process. Item requested to be cleared at JJAC 22/11/21 by Director of Finance. Cleared.



Joint Independent Audit Committee	22 November 2021
Summary of Recent External Inspection, Investigation and Audit Reports	
Report of Paul Godden, Head of Corporate Development	
Author: Tanya Reade, Corporate Governance Manager	

I. PURPOSE

- 1.1. To provide details of recent external inspection, investigation and audit reports and an overview of the process in place to manage the Force's response to recommendations and findings.

2. BACKGROUND

- 2.1. The following inspection and investigation reports have been published by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) or other relevant inspection bodies since the last Joint Independent Audit Committee:

[Neurodiversity in the criminal justice system: A review of evidence](#)

[A joint thematic inspection of the police and Crown Prosecution Service's response to rape - Phase one: From report to police or CPS decision to take no further action](#)

[A shared confidence: A summary of how law enforcement agencies use sensitive intelligence](#)

[Spotlight report A review of Fraud: Time to Choose A revisit of the 2018 fraud inspection to assess progress of the recommendations and areas for improvement](#)

[A duty to protect: Police use of protective measures in cases involving violence against women and girls](#)

[Interim report: Inspection into how effectively the police engage with women and girls](#)

[Police response to violence against women and girls - Final inspection report](#)

- 2.2. All HMICFRS reports and other external inspection, investigation and audit reports are considered by the Executive Team. A lead is appointed to consider the findings and identify actions in response to any recommendations and areas for improvement. The Force position is reported to the Police and Crime Commissioner at the Business Meeting to inform the statutory response required under section 55 of the Police Act 1996 where required.
- 2.3. All activity is regularly reviewed by the respective owners. Delivery is overseen by the Executive Team through the Force's governance and decision-making structure and progress is reported to the Scrutiny Meeting of the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner.

- 2.4. Corporate Development Department acts as the central liaison point for all HMICFRS related matters.
- 2.5. The HMICFRS Monitoring Portal includes causes of concern and recommendations made to police forces by HMICFRS since January 2013, and more recently (since September 2019) areas for improvement. Since the last meeting, a further 23 recommendations from five reports have been added to the portal.
- 2.6. The position as of 1st November 2021 was:

	Recs	AFIs
Total	293	55
Total closed	216	7
Total open	77	48
<i>Considered complete by the Force, awaiting HMICFRS review</i>	10	2
<i>Reviewed by HMICFRS for closure, awaiting update on the portal</i>	35	44
Subject to ongoing Force activity <i>(including 11 recommendations in response to super-complaints¹)</i>	32	2

- 2.7. Since the last JIAC, HMICFRS has closed a counter terrorism recommendation on the portal as 'no further action'. The National Police Chiefs' Council lead is collating responses regarding attendance at Channel Panels and will provide a collated response to HMICFRS. Northumbria already considered this complete.
- 2.8. HMICFRS has also closed the 17 undercover policing recommendations pending the conclusion of the undercover policing inquiry. Northumbria Police already considered these complete.
- 2.9. A public facing monitoring portal was released on 22nd October 2021. This covered only those recommendations made to police forces in the 2018/19 Integrated PEEL Assessments. For each recommendation, the status displayed is either Open, Superseded or Complete. All recommendations for Northumbria are shown as complete.
- 2.10. HMICFRS independently assesses the recommendations and AFIs either through further inspection or by undertaking reality testing; this was delayed as a result of the suspension of inspection activity during COVID-19 and Northumbria's place in the forthcoming PEEL inspection schedule. Meetings with the HMICFRS Force Liaison Lead (FLL) were held 21st and 22nd September 2021 to discuss progress against outstanding recommendations and AFIs.
- 2.11. A number of recommendations and AFIs were assessed as complete by the FLL. This assessment recognises the Force has responded appropriately to them; however, in some areas acknowledges there is still ongoing work. Further inspection activity is expected in these areas.

¹ HMICFRS has incorporated the recommendations from super-complaints into the monitoring portal although, it will not be used to capture progress. It is important to note that the super complaint process is different to that of an HMICFRS inspection and is governed by different legislation. As such, any recommendations made by HMICFRS do not need to be implemented immediately or in isolation.

- 2.12. The Force will ensure ongoing monitoring of these business areas within its performance management framework.
- 2.13. There are 32 recommendations and two AFIs subject to ongoing Force activity resulting from nine thematic inspection reports and two super-complaint investigations.
- 2.14. Appendix A provides an overview of the outstanding recommendations and AFIs assigned to Northumbria Police by HMICFRS on the monitoring portal. It includes the number closed by HMICFRS alongside the number of recommendations or AFIs assessed as complete by the Force. A summary of progress, together with an expected delivery date and RAG status is also included.
- 2.15. The following is an overview of the reports published since the last meeting:

Neurodiversity in the criminal justice system: A review of evidence (15th July 2021)

- 2.16. A review was commissioned by the Lord Chancellor to review the evidence into neurodiversity in the criminal justice system. The aim of the review was to understand what is currently known and being done around neurodiversity and to make recommendations for further action from the government.
- 2.17. Neurodivergence has been used as an umbrella term to refer to the group of conditions that fall under the broader category of neurodevelopmental disorders. These incorporate learning difficulties and disabilities; other common conditions, such as attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, autism spectrum conditions, developmental language disorder, tic disorders; and cognitive impairments due to acquired brain injury.
- 2.18. Evidence was gathered through an analysis of data sources, a series of round table events with experts, a general call for evidence, by consulting with practitioners in police, probation and prisons, and by listening to those with neurodivergent conditions who have experienced the criminal justice system. Northumbria was not one of the forces inspected but responded to the call for evidence.
- 2.19. The review found evidence of good local partnerships and heard about many simple adjustments that could easily be made to support neurodivergent people in the criminal justice system (CJS). However, it determined that such provision is patchy, inconsistent and uncoordinated, and that too little is being done to understand and meet the needs of individuals.
- 2.20. The report makes six recommendations to the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice.

A joint thematic inspection of the police and Crown Prosecution Service's response to rape - Phase one: From report to police or CPS decision to take no further action (16th July 2021)

- 2.21. This is the first of two inspection reports that will consider the response, decision-making and effectiveness of the police and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) at every stage of a rape case, from first report through to finalisation of the case.

- 2.22. This report focuses on those cases where either the police or the CPS made the decision to take no further action. Eight police forces in seven CPS areas were inspected as part of the fieldwork (not including Northumbria).
- 2.23. Evidence of the experiences of victims of rape in the criminal justice system was drawn from tracing cases through police and CPS files, examining the decisions made and support offered at every stage. In addition, research was commissioned to hear about victims' experiences directly alongside feedback from the police and the CPS, Government departments and victim representative groups on what it is like to report a rape in England and Wales. Five adult rape victims from Northumbria informed the commissioned research on victim experiences.
- 2.24. Inspectorates commended the many effective and dedicated individuals and teams found in every force and CPS Area. However, they found that the criminal justice system's response to rape offences fails to put victims at the heart of building strong cases despite the national focus by the Government, policing and the CPS on improving outcomes for rape.
- 2.25. The report makes 13 recommendations, eight for the police.

A shared confidence: A summary of how law enforcement agencies use sensitive intelligence (29th July 2021)

- 2.26. HMICFRS published a summary report outlining the findings from an inspection that examined how effectively and efficiently UK law enforcement uses sensitive intelligence in the fight against serious and organised crime (SOC).
- 2.27. At the time of inspection, the Sensitive Intelligence Network (SIN) comprised 18 law enforcement agencies, including the National Crime Agency and the nine regional organised crime units.
- 2.28. An examination of the approach taken to sensitive intelligence by the organisations that make up the SIN found some excellent work led by committed people working in a complex and difficult environment; however, inconsistencies were found in approaches to governance, IT and evaluation.
- 2.29. Fourteen recommendations have been made to improve the effectiveness of sensitive intelligence in tackling SOC, none for chief constables.

Spotlight report A review of Fraud: Time to Choose A revisit of the 2018 fraud inspection to assess progress of the recommendations and areas for improvement (5th August 2021)

- 2.30. In April 2019, HMICFRS published the national thematic report 'Fraud: Time to choose – An inspection of the police response to fraud'. This resulted in 16 recommendations and five areas for improvement (AFIs) – two recommendations and five AFIs for chief constables.
- 2.31. In 2021, HMICFRS revisited the inspection to determine how the police service has responded to the recommendations and AFIs.

- 2.32. While not subject of the original inspection, Northumbria Police was one of eleven forces inspected to inform the review of progress.
- 2.33. As previously reported to JIAC, following the HMICFRS inspection of the Force in January 2021, both recommendations and four of the five AFIs were assessed as complete by the HMICFRS Force Liaison Lead.
- 2.34. Overall, HMICFRS determined that improvements had been made but that not enough had changed since their inspection with too many victims still receiving a poor service and denied justice.
- 2.35. Three further national recommendations were made, two for chief constables.

A duty to protect: Police use of protective measures in cases involving violence against women and girls (24th August 2021)

- 2.36. This is the third published report following a super-complaint. The Centre for Women's Justice made the complaint because it is concerned that the police are failing to use protective measures, namely pre-charge bail conditions, non-molestation orders, Domestic Violence Protection Notices and Domestic Violence Protection Orders and restraining orders, to protect women and girls. It is worried that highly vulnerable people are not being safeguarded.
- 2.37. Good examples were found of the police working well to put in place the best possible protection for vulnerable women and girls. However, investigators also identified a lack of understanding within police forces over how and when to use protective measures, which means support for victims is sometimes not good enough and therefore victims may be less likely to report crime in the future.
- 2.38. The reasons why police support for victims is sometimes not good enough are complex and varied: sometimes officers are not aware of the powers available to them; sometimes the processes are confusing; and sometimes officers don't take the safety of vulnerable women and girls as seriously as they should.
- 2.39. The Government's new Tackling violence against women and girls strategy commits to reducing the prevalence of violence against women and girls and improving the support and response for victims and survivors.
- 2.40. HMICFRS will change its inspection activity to enhance its scrutiny of the use of these protective measures.
- 2.41. The report makes 15 recommendations; eight are applicable to chief constables. The report also includes four actions for HMICFRS, the College of Policing and Her Majesty's Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate (HMCPIS).

Police response to violence against women and girls - Final inspection report (17th September 2021)

- 2.42. In March 2021, the Home Secretary commissioned HMICFRS to inspect the effectiveness of police engagement with women and girls. This report focuses on how effectively the police respond to VAWG and builds upon the **Interim report: Inspection into how**

effectively the police engage with women and girls (7th July 2021), which outlined initial findings and recommendations to inform work on the Government's revised tackling VAWG strategy.

- 2.43. The interim report focused on the police response to VAWG offences; violent and high-harm crimes that disproportionately affect women and girls, such as domestic abuse, sexual violence, stalking, and female genital mutilation (FGM). Three overarching recommendations were made with underpinning actions. As a result of further fieldwork, more evidence in support of these actions was found.
- 2.44. Five overarching recommendations have been made within the final report relating to increasing the prioritisation of VAWG offences in policing; the enhancement of capability and capacity to pursue and disrupt adult perpetrators; structures and funding to ensure tailored and consistent support for victims; reviewing and ensuring consistently high standards in responses to VAWG supported by national standards and data; and an immediate review of the use of outcomes 15 and 16 in VAWG offences. These are underpinned by a further twenty recommendations. Three recommendations have been allocated to forces.

3. FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS

- 3.1 There are no additional financial considerations arising from this report.

4. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

- 4.1 There are no legal considerations arising from the content of this report.

5. EQUALITY CONSIDERATIONS

- 5.1 There are no equality implications arising from the content of this report.

6. RISK MANAGEMENT

- 6.1 Activity in response to HMICFRS findings is monitored through the Northumbria Police governance structure and by the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner.
- 6.2 HMICFRS expects that progress is made in response to the recommendations and uses progress against previous recommendations to assess risk when considering future inspection activity.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

- 7.1 To note there are no matters of exception to report in response to previous inspections.

Report Title	Business Lead	Executive Lead	Recommendation/ Area for Improvement (AFI)	Number of Recommendations/ AFIs (& number closed on the HMICFRS Monitoring Portal)		Context	Anticipated completion date	Progress on delivery	RAG	Reported to Scrutiny Meeting	PCC response	Next report to Scrutiny Meeting
Fraud: Time to choose Published: 2/4/19 CC response to PCC: 16/5/19 PCC Section 55 response: August 2019 Reported to JIAC: 13/5/19	Head of Crime	T/ACC (Crime and Safeguarding)	Recommendation	2 (2)		Issue National recommendations regarding the publication of Force policy for responding to and investigating allegations of fraud and the reporting of fraud outcomes to the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau. Focus for Northumbria Police Ensuring the process for reporting of fraud outcomes is robust.	N/A	Update: November 2021 Both recommendations have been reviewed by HMICFRS, assessed as complete and have now been closed on the portal.		14/05/2020	The PCC was satisfied with action taken and supported the closure of recommendations.	16/11/21
Fraud: Time to choose Published: 2nd April 2019 CC response to PCC: 16/5/19 PCC Section 55 response: August 2019 Reported to JIAC: 13/5/19	Head of Crime	T/ACC (Crime and Safeguarding)	AFI	5(4)		Issue National AFIs regarding improving the way the force uses the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau monthly victim lists to identify and support vulnerable victims and others who require additional support; ensuring forces improve the identification and mapping of organised crime groups in which the principal criminality is fraud; increased use of ancillary orders against fraudsters; compliance with the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime when investigating fraud; and ensuring that fraudsters are included among those considered for serious organised crime 'prevent' tactics, including by local strategic partnership boards and through integrated offender management processes. Focus for Northumbria Police Continue to improve VCOP compliance	Apr-22	An action plan was created following publication of this report and numerous activities have been undertaken to improve performance. Northumbria was selected as one of eleven forces to be part of the HMICFRS revisit of the 2019 fraud inspection report in January 2021. Feedback following the inspection was very positive and as a result, four of the five AFIs were considered complete by the HMICFRS Force Liaison Lead (FLL). One of the AFIs has been closed on the portal, with the remaining three awaiting closure. The fifth AFI regarding compliance with VCOP has remained open to be assessed through the continuous monitoring regime. Update: November 2021 As previously reported four of the five AFIs are considered complete by both the Force and the FLL. One AFI has been closed on the portal and the remaining await confirmation by the HMI Chief of Staff. The remaining AFI is linked to compliance with the Victims' Code of Practice (VCOP) of fraud. VCOP is a priority for the Force and while HMICFRS is satisfied the Force is taking appropriate action to address this area for improvement, this remains open to ensure the improvements become established and embedded.		03/06/2021	The PCC was satisfied with progress.	16/11/2021
A review of 'Fraud: Time to choose' Published 5th August 2021 CC response to PCC: 23/09/2021 PCC Section 55 response: September 2021 Reported to JIAC: 27/09/2021	Head of Crime	T/ACC (Crime and Safeguarding)	Recommendations	2 (0)		Issue HMICFRS has determined that not enough had changed since their previous fraud inspection with too many victims still receiving a poor service and denied justice. Two additional recommendations were made regarding ensuring that the guidance issued by the National Police Chiefs' Council Coordinator for Economic Crime about fraud-related calls for service is being followed and ensuring the adoption of the guidance issued in September 2019 by the National Police Chiefs' Council Coordinator for Economic Crime that was aimed at improving the information given to victims when reporting fraud.	To be determined	One recommendation regarding ensuring the Force is following the guidance issued by the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) Coordinator for Economic Crime about fraud-related calls for service, and the second regarding the adoption of the guidance issued in September 2019 by the NPCC Coordinator for Economic Crime aimed at improving the information given to victims when reporting fraud. Update: November 2021 A process has been developed for communications centre staff and rolled out 8th November 2021, alongside training by fraud specialists from Cyber Crime and Communications Department to reinforce the process and check understanding amongst staff. As part of the new process contact handlers and police officers will send the victim a designated link to consistent information for fraud victims.		N/A	N/A	16/11/2021
PEEL spotlight report: The Hard Yards – Police to police collaboration Published 21st July 2020 CC response to PCC: 27/08/20 PCC Section 55 response: September 2020 Reported to JIAC: 24/08/20	Funding and Innovation Manager	DCC Ford	Recommendation	1(0)		Issue The report highlighted one national recommendation for forces suggesting that if forces had not yet implemented an effective system to track the benefits of their collaborations, they should use the methodology created by the NPCC, the College of Policing and the Home Office. Focus for Northumbria Police To improve ability to track the benefits of collaborations.	N/A	Update: November 2021 The recommendation stated that if forces did not have an effective system, they should use that produced by the NPCC, College of Policing and the Home Office. The College of Policing has confirmed it does not plan to undertake the work to create a benefits realisation methodology. The Force's strategy is to seek formal collaborative opportunities when there are clear business benefits and efficiencies to be achieved. The Force has a methodology for monitoring benefits realisation which will be applied to track collaboration benefits.		03/06/2021	No issues were raised.	16/11/2021
Safe to share? Liberty and Southall Black Sisters' super-complaint on policing and immigration status (super complaint) Published 17th December 2020 CC response to PCC: 28/01/2021 PCC Section 55 response: N/A Reported to JIAC: 22/02/2021	Head of Safeguarding	T/ACC (Crime and Safeguarding)	Recommendations	4(0)	1	Issue This super-complaint considers the treatment of victims of crime and witnesses with insecure immigration status. It focuses on how information is passed to the HO for immigration enforcement (IE). It concerns two features of policing: the passing of victim and witness data to the HO by the police for immigration enforcement purposes; and the operation of and/or perception of a culture of police prioritising immigration enforcement over safeguarding and the investigation of crime. The national recommendations request that information sharing with IE on domestic abuse victims is stopped and that forces ensure that all migrant victims and witnesses of crime are effectively supported through safe reporting pathways to the police and other statutory agencies. Focus for Northumbria To ensure that victims with insecure immigration status are confident to report crimes to the Force and that they are appropriately safeguarded.	To be determined once timescales for the Home Office review findings are known.	Update November 2021 A joint Force/OPCC response to the recommendations was submitted to the HMICFRS Super-complaints team in June 2021 in line with the recommendation to provide a response within six months of the report. The outcome of a Home Office review into information sharing between Immigration Enforcement and policing is awaited following which the Force can further respond to the recommendations where necessary.		03/06/2021	The PCC was satisfied with progress.	16/11/2021
Getting the balance right? An inspection of how effectively the police deal with protests Published 11th March 2021 CC response to PCC: 29/04/2021 PCC Section 55 response: June 2021 Reported to JIAC: 19/07/2021	Head of Operations Department	ACC (Force Coordination)	Recommendations	2 (0)	1	Issue The Home Secretary commissioned HMICFRS to conduct an inspection into how effectively the police manage protests following several protests, by groups including Extinction Rebellion, Black Lives Matter and many others. This was to assess the extent to which the police have been using their existing powers effectively, and what steps the Government could take to ensure that the police have the right powers to respond to protests. There were two national recommendations regarding access to the College of Policing Knowledge Hub's Association of Police Lawyers group and to ensure that the Force has sufficiently robust governance arrangements in place to secure consistent, effective debrief processes for protest policing. The AFIs suggested the development of a stronger rationale for determining the number of commanders, specialist officers and staff needed to police protests; improvement in the police's protest-related community impact assessments; and improvement in the quality of the protest-related intelligence provided to the National Police Coordination Centre's Strategic Intelligence and Briefing team.	Dec-21	Update: November 2021 A national position statement is being produced by NPCC leads for Public Order which will respond to the recommendations and AFIs within the report. One recommendation was reported as complete at the Scrutiny Meeting in September 2021. Two further AFIs are now considered complete by the Force. The Force has created an organisational learning plan and governance. Local reporting on progress is via the Force Coordination Centre/Operations Performance meeting. Intelligence products have been reviewed and quality assured, and protest-related community impact assessments (CIAs) are an important part of protest planning and are now specifically referenced within Gold and Silvers plans and objectives. The CIA plans are pre, during and post event and also capture organisational learning.		23/09/2021	No issues raised.	16/11/2021
Policing in the pandemic - The police response to the coronavirus pandemic during 2020 Published 20th April 2021 CC response to PCC: 03/06/2021 PCC Section 55 response: June 2021 Reported to JIAC: 19/07/2021	Multiple	DCC Ford	Recommendations	5 (0)	3	Issue The report highlighted five national recommendations regarding ensuring that officers understand and correctly implement the guidance for managing registered sex offenders during the pandemic; that they can manage their responses to changes in coronavirus-related legislation; that a policy is in place to make sure that the guidance and self-isolation directions when members of the workforce come into contact with someone with coronavirus symptoms are followed; that custody records are updated with information about how/when/if detainees are informed of the temporary changes to how they can exercise their rights to legal advice and representation; and to assess the sustainability of any temporary measures introduced during the pandemic that change the way they work. The Force is well positioned with regard to the recommendations made.	To be determined	Update: November 2021 Three of the five recommendations were reported as complete at the Scrutiny Meeting in September 2021. These relate to officers understanding of guidance regarding managing registered sex offenders and coronavirus legislation and also policy regarding test track and trace. A new ways of working project is underway to determine future working practices. Custody staff have been provided guidance to ensure that custody records are updated with information about how/when/if detainees are informed of the temporary changes to how they can exercise their rights to legal advice and representation. The Electronic Custody Recording system cannot mandate this information but quality assurance checks are being undertaken. The new custody system will improve monitoring in the future.		23/09/2021	No issues raised.	22/02/2022
Custody services in a COVID-19 environment Published 20th April 2021 CC response to PCC: 03/06/2021 PCC Section 55 response: June 2021 Reported to JIAC: 19/07/2021	Head of Custody	ACC (Force Coordination)	Recommendation	1(0)		Issue This was a supplemental report to 'Policing in the Pandemic' with a further national recommendation providing detail of the custody information that HMICFRS recommends forces should collect and use.	To be determined	Update: November 2021 Limitations with the current ICT systems do not allow the collation of some of the suggested data and some can only currently be obtained by manually checks of custody records. The new custody recording system will allow for the wider scrutiny of data and information.		23/09/2021	No issues raised.	22/02/2022

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Review of policing domestic abuse during the pandemic – 2021 Published 22nd June 2021 CC response to PCC: 29/07/2021 PCC Section 55 response: August 2021 Reported to JIAC: 19/07/2021	Head of Safeguarding	T/ACC (Crime and Safeguarding)	Recommendations	3 (0)		Issue The report highlighted three national recommendations regarding a review of discontinued cases; the safeguarding and support of victims awaiting court; breaking down barriers to reporting and ensuring that new practices adopted during the pandemic are properly monitored for quality and safety.	To be determined	Update: November 2021 Online contact methods are available to victims of domestic abuse although it is acknowledged that data analysis around online reporting requires enhancements. An options appraisal is currently being progressed to determine Northumbria's new digital platform, to ensure that it has the best reporting and monitoring mechanisms, for likely implementation in May 2022. A new digital contact handling team will also be implemented in March 2022. This will see a dedicated team servicing digital submissions. Telephone-based initial response to domestic abuse incidents and crimes is provided by the Domestic Abuse Centralised Scheduling function which operates within the parameters set out by the College of Policing in its criteria and guidance for Domestic Abuse telephone first response pilots. The function has recently been subject to review. During the COVID pandemic Northumbria's Court liaison resources were temporarily increased by 50% to facilitate both increased contact with victims and to support additional trial-readiness checks to assist with case progression. Victims First Northumbria has worked closely with Court Liaison to provide information and reassurance from the initial point of support. A Domestic Abuse Improvement Plan is in place which includes activity to improve outcomes.		N/A	N/A	16/11/2021
A joint thematic inspection of the police and Crown Prosecution Service's response to rape – Phase one: From report to police or CPS decision to take no further action Published 16th July 2021 CC response to PCC: 23/09/2021 PCC Section 55 response: Reported to JIAC: 27/09/2021	Head of Safeguarding	T/ACC (Crime and Safeguarding)	Recommendations	8 (0)		Issue The inspection found that the criminal justice system's response to rape offences fails to put victims at the heart of building strong cases despite the national focus by the Government, policing and the CPS on improving outcomes for rape. Recommendations have been made to police regarding capturing the protected characteristics of rape victims; establishing reasons why victims withdraw from cases; working better with local support services to better understand their role; improving the effectiveness of case strategies and action plans with the CPS; improving relationships with the CPS to build a cohesive and seamless approach; reviewing the current process for communicating to victims the fact that a decision to take no further action has been made; ensuring investigators understand that victims are entitled to have police decisions not to charge reviewed under the Victims' Right to Review scheme; and the publication of annual SSAIDP attendance figures, and information on their numbers of current qualified RASSO investigators.	To be determined	Update: November 2021 The Force position was presented to the PCC at Business Meeting on 23rd September 2021; many of the recommendations are in the process of being or have been addressed with a view to delivering an effective justice system for victims of rape and serious sexual assault.		N/A	N/A	07/04/2022
A duty to protect: Police use of protective measures in cases involving violence against women and girls (super complaint) Published 24th August 2021 CC response to PCC: 23/09/2021 PCC Section 55 response: N/A Reported to JIAC: 27/09/2021	To be determined	T/ACC (Crime and Safeguarding)	Recommendations	8 (0)		Issue This is a report following a super complaint where concerns were raised that the police are failing to use protective measures, namely pre-charge bail conditions, non-molestation orders, Domestic Violence Protection Notices and Domestic Violence Protection Orders and restraining orders, to protect women and girls. Chief constables have been recommended to implement processes for managing RUI in line with the letter from the NPCC Lead for Bail Management Portfolio; ensure data is gathered on the use of voluntary attendance, ensure that in all pre-charge bail cases where bail lapses, the investigator in charge of the case carries out an assessment of the need for pre bail-charge to continue; review their policy on how the force processes notifications of Non Molestation Orders; review their policy on DVPNs and DVPOs; ensure that officers are fully supported in carrying out their duties to protect all vulnerable domestic abuse victims; consider what legal support they need to use protective measures and secure this support. An update is required within six months of publication.	To be determined	Update: November 2021 The Force position was presented to the PCC on 23rd September 2021; many of the recommendations are in the process of being or have been addressed to provide victims with the appropriate use of protective measures.		N/A	N/A	07/04/2022
Interim report: Inspection into how effectively the police engage with women and girls Published 7th July 2021 CC response to PCC: 29/07/2021 PCC Section 55 response: August 2021 Reported to JIAC: 27/09/2021	Head of Safeguarding	T/ACC (Crime and Safeguarding)	Recommendations	2 (2)		Issue The report states the need for immediate and unequivocal commitment that the response to VAWG offences is a priority and that the pursuit and disruption of adult perpetrators should be a national police priority. It recommends that information on the protected characteristics of victims is accurately and consistently recorded and that police forces and partner agencies should have clear responsibilities in supporting victims through every stage of the case. The victim's voice should play a central role in shaping this, and their individual needs should be understood and addressed throughout.	N/A	Update: November 2021 Northumbria works closely with Child and Adult Safeguarding Partnerships and the Local Criminal Justice Board and the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner in policing VAWG, reinforcing current work on VAWG, embedding best practice and working with partners on prevention and early intervention. Northumbria presently records information on victim age, gender and ethnicity. It is recognised that while Northumbria can provide overall victim data in terms of volumes, data relating to all nine protected characteristics is not available. The new Force system Connect will allow for the collection of far more data than NPICCS currently does. Capturing the voice of child and adult victims is a key facet of Northumbria's multi-agency safeguarding partnerships, which are focused on impact on practice. Cases are continually reviewed to ensure the voice of the victim is heard in planned partnership activity.		N/A	N/A	16/11/2021
Police response to violence against women and girls - Final inspection report Published 17th September 2021 CC response to PCC: 16/11/2021 PCC Section 55 response: Reported to JIAC: 22/11/2021	Head of Safeguarding	T/ACC (Crime and Safeguarding)	Recommendations	3(0)		Issue The recommendations in the final report relate to increasing the prioritisation of VAWG offences in policing; the enhancement of capability and capacity to pursue and disrupt adult perpetrators; structures and funding to ensure tailored and consistent support for victims; reviewing and ensuring consistently high standards in responses to VAWG supported by national standards and data; and an immediate review of the use of outcomes 15 and 16 in VAWG offences.	To be determined	The report has been reviewed and the Force position presented to the PCC on 16th November 2021. Update: November 2021 Northumbria presently records information on victim age, gender and ethnicity. It is recognised that while Northumbria can provide overall victim data in terms of volumes, data relating to all nine protected characteristics is not available. Recent work has been conducted via the Northumbria Local Criminal Justice Board. The NPICCS Replacement Project Team confirm that in relation to the nine protected characteristics, Connect allows for the collection of far more data than NPICCS currently does. A force VAWG delivery plan is to be presented to the Executive Team by the Head of Safeguarding. The force will work with the NPCC VAWG National Delivery Lead to align its action plan to the national framework once set and shared with the force. The force routinely monitors use of outcomes 15 and 16, and will support the NPCC VAWG national delivery lead in the development and implementation of the new process.		N/A	N/A	16/11/2021
Pre-charge bail and released under investigation: striking a balance Published 08/12/2020 CC response to PCC: 28/01/21 PCC Section 55 response: March 2021 Reported to JIAC: 22/02/21	To be confirmed	T/ACC (Crime and Safeguarding)	Recommendations	2(0)	2	Issue The report highlighted two national recommendations suggesting that forces should develop processes and systems to clearly show whether suspects are on bail or RUI and that forces should record whether a suspect is on bail or RUI on the MG3 form when it is submitted to the CPS. The Force is already able to differentiate between those suspects on bail and those RUI. Whilst systems currently allow the recording of bail details for a suspect within the functionality of the MG 3, it does not ask for details of RUI; officers in charge have a responsibility to update the CPS in relation to any changes to Bail or RUI	N/A	Northumbria Police is able to differentiate between those cases on bail and those released under investigation from existing systems recognising if bail conditions are in place and the associated impact on safeguarding and controls. Update: November 2021 The notification of bail or RUI to the CPS will form part of future national guidance. The Force has introduced systems and processes to ensure information on whether a suspect has been on bail or RUI is submitted to the CPS. This recommendation is considered complete by the Force.		23/09/2021	No issues were raised.	16/11/2021
Report on Hestia's super-complaint on the police response to victims of modern slavery (super complaint) Published 26th May 2021 CC response to PCC: 07/07/2021 PCC Section 55 response: N/A Reported to JIAC: 19/07/2021	Head of Crime	T/ACC (Crime and Safeguarding)	Recommendations	3 (0)	3	Issue Three national recommendations highlighting the requirement for the support of police officers and staff (including non-specialist staff, as appropriate) through access to learning, specialist policing resources and victim support arrangements; to ensure that resources are being deployed to enable effective investigation of modern slavery offences; and to support the needs of victims of modern slavery by providing appropriate support to augment the national provision so that victims feel safe and empowered to remain involved in any investigations. The Force is well positioned with regard to the recommendations made.	To be determined	Update: November 2021 All of the force level recommendations within this report are considered complete by the Force. The Modern Slavery Human Trafficking procedure details officer and staff roles when dealing with incidents of modern slavery and human trafficking. Processes for the allocation of resources are in place to ensure the correct and appropriately skilled individuals and teams are allocated to modern slavery offences. Northumbria Police works in partnership with statutory agencies, non-statutory agencies and community groups to prevent, identify and protect those at risk of modern slavery. The Exploitation Hub performs a number of functions including: the design and implementation of bespoke victim contact plans to support victims; engagement with partners to enable a multi-agency approach to victims/families to provide support and intervention; and the provision of advice and support to the wider workforce regarding the management of victims presenting with complex needs. An update will be provided to the NPCC in line with reporting requirements.		N/A	N/A	16/11/2021

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An inspection of undercover policing in England & Wales Published: 13/10/14		T/ACC (Crime and Safeguarding)	Recommendation	17 (17)		Awaiting the outcome of a national inquiry.	N/A	Update: November 2021 HMICFRS has closed the recommendations pending the conclusion of the undercover policing inquiry; Northumbria Police already considered these complete.		N/A	N/A	16/11/21
PEEL: Police legitimacy 2017 Published: 12/12/2017 CC response to PCC: 22/1/2018 PCC Section 55 response: February 2018 Reported to JJAC: 19/2/2018	Stop and Search Lead/ Head of People Services	T/ACC (Communities)	Recommendation	1 (1)		This is a national recommendation regarding the use of stop and search. Issue Northumbria officers have been trained in unconscious bias. The findings from the Force's Legitimacy Inspection in 2017 determined that the Force was well placed, with officers receiving information about unconscious bias during stop and search training. HMICFRS also stated that the officers spoken to had a full and comprehensive understanding of how they should be treating people fairly and with respect in their interactions with the public and each other. Focus for Northumbria Police Findings in the 2018/19 PEEL inspection acknowledged that the Force had complied with most of this recommendation; however, could not evidence sufficient understanding of unconscious bias and analysis of find rates for drug supply and possession. As a result, unconscious bias has been raised as an AFI within the 2018/19 PEEL inspection below.	N/A	Update: November 2021 The remaining recommendation from Police legitimacy 2017 has been assessed as complete on the monitoring portal by the FLL; this was open in Force. The Force will ensure ongoing monitoring within its performance management framework. The FLL will attend stop and search internal and external scrutiny groups to monitor progress and this will be subject of ongoing review within forthcoming inspection activity.		29/07/2021	No issues were raised.	16/11/2021
The poor relation: the police and Crown Prosecution Service's response to crimes against older people Published: 17/7/19 CC response to PCC: 22/8/19 PCC Section 55 response: September 2020 Reported to JJAC: 18/11/19	Head of Safeguarding & Head of Prosecution & Victim Services	T/ACC (Crime and Safeguarding)	Recommendation	4 (4)		Issue National recommendations regarding adult safeguarding: victim support services; victim needs assessments; referrals; and the analysis of current and future demand. The report highlighted the need for better services for older people subject of crime. The Force already has a safeguarding policy and a robust system for reporting concerns for adults. Force policy and guidance in respect of vulnerable adults outlines the requirement for safeguarding referrals. There is no particular threshold for the submission of an Adult Concern Notification (ACN). Submission is based on the officer's assessment of risk, in particular, risk of abuse or neglect. Victim needs assessments are submitted for all crime victims.	N/A	Update: November 2021 All recommendations are considered complete by both the Force and the FLL. Three have been previously presented as complete and the fourth regarding a review of whether victim support services can be provided in a better way is now also considered complete. Alongside the transfer of Victims First Northumbria, a wider review into the overall provision of victim services has been conducted by the Force and OPCC.		23/09/2021	No issues were raised.	16/11/21
Shining a light on betrayal: Abuse of position for a sexual purpose Published: 27/9/19 CC response to PCC: 14/11/19 PCC Section 55 response: November 2019 Reported to JJAC: 18/11/19	Head of Professional Standards Department	DCC Ford	Recommendation	3 (3)		Issue National recommendations regarding: abuse of authority; counter corruption; and vetting. The Force was already well placed in this area and received a 'good' grading overall for Legitimacy within the PEEL inspection, which includes those areas under consideration within this inspection. Focus for Northumbria Police To ensure all staff vetting statuses are reviewed and are up to date.	N/A	Northumbria's legitimacy inspection suggested that the Force was already well positioned with regard to these recommendations. One of the recommendations is considered complete regarding having enough people with the right skills to look proactively for intelligence about those abusing their position for a sexual purpose. The majority of the counter corruption recommendation is complete. Whilst ATA monitoring software is available on all desktop devices, a roll out of ATA onto handheld devices is scheduled for July 2021. Whilst vetting was positively reviewed within PEEL 2018/19 with inspectors highlighting great improvements in vetting the workforce, the current uplift of police officer numbers coupled with contractor vetting linked to the large scale estate refurbishment and IT systems renewal impacted on the ability of the vetting department to complete all requirements as defined by the recommendation. Changes to structure, resourcing and working practices have been implemented to facilitate vetting requirements. The levels of outstanding renewal vettings are now considered 'business as usual' and backlogs have been cleared. The recommendation regarding vetting is considered complete by the force. A review of the use of encrypted apps on police systems was undertaken. The use of WhatsApp and also personal use of force IT and phones was considered at the November Code of Ethics Board. WhatsApp has now been removed from Northumbria Police devices and there are no other encrypted apps on Force devices. Update: November 2021 The Force has implemented appropriate monitoring software to all desktop devices. Further minor technical issues were encountered in deploying the software to handheld devices, however, this is now being rolled out. The Force is responding to the updated Vetting Authorised Professional Practice.		29/07/2021	No issues were raised.	18/01/2022
Cyber: Keep the light on - An inspection of the police response to cyber-dependent crime Published: 24/10/19 CC response to PCC: 12/12/19 PCC Section 55 response: December 2019 Reported to JJAC: 18/11/19	Head of Crime	T/ACC (Crime and Safeguarding)	AFI	1 (1)		Issue National AFI regarding an assessment of the use of cyber specials and volunteers. Use of cyber volunteers is already established.	N/A	Update May 2020 This AFI is considered complete and is awaiting review by HMICFRS. The force was inspected as part of this thematic inspection and feedback on the Force's use of cyber volunteers was positive. This AFI has been reviewed by HMICFRS as complete and is awaiting ratification by HMI Chief of Staff before closure.		14/05/2020	The PCC was satisfied with the position and supported closure of the AFI.	-

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Northumbria Police - Joint inspection of police custody Published: 23/1/20 CC response to PCC: 20/2/20 PCC Section 55 response: March 2020 Reported to JIAC: 24/2/20	Head of Custody	ACC (Force Coordination)	Recommendation	3(3)		Issue Three recommendations regarding the consistent application of legislation and guidance; the full and accurate recording of information on custody records; and ensuring dignity of detainees when using toilet facilities. Nineteen AFIs in relation to performance information and quality assurance; full and accurate recording of information on records; use of force; approach to the dignity and meeting the individual and diverse needs of detainees; notices highlighting CCTV in operation; adherence to legal requirements for fire regulations; the provision of a wider diet, nicotine replacement products and better blankets; and strengthening work with local authority partners to monitor children entering custody and the provision of appropriate adults. Focus for Northumbria Police Appropriate adult provision and secure beds for children, which is dependent upon external organisations for delivery.	N/A	Update: November 2021 All recommendations and AFIs are considered complete by the FLL. The Force has previously reported that all were considered complete, except for one AFI relating to the provision of specialist support to detainees with drug and alcohol problems while in custody. The FLL stated that the full and complete implementation of the remaining AFI at all custody sites in the force is reliant upon local agencies supporting the provision of appropriate services, however, was satisfied the Force had properly considered and was addressing this.		23/09/2021	No issues were raised.	16/11/2021
Evidence led domestic abuse (DA) prosecutions Published: 23/1/20 CC response to PCC: 24/3/20 PCC Section 55 response: March 2020 Reported to JIAC: 24/2/20	Head of Safeguarding	T/ACC (Crime and Safeguarding)	Recommendation	5(5)		Issue National recommendations regarding a review of training plans for DA: use of DA champions; clear guidance that evidence led investigations should be afforded the same quality of investigations as other investigations; decisions to take no further action in DA cases receive the same robustness of supervisory oversight as other DA cases and that police and CPS share examples of good work and successful outcomes. Domestic abuse is a force priority and is closely monitored; evidence-led investigations form part of this.	N/A	Activity is progressing well. Appropriate training will be delivered via CPD. Performance management arrangements are in place. A process has been put in place to identify and share learning with the CPS. This consists of a regular meeting between the force DA lead and the CPS DA lead who will examine recent cases, identify learning, then feed the learning back into each organisation. Training has now been delivered to all 42 identified DA Champions and the role was promoted through the Force 'In the Know' Bulletin on the 25th May 2021. Update: November 2021 One recommendation had remained incomplete: Police forces with Domestic Abuse Champions should raise awareness of the role and seek to utilise them to maximum effect. The Force now considers this action complete due to the creation of a network of 42 trained DA Champions, with accompanying Terms of Reference which provides clarity and direction. Internal communications promoted the DA Champions throughout the Force, and regular DA Champions network meetings are held with the cohort, which provides measured effectiveness through an action tracker, which is fed into Operational and Strategic DA leads and members of the DA Improvement Group to tackle barriers to performance and improvement. The HMICFRS Force Liaison Lead has now updated the HMICFRS Monitoring Portal to the effect that all of the Evidence-led recommendations are considered complete, recognising that the Force has responded appropriately to them. These great features within the		29/04/2021	The PCC was satisfied with progress.	16/11/2021
National Child Protection Inspections: 2019 thematic report Published: 27/2/20 CC response to PCC: 16/4/20 PCC Section 55 response: May 2020 Reported to JIAC: 22/6/20	Head of Safeguarding	T/ACC (Crime and Safeguarding)	Recommendation	3(3)		Issue National recommendations to reduce the unnecessary criminalisation of children; to review performance management and quality assurance approaches; and for forces not yet inspected by the NCPI or JTAI to take steps to identify and implement good practice and the learning highlighted from these programmes. The Force was already responding to the force specific recommendations and is, therefore, in a positive position with regard to the national recommendations.	N/A	Update: November 2021 All recommendations are considered complete by both the Force and the FLL.		28/07/2020	The PCC was satisfied with action taken and supported the closure of recommendations.	16/11/21
A joint thematic inspection of Integrated Offender Management (IOM) Published: 28/2/20 CC response to PCC: 16/4/20 PCC Section 55 response: May 2020 Reported to JIAC: 22/6/20	ACC Hutchison	T/ACC (Communities)	Recommendation	4(4)		Issue National recommendations regarding defining the IOM operating models; improving the quality and accuracy of recording in IOM cases; analysis of training needs; and to ensure that service users are kept informed, as much as possible, about the benefits of inclusion in IOM. Northumbria had already reviewed its IOM provision and established new policy and procedures prior to the publication of this report. The Force is well positioned with regard to IOM.	N/A	Update: November 2021 All recommendations are considered complete by the FLL. Three recommendations have been previously presented as complete. The final recommendation relates to the analysis of training needs and for all IOM staff to receive sufficient training to enable them to fulfil their duties; this was open in Force. A training needs assessment has been completed and joint training is established between Northumbria Police and Probation.		23/09/2021	No issues were raised.	16/11/2021
Counter-terrorism policing - An inspection of the police's contribution to the government's Prevent programme Published: 9/3/20 CC response to PCC: 16/4/20 PCC Section 55 response: May 2020 Reported to JIAC: 22/6/20	Head of Crime	T/ACC (Crime and Safeguarding)	Recommendation	1(1)		Issue A national recommendation to review the attendance of force representatives at Channel panels so that police are correctly represented by decision makers who can contribute to managing risk. The Force is already compliant.	N/A	Update July 2020 The review is complete - a Prevent specialist attends every Channel Panel; this was in place prior to the recommendation. An update was presented to Scrutiny Meeting in August 2020 outlining the proposed closure of this recommendation . This recommendation has been closed on the portal as 'no further action' as the NPCC lead will be collating responses and providing an update to HMICFRS.		27/08/2020	No issues were raised with the proposed closure of the recommendation.	-
Roads Policing: Not optional - An inspection of roads policing in England and Wales Published: 15/07/2020 CC response to PCC: 27/08/20 PCC Section 55 response: September 2020 Reported to JIAC: 24/08/20	Head of Operations Department	ACC (Force Coordination)	Recommendation	6(6)		Issue National recommendations stating that with immediate effect: roads policing should be included in the force's strategic threat and risk assessments; that there is enough analytical capability to identify risks and threats on the road network within the force area and that this is used to reduce risks; forces should comply with Department for Transport Circular 1/2007 in relation to the use of speed and red-light cameras; forces where Operation Snap (the provision of digital video footage by the public) has been adopted, should make sure that it has enough resources and process to support its efficient and effective use; forces should satisfy themselves that the resources allocated to policing the strategic road network within their force areas are sufficient; and chief constables should make sure that appropriate welfare support is provided to specialist investigators and family liaison officers involved in the investigation of fatal road traffic collisions. AFIs with regard to force-level support to national roads policing operations and intelligence structure; the efficient and effective exchange of all collision data with other relevant bodies; and the awareness and understanding of the changes in the Professionalising Investigation Programme within police forces. Focus for Northumbria Police To ensure threats and risks are identified and addressed on the road networks within the force area with effective partnership working.	N/A	Update: November 2021 All recommendations and AFIs are considered complete by both the Force and the FLL. Three recommendations and two AFIs have been previously reported as complete. Regarding the remaining three recommendations and one AFI: - the production of a local STRA for Roads Policing has now been completed. - analytical capability to identify risks and threats on the road network within the force area is in place alongside embedded representation within the road safety partnership with the six local authorities. - appropriate welfare support for specialist investigators and family liaison officers involved in the investigation of fatal road traffic collisions is established. - awareness and understanding of the changes in the Professionalising Investigation Programme has resulted in all teams now having supervisors who are PIP2 or working towards portfolio having passed the exam. The Force is working towards mixed economy teams of PIP1 and PIP2 and any adverts for new recruits into Motor Patrols now state they must be able to successfully complete Crime Skills.		23/09/2021	No issues were raised.	16/11/2021

Report Title	Business Lead	Executive Lead	Recommendation/ Area for Improvement (AFI)	Number of Recommendations/ AFIs (& number closed on the HMICFRS Monitoring Portal)	Number considered complete by the Force & reported to Scrutiny Meeting	Context	Anticipated completion date	Progress on delivery	RAG	Reported to Scrutiny Meeting	PCC response	Next report to Scrutiny Meeting
An inspection of the effectiveness of the Regional Organised Crime Units Published 10/02/2021 CC response to PCC: 01/04/2021 PCC Section 55 response: June 2021 Reported to JJAC: 19/07/2021	Head of Crime	T/ACC (Crime and Safeguarding)	Recommendations	2(2)		Issue Inspectors found inconsistencies across England and Wales in the resourcing, leadership and operation of ROCUs. The major finding was the lack of a clear and sustainable funding model to make sure the ROCUs are a central part of achieving the 2018 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy. The national recommendations for forces suggest that systems should be in place for senior investigating officers (SIOs) and lead responsible officers (LROs) to work effectively together and that a chief officer should be appointed with responsibility for each ROCU, as far as practicable working autonomously of force responsibilities.	N/A	Update November 2021 One recommendation has been updated to 'complete – no further action required' by HMICFRS in recognition of the regional chief constables' position regarding NERSOU management and governance. The second related to ensuring systems are in place for senior investigating officers and lead responsible officers (LROs) to work effectively together. All LROs in Northumbria are effectively connected to the ROCU (NERSOU) via the Force Tasking and Coordination Group processes and the Serious and Organised Crime Governance Group. This recommendation is considered complete by the FLL as having been properly considered and addressed by the Force.		N/A	N/A	16/11/2021
Disproportionate use of police powers - A spotlight on stop and search and the use of force Published 26/02/2021 CC response to PCC: 01/04/2021 PCC Section 55 response: June 2021 Reported to JJAC: 19/07/2021	Mixed	T/ACC (Communities)	Recommendations	6(6)		Issue HMICFRS produced a spotlight report that shows forces still do not fully understand the impact on individuals and communities of the use of police powers. Inspectors highlighted the need for the police to do more to ensure they identify disproportionality, understand the reasons for it, take action to reduce it where required, and explain those reasons and actions to the public. The focus of the report was on stop and search and use of force; however, it also highlighted that the HMICFRS PEEL programme will continue to inspect disproportionality in other specific areas of policing such as recruitment, retention and vetting Focus for Northumbria Police To ensure legitimate use of powers and an understanding of any disproportionality in order to address this where necessary.	N/A	The Force is using data analysis to understand any disproportionality and internal and external scrutiny to review this. The Force continues to use the opportunities presented by the National Uplift Programme to focus positive action activity on the most underrepresented groups within the workforce, with an aim to increase female and BAME police officers. The Vetting Unit monitors vetting applications relating to officer recruitment, at all levels, against Protected Characteristics to obtain an understanding of whether there is any disproportionate impact on particular groups. Update November 2021 The use of body worn video is now mandated for stop and search and use of force. A new external scrutiny panel for stop and search and use of force commenced on 12th August 2021. The recommendation regarding the recording of the self-defined ethnicity of stop and search subjects is considered complete. This facility already exists on Force systems.		29/07/2021	No issues were raised.	18/01/2022
PEEL Effectiveness PEEL: Police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy 2018/19 - Northumbria Police Published: 27/9/19 CC response to PCC: 14/11/19 PCC Section 55 response: November 2019 Reported to JJAC: 18/11/19	Multiple	ACC (Force Coordination)	Recommendation	2 (2)		Issue Two recommendations and six AFIs were made by HMICFRS as a result of the effectiveness strand of PEEL. The recommendations related to response to incidents. The Force needed to ensure that response was determined by the initial assessment of risk rather than the availability of response officers and that in the event that incidents to vulnerable victims were delayed, to ensure full justification for the delay with supervisory oversight. The AFIs related to: the process for commissioning and analysis of problem profiles; consistency of engagement approach; understanding and use of problem solving; evaluation and sharing of effective practice; understanding of the nature and scale of vulnerability; and review of the domestic abuse risk assessment grading policy. These were about improving current practices to extend understanding of communities, uncovering hidden demand and having effective and consistent processes to problem solve and share learning. The domestic abuse risk assessment grading process was already a recognised issue and was under review at the time of the inspection. Focus for Northumbria Police To ensure that vulnerable incidents are recognised and responded to appropriately to ensure safeguarding, evidence gathering and investigation.	N/A	Update: November 2021 All of the PEEL 2018/19 recommendations and AFIs have been assessed as complete on the monitoring portal by the FLL; two recommendations and one AFI were open in Force. The Force will ensure ongoing monitoring within its performance management framework. Progress will be reviewed by HMICFRS as part of the continuous monitoring process and will be re-visited and further assessed within the upcoming PEEL inspection.		03/06/2021	No issues were raised.	16/11/2021
PEEL Efficiency PEEL: Police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy 2018/19 - Northumbria Police Published: 27/9/19 CC response to PCC: 14/11/19 PCC Section 55 response: November 2019 Reported to JJAC: 18/11/19	Multiple	DCC Ford	AFI	9(9)		Issue There were nine AFIs regarding understanding of current and future demand including analysis of data from partners; making best use of resources to meet the needs of the public; and understanding the capacity and capability of the workforce. The Force had recently undertaken a review of resources to inform the new Force Operating Model (FOM); however, recognises the need for further work to understand demand across all services, including hidden demand. Whilst the Force recorded operational skills and qualifications obtained by officers/staff during their police career, information was not held relating to academic, professional or personal skills. This is necessary in order to better understand the capacity and capability of the workforce and identify any gaps/ opportunities to support future development. Focus for Northumbria Police To further improve understanding of demand, capacity and capability.	N/A	All of the PEEL 2018/19 recommendations and AFIs have been assessed as complete on the monitoring portal by the FLL; six AFIs were open in Force. The Force will ensure ongoing monitoring within its performance management framework. Progress will be reviewed by HMICFRS as part of the continuous monitoring process and will be re-visited and further assessed within the upcoming PEEL inspection.		23/09/2021	Nos issues were raised.	16/11/2021

Report Title	Business Lead	Executive Lead	Recommendation/ Area for Improvement (AFI)	Number of Recommendations/ AFIs (& number closed on the HMICFRS Monitoring Portal)		Context	Anticipated completion date	Progress on delivery	RAG	Reported to Scrutiny Meeting	PCC response	Next report to Scrutiny Meeting
PEEL Legitimacy PEEL: Police effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy 2018/19 - Northumbria Police Published: 27/9/19 CC response to PCC: 14/11/19 PCC Section 55 response: November 2019 Reported to JJAC: 18/11/19	Multiple	ACC (Force Coordination)	Recommendation	2(2)		Issue Two recommendations regarding understanding, analysis and scrutiny of use of force and three AFIs regarding: training and understanding of unconscious bias; proactive approach to counter corruption; and confidential reporting mechanisms. The inspection highlighted that whilst good at recording use of force, it needed to make better use of this to understand how force is being used. The Force had identified a requirement for increased scrutiny and transparency regarding use of force prior to the inspection. Focus for Northumbria Police It is important that the Force is seen to operate legitimately to maintain public confidence. The Force must demonstrate an understanding of disproportionality in the use of police powers to mitigate risk.	N/A	Update: November 2021 All of the PEEL 2018/19 recommendations and AFIs have been assessed as complete on the monitoring portal by the FLL; two recommendations and one AFI were open in Force. Progress will be reviewed by HMICFRS as part of the continuous monitoring process and will be re-visited and further assessed within the upcoming PEEL inspection.		29/07/2021	No issues were raised.	16/11/2021
Information Commissioner's Office data protection audit report – Northumbria Police Published 18/12/2020 Reported to JJAC: 22/02/2021	Head of Information Management & Data Protection	DCC Ford	Recommendations	Governance and Accountability (31) Training and Awareness (11) Information Risk Management (18)	Governance and Accountability (27) Training and Awareness (7) Information Risk Management (14)	Issue: ICO audit to independently determine the extent to which the Force, within the scope of the agreed audit, is complying with data protection legislation. Where weaknesses were identified recommendations have been made, primarily around enhancing existing processes to facilitate compliance with data protection legislation. Assurance ratings were attributed as follows: Governance and Accountability (Limited – 31 recommendations); Training and Awareness (Reasonable – 11 recommendations); and Information Risk Management (Reasonable – 18 recommendations). In addition seven AFIs were allocated. Focus for Northumbria Police To deliver against the action plan created in response to the findings to ensure compliance with data protection legislation..	Dec-21	An initial action plan in response to the findings was submitted to the ICO on the 21st January 2021 and an update provided week commencing 15th February. Action owners have been assigned and timescales for delivery agreed. An Information Management Working Group has been established to deliver the plan, which reports directly to the Operational Information Management Board on progress and also to the ICO in line with their recommendations. Update: September 2021 Overall, 80% of all actions across the three audit areas are now complete and progress has been made across all business areas. Ongoing monitoring and management by the Information Management Unit is ensuring compliance with the recommendations made by the Information Commissioners Office. The Information Management Unit will continue to prioritise recommendations based on risk to the organisation to ensure mitigation and compliance at the earliest opportunity. The ICO requested further evidence following a review carried out in September 2021; a final assessment is expected December 2021.□		23/09/2021	No issues raised.	07/04/2022

■ On track - no concerns
■ Progressing - additional action required to ensure delivery/delivery delayed
■ Risk to completion

Short Report for Information

Joint Independent Audit Committee	22 November 2021
Joint Strategic Risk Register	
Report of Ruth Durham, Chief of Staff and Monitoring Officer and Debbie Ford, Deputy Chief Constable	
Author: Tanya Reade, Corporate Governance Manager, Corporate Development	

I. PURPOSE

- 1.1 To present the Joint Strategic Risk Register (JSRR); this incorporates the strategic risk(s) faced by the Force and OPCC within twelve thematic areas.

2. BACKGROUND

- 2.1 The Office of Police and Crime Commissioner (OPCC) and Northumbria Police share a JSRR. Each strategic risk is assigned an Executive or OPCC owner(s), who has responsibility for the management of controls and the implementation of new controls where necessary.

Governance of the Joint Strategic Risk Register

- 2.2 The JSRR identifies each risk, provides context to the risk and identifies current factors affecting thematic areas and captures the consequences if it were to happen. It also provides a summary of existing controls and rates risks on the likelihood of the risk occurring and the impact it would have. All risks are regularly reviewed by the respective owners and updated, where necessary.
- 2.3 Area Commanders, Department Heads and the OPCC are responsible for the identification of emerging risks which cannot be controlled locally and have the potential to prevent the Force and PCC from achieving objectives. Recommendations and areas for improvement following external inspections are considered to ensure they are adequately reflected in current risks. Risks are escalated to the Executive Team in-line with the governance and decision-making structures and recorded on the JSRR. PCC risks are reviewed locally by the OPCC.
- 2.4 The JSRR is presented to the joint Business Meeting between the PCC and the Chief Constable on a quarterly basis. The Joint PCC/Chief Constable Governance Group and Joint Independent Audit Committee (JIAC) provide additional scrutiny and governance on a quarterly basis.
- 2.5 The JSRR captures risk(s) in twelve thematic areas: Finance; Governance; Information and Communication Technologies (ICT); Information and Data Management; Information and Data Quality; Infrastructure and Assets; Operational; Partnership and Collaboration; Public Confidence; Regulation and Standards; Strategy; and Workforce.
- 2.6 Appendix A provides an overview of the current RAG status of the strategic risks for Northumbria Police, alongside the Force Strategic Risk Register. (Thematic risk areas are recorded alphabetically and numbered for ease of reference only).

Short Report for Information

- 2.7 Appendix B provides an overview of the current RAG status of the risks for the OPCC, alongside the register.

Recent Updates**1. Finance (Force)****B - Unplanned in-year budget pressures.**

- 2.8 The risk has been updated from 'Failure to effectively manage the allocated budget' to better reflect the overall risk position.
- 2.9 Likelihood remains medium (3) and impact high (4).

Governance (OPCC)**Existing arrangements for the PCC to carry out robust scrutiny and hold the Chief Constable to account for efficient and effective delivery of the Police and Crime Plan are ineffective or inconsistent.**

- 2.10 Introduction of the new national outcome measures for policing has been removed from current factors as this is now business as usual. The measures have been introduced and the PCC publishes data on a quarterly basis in line with requirements. Work will continue over the coming months to further improve the content and level of information shared to ensure the data meets the purpose of providing the public with clear and timely information about improved outcomes.
- 2.11 Likelihood remains very low (1) and impact low (2).

3. Information and Communications Technology (ICT) (Force)**Inability of the Force to respond effectively to service demand due to loss or failure of mission and business critical technology solutions.**

- 2.12 The risk has been updated from 'Loss or failure to provide the core ICT solutions and functions that support and enable the Force service delivery' to better reflect the overall risk position.
- 2.13 The summary of controls has been updated to include:
- Implementation of the cloud based SmartContact Command and Control solutions removing the threat of loss of 999 and 101 calls due to loss of NPICCS.
 - The completion of patching of critical, high and medium high, key and operating systems.
- 2.14 The controls are significant; however, do not alter the likelihood or impact at this stage. The risk rating will be revised when NPICCS is no longer the primary system.
- 2.15 Likelihood remains medium (3) and impact high (4).

Short Report for Information**Public Confidence (OPCC)****Loss of public confidence in the PCC resulting from a lack of engagement and communication, leading to a failure to reflect public priorities in the Police and Crime Plan. Failure to hold the Chief Constable to account on behalf of the public for delivery of their priorities or other statutory obligations.**

- 2.16 Current factors influencing public confidence have changed following recent tragic events and the heightened focus on violence against women and girls (VAWG) related crimes and the policing response nationally. The OPCC is responding to and reassuring the public through targeted robust scrutiny of Northumbria Police and engagement with partners and communities. The recent Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary Fire and Rescue Service report considering police responses to VAWG crimes helps to frame scrutiny by providing a focus on re-building confidence in policing, safeguarding victims of VAWG and work to prevent further offending. The introduction of national outcome measures for policing has also been removed from current factors.
- 2.17 Likelihood remains low (2) and impact high (4).

12. Workforce (Force)

- 2.18 The risk has been updated to reflect the current challenges and position. In particular: the current recruitment environment and challenges appointing to high risk, technical posts and our ability to retain these individuals; the development of the workforce through Performance and Development Review and professional development and; the need to ensure standards are maintained through recruitment and development of the workforce.
- 2.19 Currently the Force has insufficient investigative resources to meet demand across PIP level 2 investigative roles, impacting on investigative standards and quality. There are challenges in the attraction of investigative resources through internal routes with low interest and uptake in exam registrations. Implementation of the Investigative Capability Plan aims to address this issue.
- 2.20 The overall risk level is unchanged; likelihood remains medium (3) and impact high (4).

A - Inability to attract, recruit and retain a competent workforce with the right skills, resilience and diversity to deliver effective policing service, particularly investigative (PIP level 2) resource.

- 2.21 The risk has been revised from 'Attraction, recruitment and retention of a workforce with the right skills, resilience and diversity to deliver effective policing service, and who demonstrate the Northumbria Police / policing values and standards of professional behaviour' to better reflect overall risk position.
- 2.22 Current factors have been updated to reflect the challenges faced by the force to attract investigative resources internally. A number of pre-requisite steps are required by candidates as part of the exam process which limits the number of resources available.

Short Report for Information

B - Inability to ensure the workforce has the appropriate capacity and capability in order to meet the current and future requirements of an effective policing service.

- 2.23 The risk has been revised from ‘Ensuring the workforce have the appropriate capacity and capability in order to meet the current and future requirements of an effective policing service’.
- 2.24 Governance and oversight arrangements for each risk have been reviewed and updated to reflect recent changes to the Force governance structure where appropriate. Additional Force level meeting arrangements are still to be determined for the thematic risk areas of 3 - ICT, and 6 - Infrastructure and Assets in relation to asset and fleet management.
- 2.25 There have been no significant changes to the Force Strategic Risk Register which impact on the overall risk level and the assessment of risk ratings has not changed. Five areas remain high risk: Finance; ICT; Information and Data Management; Information and Data Quality; and Workforce.
- 2.26 The OPCC has assessed one area as high risk: Finance.

3. CONSIDERATIONS

Government Security Classification	Official
Freedom of Information	Non-Exempt
Consultation	Yes
Resources	No
<i>There are no additional financial considerations arising from this report.</i>	
Code of Ethics	No
<i>There are no ethical implications arising from the content of this report.</i>	
Equality	No
<i>There are no equality implications arising from the content of this report.</i>	
Legal	No
<i>There are no legal considerations arising from the content of this report.</i>	
Risk	No
<i>There are no additional risk management implications directly arising from this report.</i>	
Communication	No
Evaluation	No

**AGENDA ITEM 6
APPENDIX A**

Very High (5)			4 Information and Data Management	
High (4)			5 Information and Data Quality	
Medium (3)		10 Regulation and Standards	1 Finance 3 ICT 12 Workforce	
Low (2)		6 Infrastructure and Assets	7 Operational 8 Partnership and Collaboration 9 Public Confidence 11 Strategy	
Very Low (1)	2 Governance			
Very Low (1)	Low (2)	Medium (3)	High (4)	Very High (5)

Overview of the RAG status of Strategic Risk – Northumbria Police

IMPACT

Assessment of Risk

Risks are rated on the basis of the likelihood of the risk materialising and the impact this would have. It is recognised rating risk is not an exact science and should be informed by evidence where possible.

Professional knowledge, judgement and active consideration are applied in assessing the likelihood and impact of a risk materialising; this is more important than the nominal rating itself.

The purpose of the rating of risk is to focus attention to ensure appropriate and proportionate mitigation plans and controls are in place.

L i k e l i h o o d	5. VERY HIGH	5	10	15	20	25
	4. HIGH	4	8	12	16	20
	3. MEDIUM	3	6	9	12	15
	2. LOW	2	4	6	8	10
	1. VERY LOW	1	2	3	4	5
		1. VERY LOW	2. LOW	3. MEDIUM	4. HIGH	5. VERY HIGH
Impact						

The overall outcome of a risk rating assessment will identify the risk as being **very low/low (Green)**, **medium (Amber)** or **high/very high (Red)**. The residual risk rating is included on the Force Strategic Risk Register as a single overall score (identified by multiplying the impact by the likelihood rating) after controls/mitigations have been put in place.

Key:

Green: Very Low/Low - Unlikely to occur or the risk is fully manageable. Likely to lead to no or only tolerable delay in the achievement of priorities.

Amber: Medium - The Force is actively managing the risk as is practicable. The risk may lead to moderate impact on the achievement of priorities.

Red: High/Very High - The Force has only limited ability to influence in the short term; however, is actively managing. The risk may lead to considerable impact on the achievement of priorities.

I	Strategic Risk – Finance	
A	Reduction in funding and/or the arising of additional funding pressures which require changes to financial planning and/or a change to the resourcing of service delivery.	
Owner(s)	Chief Constable and Director of Finance	
Governance & Oversight	Executive Board/Business Meeting	
Context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reduction in central government funding as announced in the annual Home Office (HO) Police Funding Settlement. ▪ The funding settlement currently provides certainty for only one financial year and carries continued long-term uncertainty over several funding strands, including Uplift and Pensions. ▪ The next Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), which is yet to be confirmed, is expected to include a review of the Police Funding Formula. ▪ Other public sector funding reductions may reduce services provided, leading to increased service pressure on Northumbria Police and a need to look at potential collaboration opportunities. 	
Current factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Potential uncertainty of future implications/cost pressures/timescales relating to COVID-19 including costs of COVID-19 enforcement and operational policing in 2021/22. ▪ Implications of the pension remedy, which are currently being progressed based on national guidance. 	
Potential consequence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Short notice change to national funding may require a change in short and medium term force financial planning, including a need to deliver unplanned savings thereby impacting on service delivery. 	

Summary of Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Transparent ownership of financial matters between the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) and Chief Constable. ▪ HO reimbursement of costs relating to COVID-19: Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) medical grade; non-medical grade PPE and logistics cost; a proportion of irrecoverable income loss; a one off general COVID-19 grant. ▪ Creation of a one-off 'COVID-19 Enforcement and Operational' reserve. 	
Likelihood	3	12
Impact	4	

I	Strategic Risk – Finance	
B	Unplanned in-year budget pressures.	
Owner(s)	Chief Constable and Director of Finance	
Governance & Oversight	Executive Board/Business Meeting	
Context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ An in-year event or change, outside of Northumbria Police's control, may lead to unbudgeted costs that cannot be met from within the annual budget. 	
Current factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ There is still potential uncertainty of future implications/cost pressures/timescales relating to COVID-19 	
Potential consequence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Any in-year pressures which become a forecast overspend must be addressed through consideration of in-year savings and discussion with the PCC. 	
Summary of Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Transparent ownership of financial matters between the PCC and Chief Constable. ▪ Well understood in-year financial monitoring and reporting governance. ▪ An effective Reserves Strategy to provide mitigation against known and potential future events (COVID-19 Enforcement and Operational Reserve, Emergency Services Network (ESN), Pension etc.), plus reserves providing financing to planned future investments. 	
Likelihood	3	12
Impact	4	

2	Strategic Risk – Governance	
	Failures originating from a lack of scrutiny, oversight, transparency, internal controls and adherence to legislation.	
Owner(s)	Deputy Chief Constable	
Governance & Oversight	Executive Board	
Context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Chief Constable is unable to account to the PCC for the exercise of his functions and those under his direction and control. ▪ There is a breakdown in relationship between the Force and Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner. 	
Current factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Significant Transformation 2025 Programme including delivery of new ICT platforms and Victims & Witnesses service improvement. ▪ Preparation for, and response to external inspection and investigation activity by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS). ▪ Response to the findings of the October 2020 Audit by the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). ▪ Understanding and responding to disparity. 	
Potential consequence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Inability to identify and respond to deteriorating performance resulting in policing priorities not being achieved. ▪ Inability to work effectively in partnership to provide services to victims and witnesses. ▪ Slippage/failure of projects, which hamper the achievement of objectives. ▪ A decline in quality and service delivery, leading to a reduction in satisfaction levels. ▪ Adverse external inspection reports, leading to recommendations and wider escalation. ▪ Loss of public confidence. 	
Summary of Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Regular review of the governance and decision-making structure to ensure it provides appropriate governance arrangements. ▪ Annual Governance Statement is prepared setting out the Force’s current governance arrangements. 	
Likelihood	1	2
Impact	2	

3	Strategic Risk – Information and Communications Technology (ICT)
	Inability of the Force to respond effectively to service demand due to loss or failure of mission and business critical technology solutions.
	Owner(s) Chief Information Officer
	Governance & Oversight Transformation Board
	Context <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Limitations of current ICT systems and the impact on service delivery. ▪ Loss of Critical ICT Services. ▪ Significant IT transformation programme. ▪ A malicious intent to compromise or access information or data. ▪ Failure of national projects to deliver on time and to specification.
Current factors <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ New technology/new working practices being introduced. ▪ Masons Advisory risk assessment and identification. ▪ Major IT Transformation now running (recruitment phase). ▪ Impact internally and externally of second/further COVID-19 waves. 	
Potential consequence <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ineffective IT system to support business processes. ▪ Inability to effectively communicate with partners and the public. ▪ Loss of information from systems as a result of a cyber-attack. ▪ Loss of confidence in systems and the organisation from users, the public and partner organisations. 	

Summary of Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Significant investment in place to provide core IT services. ▪ Digital policing senior leadership now fully recruited and robust governance via the Digital Policing Board. ▪ Contracted advisory service in place. ▪ Centralised hardware security monitoring now fully operable via the National Management Centre provided by the National Enabling Programme. ▪ Greater security enhancement via enhanced Firewalls and access controls. ▪ Annual and ad-hoc penetration testing regime embedded. ▪ Recruitment and retention arrangements being finalised over transition period. ▪ Recruitment to structure on target and to plan to achieve required capacity and capability. ▪ Dedicated Solution Delivery function focussed on project delivery of the transformation programme. ▪ Renegotiation of both Northgate and Sopra Steria contracts with more delivery focus via contract change notes (CCNs). ▪ Improved remote working capabilities for project delivery staff in place and effective. ▪ Implementation of the cloud based Smart Contact Command and Control solutions removing the threat of loss of 999 and 101 calls due to loss of NPICCS.
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	▪ Patching of key systems and operating systems completed across critical, high and medium high systems.	
Likelihood	3	12
Impact	4	

4	<p>Strategic Risk – Information and Data Management</p> <p>Inability to implement consistent and sustainable data management processes and standards to prevent data breaches.</p>
Owner(s)	Assistant Chief Constable (Force Coordination)
Governance & Oversight	Operational Information Management Board
Context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The replacement of Force legacy systems presenting competing data management processes. ▪ The build of smart processing activities through the alignment of business leads, data and ICT architecture ensuring interoperability. ▪ Developing workforce and the role of Information Asset Owner. ▪ New audit and organisational learning process to identify inappropriate handling and management of information. ▪ A recognition of the current position of the force data infrastructure is required to identify associated data use risks, compliance and ethical issues to prevent a breach of relevant legislation and/or non-compliance with statutory guidance.
Current factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ ICO Data Protection Audit (October 2020)
Potential consequence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Corruption or loss of Force systems. ▪ Loss of data and information assets. ▪ Failure to comply with both Force policy and procedure and MoPI statutory guidance relating to the retention and destruction of data. ▪ Force policy and procedure processing, storing and handling of data not followed. ▪ Mishandling of information through a lack of understanding of relevant legislation (DPA 2018). ▪ Failure to comply with ICO best practice, standards and relevant codes of practice. ▪ Litigation, legal action against the Force leading to enforcement action and monetary penalties. ▪ Limited ability to access information and/or respond to requests for information. ▪ Loss of confidence due to inappropriate or unlawful disclosures of personal data (internally and externally). ▪ Compromise of operational activity and/or covert tactics. ▪ Compromise of physical and technical security controls which would impact information assets and/or systems if vulnerability is exploited.
Summary of Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Information Management Unit with capability, including the roles of Data Protection & Disclosure Adviser (DPDA) and Information Security & Assurance Manager (ISAM). ▪ Oversight and management through the Governance and Decision-making structure – Operational Information Management Board. ▪ Plan for the implementation of formal Information Asset Registers in place. ▪ Existing procedures in respect of data breaches ensure obligations placed on the organisation in such instances are met.

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	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Monthly meeting with Senior Information Risk Owner to formally assess and govern risk.▪ Comprehensive response to the ICO's audit recommendations.	
Likelihood Impact	5 4	20

5	<p>Strategic Risk – Information and Data Quality</p> <p>Inability to intelligently use data through the technical and cultural implementation of control measures, storage and practice in support of existing and new operating platforms.</p>
Owner(s)	Assistant Chief Constable (Force Coordination)
Governance & Oversight	Operational Information Management Board
Context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A recognition of the force’s ability to accurately collect and present data required to support decision making in all areas of business, whilst ensuring statutory data returns to relevant bodies are concise, accurate and timely. ▪ The replacement of Force legacy systems presenting competing data collection processes. ▪ The ability to assign accountability/ownership of data assets to ensure data is collected, stored and used appropriately. ▪ The application of control measures that affect the way staff interact with data is needed to support the cultural change required to successfully deliver the new operating platforms. ▪ The implementation of data storage, audit and access capability that is complimentary across all new platforms is essential to ensure compliance, analysis and quality information readily accessible to staff to advise organisational and operational delivery.
Current factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Migration to new operating platforms, including Northgate Connect and Steria – Storm. ▪ Ability to respond to external inspection findings. ▪ ICO Data Protection Audit – October 2020. ▪ Legacy data and systems.
Potential consequence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Inaccessible/inaccurate intelligence. ▪ Up-to-date crime and intelligence data is not available to officers/staff or data is stored in various locations and formats. ▪ Inaccurate crime recording or held data leading to non-compliance with regulations, a negative impact upon investigations and loss of public confidence. ▪ Reduction in force performance and delivery. ▪ Failure to identify risk of vulnerability, officer, public safety. ▪ Inaccurate data returns to the HO and other bodies e.g. HMICFRS. ▪ Implications of inaccurate crime recording or held data. ▪ Poor data quality affecting business decisions, meaning that critical risk factors may be missed or not fully understood.

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Summary of Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Investment in information technology aligned to Masons Advisory review. ▪ Migration strategy as part of the Transformation 2025 programme IT strand to ensure data quality, accuracy and compliance with GDPR. ▪ Quality Assurance & Audits; identification of documentation and standards. ▪ Introduction of the Quality Standards Delivery Team. ▪ Self-service updates (i.e. HRMS). ▪ Use of the QlikSense Business Intelligence tool to identify compliance and data quality issues. ▪ Engagement with the HO/NPCC National Data Quality Improvement Service (NDQIS). ▪ Formal training provision for all staff and officers on new force systems. 	
Likelihood Impact	4 4	16

6	<p>Strategic Risk – Infrastructure and Assets</p> <p>Failure to effectively manage assets to ensure continued effective service delivery through provision of equipment and facilities which keep the workforce capable; able to respond to the public and maintain the physical security and safety of our estate.</p>
Owner(s)	Director of Finance
Governance & Oversight	Operational Information Management Board (Physical Security)/ People & Organisational Justice Delivery Board (Force Safety Group and subgroups).
Context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Failure to appropriately maintain assets may result in critical failure. ▪ Failure to comply with building regulations and legislation regarding the safety of our estate. ▪ Failure to ensure officers and staff have the right assets and equipment available to perform their role.
Current factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Impact of post COVID-19 on force infrastructure, estate and assets. ▪ Implementation of New Ways of Working programme. ▪ COVID-19 - Delays in new supply of vehicles/availability of fleet. ▪ Physical security.
Potential consequence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Injury to users of assets or the public. ▪ Reduced availability of assets impacts on services across some or all business areas. ▪ Litigation and civil claims. ▪ Negative impact on the workforce and on public confidence.

Summary of Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Review and re-profile of building refurbishment programme in-line with COVID Secure and New Ways of Working requirements. ▪ Established internal arrangements to minimise the impact of proposed estate and infrastructure changes/refreshes on the business. ▪ Business Continuity Plans, Estate Strategies and policies and procedures in place, including organisational learning from COVID-19. ▪ Regular inspection, testing and maintenance programmes in place in respect of water hygiene, electricity and gas safety. ▪ Fire risk assessments in place. ▪ Asbestos management plan in place. ▪ All buildings are COVID Secure including enhanced cleaning regimes and investment in health and safety products. ▪ Health and Safety management embedded at tactical and strategic level. ▪ New fleet purchasing framework agreed. Vehicle purchases will be made using this framework once award of contracts to suppliers has been concluded. ▪ Vehicle maintenance, transportation and installation partners are vetted to ensure security and continuity of service. ▪ Internal fuel stock maintained. ▪ Asset management software. ▪ Telematics installed in all cars providing management oversight with timely maintenance and usage data.
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Operational equipment requirements are managed via the Force Safety Group and reported to the People & Organisational Justice Delivery Board.	
Likelihood Impact	2 3	6

7	<p>Strategic Risk – Operational</p> <p>Inability to implement centralised force coordination ensuring sustainable capacity and capability to meet statutory requirements under the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) and responsibilities from the Strategic Policing Requirement.</p>
Owner(s)	Assistant Chief Constable (Force Coordination)
Governance & Oversight	Strategic Management Board
Context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The implementation of a new Force Operating Model, demographic and operational placement of officers and staff. ▪ The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has led to a change to resource availability and capability due to the implementation of an exigency shift pattern and training ability. ▪ Lessons learned from the multiagency response to the pandemic have highlighted the need to review the CCA and the way CAT 1 and 2 responders work together. ▪ A specific focus on JESIP principles and preparedness planning through the LRF to manage Major Incidents. ▪ The national strategic threat and risk assessment (STRA) in specialist areas of POPS, FA and MP has led to the identification of shifting threats from extremist groups and associated learning from public inquiries. ▪ The uplift of staff and coordinated work force plan has predicted a significant gap in experience and skill base, particularly in specialist areas of investigation and TL2. ▪ A recognition of the Force’s ability to effectively deal with Societal Risks; Diseases; Natural Hazards; Major Accidents; Malicious Attacks to protect the public and comply with statutory requirements in these circumstances.
Current factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Impact post COVID-19. ▪ Current review of the CCA. ▪ Proposed wider remit of Local Resilience Forums. ▪ Statutory guidance for JESIP. ▪ Force Operating Review. ▪ Interim exigency Response Policing Team (RPT) shift pattern. ▪ Work Force Plan. ▪ Significant Events.
Potential consequence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Inability to meet core policing requirements. ▪ Inability to respond effectively to Major Incidents. ▪ Reduced staffing and service provision. ▪ Inability to deliver services across some or all business areas. ▪ Inability to project accurate resourcing to meet future demand. ▪ Ability to meet mobilisation commitment. ▪ Negative impact on public confidence.

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Summary of Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Robust business continuity plans in place across all area commands and departments which have been reviewed in light of COVID-19 and EU Exit. ▪ COVID-19 Response plan and local response plan prepared for localised lockdowns. ▪ PMART Plan with partners and ability to activate in response to excess death management. ▪ Concept of Operations developed in line with the States of Policing Matrix to support resourcing decisions in order to maintain critical functionality for the force. ▪ Close working with National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC) and the Regional Information and Coordination Centre (RICC) to test and exercise mobilisation commitment and provide and request mutual aid as appropriate. ▪ Mobilisation plan includes changes to NPoCC mobilisation commitment and deployments to British Overseas Territories with COVID-19 considerations. ▪ Ability to implement agile ways of working and COVID Secure estate. ▪ Northumbria Police currently chairs the Northumbria Local Resilience Forum (LRF) and work closely with partners on preparedness for civil emergencies and the testing and exercising of the multi-agency response. ▪ LRF Strategic Coordination Group (SCG) and Tactical Coordination Group (TCG) currently activated with Vice Chair status on each group. ▪ At Chief Constable level Recovery Plan and Recovery Coordination Group (RCG) participation. ▪ Ability to revise shift pattern to facilitate mobilisation of specialist staff, particularly in respect of Tier 2 assets. ▪ Force Coordination Centre and daily pace setter meetings to align demand and resources. 	
Likelihood Impact	2 4	8

8	<p>Strategic Risk – Partnership & Collaboration</p> <p>Reduction in or withdrawal of current and/or future partnership arrangements or collaborations leading to impact on service delivery or ineffective management of these arrangements including commercial partnerships (management of commercial contracts).</p>
Owner(s)	Deputy Chief Constable
Governance & Oversight	Business Meeting
Context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lack of scoping and user requirements at the outset of partnerships/collaboration or commercial interest. ▪ Future financial constraints on public services. ▪ Lack of integrated planning with partners. ▪ Reduction in partnership services. ▪ Failure of significant collaborative agreement.
Current factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reduction in safeguarding activity and preventative work, particularly relating to domestic abuse. ▪ Limited Out of Court Disposals and Restorative Justice options for adults. ▪ Commercial contract management capability and capacity. ▪ Missed opportunities for further partnership collaboration with partners. ▪ Impact of post COVID-19 on current partnerships.
Potential consequence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Gaps in services and support to communities. ▪ Missed opportunities to prevent and reduce crime and disorder. ▪ Reduced public confidence. ▪ Reduced opportunities for more efficient and effective services. ▪ Increased costs due to poor scoping and/or contract management. ▪ Missed learning opportunities for partner agencies from serious case reviews.
Summary of Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Effective partnership governance arrangements and joint partnership plans through Community Safety Partnerships. ▪ Force wide business planning cycle and delivery of local business plans. ▪ Strategic Design Authority and Transformation Programme. ▪ Improving understanding of demand and external influences of demand enabling effective management of response. ▪ Business continuity plans between relevant partners. ▪ Access to local and/or national support programmes. ▪ Introduction of Chief Information Officer functions and change lead to oversee ICT projects and contracts. ▪ Internal review of commercial contract arrangements in Northumbria Police by Director of Finance. ▪ Adoption of recommendations made in HMICFRS Thematic report ‘The Hard Yards’.

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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Joint work between agencies e.g. Newcastle Safeguarding Children’s and Adults Boards and Safer Newcastle to produce a Serious Violence and Criminal Exploitation Strategy. ▪ Ability to introduce and maintain joint Criminal Justice Impact and Recovery working exercises when required, utilising resources across disciplines to meet demand. ▪ Increased early interventions and out of court disposals in place for young people. 	
Likelihood Impact	2 4	8

9	<p>Strategic Risk – Public Confidence</p> <p>The loss of public confidence in Northumbria Police due to the behaviour, conduct, actions or inaction of Northumbria Police as an organisation or individuals representing the Force, including reduced legitimacy due to poor engagement, abuse of powers and disproportionality in practices.</p>
Owner(s)	T/Assistant Chief Constable (Communities)
Governance & Oversight	Engaged Communities Group/Strategic Resourcing Delivery Board/ People & Organisational Justice Performance Board/Organisational Learning Board/Ethics Advisory Board
Context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Force or an associated individual acts, in an inappropriate, discriminatory way or demonstrates corrupt behaviour. ▪ Death or serious injury following police contact, or following other adverse or critical incident, as a result of police action or omission. ▪ Misuse or deliberate disclosure of sensitive data or information.
Current factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Current operating context and legitimacy in use of police powers. ▪ Disproportionality in use of powers. ▪ Embed organisational learning across the Force. ▪ Compliance with Authorised Professional Practice (APP) on Vetting.
Potential consequence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Abuse of authority for financial or sexual purpose, fraud or theft. ▪ Litigation, legal action against the Force. ▪ Reduced public confidence. ▪ Increased civil interest. ▪ Perception of disparity damaging confidence of minority groups.
Summary of Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governance arrangements. ▪ Completion of Equality Impact and Community Tension Assessments. ▪ External advisory groups. ▪ Dedicated Counter Corruption Unit with appropriate capacity and capability to deliver a full range of covert tactics. ▪ Forcewide internal communications to increase awareness of behaviour and standards, such as corruption, ethical dilemmas, understanding boundaries. ▪ Vetting procedures in-line with APP on Vetting with full compliance achieved over the coming months. ▪ Identification and review of organisational learning, with organisational learning a standing agenda item within the Governance and Decision-making structure and oversight by the force Organisational Learning Board. ▪ Utilisation of information from abuse of authority problem profile. ▪ Unconscious bias training for all staff. ▪ Focus on diversity in recruitment, attraction, selection and retention. ▪ Development of formal external public confidence meeting. ▪ Continued appraisal and development of staff via performance management frameworks.

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Likelihood	2	8
Impact	4	

10	<p>Strategic Risk – Regulation & Standards</p> <p>Northumbria Police and/or its staff fail to operate within the regulatory framework applicable to policing activity as defined by law or by Northumbria Police and in doing so create risks which may result in harm to individuals, groups or organisations.</p>
Owner(s)	Deputy Chief Constable
Governance & Oversight	Engaged Communities Group/People & Organisational Justice Performance Board/People & Organisational Justice Delivery Board/Operation Talla Gold
Context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Litigation, legal action and/or prosecution of the Force and/or individuals by former officers or staff members. ▪ Failure to comply with regulatory frameworks.
Current factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Operational risks affecting international policing arrangements following exit from the European Union. ▪ Application of legislation under Health Protection Regulations during COVID-19. ▪ Increased scrutiny and challenge on police powers and super complaints.
Potential consequence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Litigation, legal action and/or prosecution of the Force and/or individual staff. ▪ Associated costs of dealing with litigation. ▪ Negative impact on the workforce and public confidence. ▪ Failure to achieve/maintain relevant ISO/IEC accreditation in line with relevant codes of practice. ▪ Failure to comply with relevant Health and Safety regulations. ▪ Delays/access to/inability to share information and intelligence effectively across European countries.

Summary of Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ International Crime Co-ordination Centre in place to manage risks associated with the loss of EU policing tools ▪ The force has prepared contingency plans in response to the loss of EU policing tools, the impact is still unknown. ▪ Central review of all civil claims, with adverse trends and lessons learnt reported to People & Organisational Justice Delivery Board/ Engaged Communities Group. ▪ Audit arrangements and Quality Management System. ▪ ISO governance meeting. ▪ Health and Safety Management System and provision of health and safety advice. ▪ Investigations and review of health and safety incidents, with lessons learnt reported to People & Organisational Justice Delivery Board. ▪ Op Talla Gold structure in response to COVID-19 which includes assessment of enforcement and proportionality alongside external engagement to gain legitimacy. ▪ Effective governance arrangements in place at Confidence and Standards to monitor regulations and standards. ▪ Introduction of scrutiny panel for use of police powers.
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Likelihood	3	9
Impact	3	

II	<p>Strategic Risk – Strategy</p> <p>Northumbria Police fails to deliver its strategic objectives and those of the Police and Crime Plan, due to ineffective business planning, including effective management of performance, risk, demand, transformation, workforce and finance.</p>
Owner(s)	Chief Constable
Governance & Oversight	Executive Board
Context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Failure to deliver the Force Strategic Priorities. ▪ Failure to deliver against objectives set out in the Police and Crime Plan. ▪ Failure to achieve the business benefits from the Transformation Programme. ▪ Compliance and standards not meeting acceptable levels impacting on victim services. ▪ Failure to meet areas for improvement highlighted by external bodies.
Current factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ COVID-19 - Suspension of court trials resulting in significant backlog of court trials and an increased risk of victim attrition. ▪ Implementation and impact of Northgate over the next 14 months. ▪ Increased demand as the force implements the Transformation Programme.
Potential consequence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Deteriorating performance resulting in policing priorities not being achieved. ▪ A decline in quality and service delivery, leading to a reduction in satisfaction and confidence. ▪ Adverse external inspection reports, leading to recommendations and wider escalation. ▪ Reduction in services provided to victims and witnesses as a result of ineffective partnership working with other criminal justice agencies. ▪ Delays to criminal justice outcomes. ▪ Slippage/failure of projects, which hamper the achievement of objectives.
Summary of Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Business planning cycle and delivery of local business plans. ▪ Forcewide Performance Management Framework. ▪ Oversight and management of performance using the Governance and Decision-making structure. ▪ Transformation 2025 Programme. ▪ Local Criminal Justice Board (LCJB) Plan and supporting governance structures. ▪ Operation Talla Gold/Silver structure. ▪ Effective relationships and communication with partners locally enabling response to national issues (e.g. LCJB Strategic Recovery Group). ▪ Victim service review to improve service delivery to victims of crime and investigative standards.

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	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Transfer of Victim First Northumbria services to Northumbria Police.▪ Ring fenced funding to deliver Force Strategic Priorities.	
Likelihood	2	8
Impact	4	

12	Strategic Risk – Workforce
A	Inability to attract, recruit and retain a competent workforce with the right skills, resilience and diversity to deliver effective policing service, particularly investigative (PIP level 2) resource.
Owner(s)	Director of People & Development
Governance & Oversight	People & Organisational Justice Performance Board, People & Organisational Justice Delivery Board, Strategic Resourcing Delivery Board, Strategic Design Authority, Transformation Board
Context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inability to attract, recruit and retain individuals with specialist / technical skills, both externally as well as internally into specialist roles. • Inability to attract, recruit and retain a diverse workforce at sufficient pace to reflect the communities we serve, with a particular focus on gender and ethnicity. • Significant gaps across PIP level 2 investigative roles and challenges to recruit detectives internally. • Increasing variances in key technical, particularly technology, roles . • Requirement to ensure efficiency of the recruitment vetting procedures to match pace of hiring and ensure standards are met.
Current factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COVID-19 pandemic has created a much more fluid job market, with significant vacancies nationally. • Increased competition due to agility of recruitment market. • Skills shortages in specialist / technical roles due to current recruitment climate. • Challenges in meeting diversity ambitions and limited pool which is in high demand from all sectors. • Challenges in meeting changing workforce expectations through new ways of working. • Challenges in the attraction of investigative resources through internal routes with low interest and uptake in exam registrations, with the exam process limiting the number of resources available to begin this route as there are a number of pre-requisite steps candidates are required to take.
Potential consequence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Failure to deliver service in key technical and specialist areas, impacting on public trust and competence. • Impact on investigative standards and quality due to insufficient investigative resources to meet demand. • Lack of representation of the communities we serve. • Impact on wellbeing due to high vacancy and turnover rates. • Loss of key skills and knowledge through high turnover. • Increased recruitment cost and process inefficiency.
Summary of Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Investigative Plan – delivered through the Investigative Capability Working Group and governed via the Strategic Resourcing Delivery Board. • Operational Resourcing Meeting (ORM) – monitor tactical operational resourcing requirements. • Resourcing Strategy for each business area to deal with the demand, design, supply, capacity and capability segments for each functional area. • Workforce plan for police officer and police staff, which is affordable and achievable. • Career development plans. • Use of agency / organisations to provide Burst capability for technical skills. • DE&I Strategy and Plan (including Positive Action strategy/plan).

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	• Appropriate and robust vetting framework.	
Likelihood	3	12
Impact	4	

12	Strategic Risk – Workforce
B	Inability to ensure the workforce has the appropriate capacity and capability in order to meet the current and future requirements of an effective policing service.
Owner(s)	Director of People & Development
Governance & Oversight	People & Organisational Justice Performance Board, People & Organisational Justice Delivery Board, Strategic Resourcing Delivery Board, Strategic Design Authority, Transformation Board
Context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Need to have an appropriate assessment of people performance through effective P&DR assessments • Need to ensure the workforce is developed in terms of their operational, technical, leadership and business skills. • Need to ensure training profiles and minimum levels are met and maintained. • Need to ensure ongoing professional development in key technical / specialist roles, in particular for investigative resource and the development of career pathways from PIP level 1 through PIP level 2. • Ensure the workforce understands its role in ensuring appropriate standards are met in line with the Code of Ethics. • Ensure the organisation becomes a learning organisation where the learning experience is supported through effective tutoring, mentoring and coaching.
Current factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gap in knowledge of people performance • COVID-19 has impacted training delivery plans, particularly specialist training. • Current lack of investigative resources available, in particular PIP level 2, impacting the ability to meet investigative demands of the Force. • Lack of experienced investigative resource across a number of different teams, particularly in Secondary Investigation. • Need to ensure the organisation is able to respond to core operational capability risks, for example driver training. • Ability to respond to core operational capabilities i.e. driver training. • Lack of understanding of business and leadership skills profiles and requirements to bridge the gap. • Lack of clarity and action in regards to people performance and understanding of expectations. • PEQF entry routes require the organisation to effectively support the learner experience.
Potential consequence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • People performance is not maximised • Inability to deliver service and reduction of service quality will impact on trust and confidence. • Inability to meet demand, particularly from an investigative perspective. • Impact on wellbeing through increased pressure on a smaller number of resources to deliver services. • Inability to meet minimum training profile requirements.
Summary of Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Investigative Plan – delivered through the Investigative Capability Working Group and governed via the Strategic Resourcing Delivery Board. • Operational Resourcing Meeting (ORM) – monitor tactical operational resourcing requirements. • Resourcing Strategy for each business area to deal with the demand, design, supply, capacity and capability segments for each functional area.

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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clear, achievable training plan for the next 12 months in detail, with projections across the 4-year MTFS period. • Embedded training profiles and plans. • Enhanced development offer including leadership and career development. • Ongoing workforce development through P&DR and local ownership. • DE&I Strategy and Plan (including Positive Action strategy/plan) • Vetting – integrity health checks through the P&DR • Performance and promotion assessment uses the national competency and values framework which is built on the Code of Ethics. • The development of a Professional Development Unit (PDU) within Area Commands will provide support to student officers to maximise their learner experience. 	
Likelihood Impact	3 4	12

Very High (5)				
High (4)				
Medium (3)			(OPCC) Finance	
Low (2)			(OPCC) Partnership and Collaboration (OPCC) Public Confidence	
Very Low (1)	(OPCC) Governance			
Very Low (1)	Low (2)	Medium (3)	High (4)	Very High (5)

Overview of the RAG status of Strategic Risk – OPCC

IMPACT

OPCC has identified risks in four thematic risk areas:
Finance; Governance; Partnership and Collaboration; and Public Confidence.

OPCC	Strategic Risk – Finance (OPCC)	
	Government reduces funding to PCCs/Police Forces which results in a reduced service ability. The need to contain expenditure within available resources and enable Northumbria Police to police effectively.	
Owner(s)	Chief Finance Officer – OPCC	
Governance and Oversight	Joint Business Meeting/OPCC Business Meeting	
Context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The PCC has a robust, balanced MTFS that meets the medium term financial plans of the Chief Constable and facilitates delivery against the Police and Crime Plan. ▪ The balanced nature is predicated by the risk of Home Office funding being guaranteed for one year only which requires an annual review of the MTFS and potential reprioritisation of spending plans ▪ Affordability may also be affected by changes in national interest rates. ▪ Reserves policy is crucial to medium term sustainability. ▪ In-year financial monitoring must be robust. 	
Current factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ An in-year potential budget pressure as a consequence of COVID-19. 	
Potential consequence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Short notice change to national funding may require a change in short and medium term force financial planning, including a need to deliver unplanned savings thereby impacting on service delivery. ▪ Any in-year pressures which become a forecast overspend must be addressed through consideration of in-year savings and discussion with the CC. 	
Summary of Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Transparent ownership of financial matters between the PCC and Chief Constable. ▪ Comprehensive approach to business planning cycle and annual budget setting process. ▪ Well understood in-year financial monitoring and reporting governance. ▪ Medium and long term financial planning. ▪ Regular oversight of revenue & capital budget. ▪ Maintain adequate risk assessed reserves. ▪ Audit Committee /Internal Audit Treasury Management strategy in place outcomes reviewed by PCC. ▪ HMICFRS inspection regime. 	
Likelihood	3	12
Impact	4	

OPCC	<p>Strategic Risk – Governance (OPCC)</p> <p>Existing arrangements for the PCC to carry out robust scrutiny and hold the Chief Constable to account for efficient and effective delivery of the Police and Crime Plan are ineffective or inconsistent.</p>
Owner(s)	Chief of Staff and Monitoring Officer
Governance and Oversight	Joint Business Meeting/ Annual Scrutiny Programme/CC/PCC Governance Meeting/ JIAC/Police and Crime Panel/PCC/CC 1:1 Meeting
Context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ineffective governance, scrutiny, oversight of services and outcomes delivered and lack of reaction to organisational learning by NP ▪ Need to target resources and priorities towards changing performance/landscapes or community needs. ▪ Chief Constable setting high performance standards and appropriate culture and values is crucial to meaningful scrutiny. ▪ Trust in the transparency of NP. ▪ Effective governance includes effective oversight of complaints against the Chief Constable and Northumbria Police. ▪ Effective systems and controls to manage risk are needed to support the delivery of service. ▪ A strong relationship between the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner and Force which is resilient to external factors.
Current factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ National PCC Review – expansion of PCCs remit into fire and criminal justice ▪ Policing protocol review ▪ Expanded devolution deals
Potential consequence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Loss of public confidence. ▪ Reputational risk ▪ A decline in quality and service delivery, leading to a reduction in public satisfaction with policing. ▪ Deteriorating performance resulting in policing priorities not being achieved. ▪ Poor relationship with Northumbria Police. ▪ Government Intervention. ▪ Challenge by the Police and Crime Panel ▪ Adverse external inspection reports, leading to recommendations and potential escalation.
Summary of Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Police and Crime Plan (regularly reviewed) ▪ Joint Business Meeting ▪ Annual Scrutiny Programme ▪ Provision of the Complaints Statutory Review Process ▪ Public and Partnership Engagement and Feedback ▪ PCC and Chief Constable 1:1s ▪ Police and Crime Panel Scrutiny ▪ Scrutinising Force response to HMICFRS Inspection Findings

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	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Audit Committee, audit, annual governance statement▪ Contributing to Governments PCC Review	
Likelihood Impact	1 2	2

OPCC	<p>Strategic Risk – Partnership & Collaboration (OPCC)</p> <p>Reduction in or withdrawal of partnership working for the OPCC leading to a failure to identify, develop and retain collaborative arrangements that support communities with sustainable multi agency responses.</p>
Owner(s)	Chief of Staff and Monitoring Officer
Governance and Oversight	Joint Business Meeting/VRU Strategic Board/Local Criminal Justice Board
Context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Uncertainty of long-term sustained resourcing to deliver current public health approach collaboration - Violence Reduction Unit and other joint projects including Victims Service Provision. ▪ Challenging budget and service pressures within organisations both in public and voluntary sector can lead to silo working. ▪ Potential for national issues and crisis to affect collaborative working. ▪ Requirement to retain engagement of the public as a partner. ▪ Ensuring external factors do not alter relationships preventing joint working. ▪ Clear outcomes not being identified and reported can risk sustainability and ongoing partner engagement.
Current factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ PCC Review Government ambition to strengthen and expand the role of PCCs and maximise potential for wider efficiencies. ▪ Impact of the current pandemic on the Local Criminal Justice System
Potential consequence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reduced public confidence. ▪ Reduced opportunities for more efficient and effective services. ▪ Missed opportunities to prevent and reduce crime and disorder and maintain an efficient and effective Criminal Justice System ▪ Increased costs due to poor partnership and commissioned service management.
Summary of Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Effective partnership/commissioning governance arrangements that identify and report outcomes and progress ▪ Comprehensive public engagement and communication strategies to inform multi agency responses. ▪ Scrutiny of effectiveness of Force collaborative activity. ▪ Focus on accessing funds for collaborative working and lobbying government for sustained funding streams. ▪ VRU Strategic Board and Response Strategy ▪ PCC Charing Local Criminal Justice Board, LCJB Business Plan and Covid Recovery Group. ▪ Collaboration and engagement with other PCCs, nationally and regionally. ▪ Comprehensive engagement with and monitoring of commissioned services.

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	▪ Regular 'sector' engagement meetings with potential and current partners.	
Likelihood	2	8
Impact	4	

OPCC	<p>Strategic Risk – Public Confidence (OPCC)</p> <p>Loss of public confidence in the PCC resulting from a lack of engagement and communication, leading to a failure to reflect public priorities in the Police and Crime Plan. Failure to hold the Chief Constable to account on behalf of the public for delivery of their priorities or other statutory obligations.</p>
Owner(s)	Chief of Staff and Monitoring Officer and Director of Planning and Delivery
Governance and Oversight	Joint Business Meeting/Annual Scrutiny Programme/
Context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A robust communications plan is needed to demonstrate effective and visible accountability of the chief constable to the PCC. ▪ Delivery of the PCCs manifesto commitments on which they were elected with the continual need to understand and react to changing communities or priorities and reflect this in the Police and Crime Plan. ▪ Engagement with communities to identify and respond to trends identified through the complaints process and external communication to reflect organisational learning. ▪ The OPCC business must ensure compliance with legal, information management legislation and transparency guidance.
Current factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Role of social media in shaping public perceptions ▪ Changes to law to allow the public to report crimes via social media ▪ Responding to and reassuring communities following recent tragic events, through robust scrutiny and engagement with partners and communities.
Potential consequence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reputational damage ▪ Police and Crime plan and actual delivery not aligned to public concerns and priorities ▪ Loss of trust/confidence in the PCC as a result of crime perceptions ▪ Poor service delivery damages public confidence ▪ Relationship with force and partners ▪ Government penalties Poor assessment results

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Summary of Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Police and Crime Plan (annually updated to reflect local priorities) ▪ Annual Scrutiny Programme ▪ Police and Crime Panel Scrutiny ▪ Reporting back to the public crime data and on their concerns and progress towards the Police and Crime plan ▪ External evaluations including impact of the VRU ▪ Rolling programme of engagement across demographics and issue based topics, including regular connection with the PCC Advisory Groups ▪ Annual Report ▪ OPCC Delivery Plan ▪ Governance Framework ▪ Annual Assurance Statement/Audit Committee ▪ Internal Audit ▪ OPCC Website ▪ Data Protection Officer ▪ Complaints Review process ▪ Service level agreement with Northumbria Police 	
Likelihood Impact	2 4	8

JOINT INDEPENDENT AUDIT COMMITTEE	22 NOVEMBER 2021
TREASURY MANAGEMENT MID-YEAR REPORT 2021/22	
REPORT OF THE JOINT CHIEF FINANCE OFFICER	

1. PURPOSE OF THE REPORT

- 1.1 The CIPFA (Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy) Code of Practice for Treasury Management recommends that those charged with governance and scrutiny receive regular updates on Treasury Management activities. This report presents the mid-year performance, up to and including 30 September 2021, for scrutiny.

2. RECOMMENDATION

- 2.1 The Committee is asked to review the Treasury Management Mid-Year Report and approve for presentation to the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC).

3. BACKGROUND

- 3.1 The mid-year performance of the Treasury Management service is reported in-line with CIPFA's Code of Practice for Treasury Management and the Treasury Policy Statement and Strategy.

4. SUMMARY

- 4.1 The Treasury Management mid-year report is attached at Appendix A. The key highlights are as follows:
- Bank Rate has remained at a historical low of 0.100% impacting both investment interest and borrowing charges.
 - Borrowing interest is forecast at £2.840m for the year which is £0.100m under budget. The reduced forecast for interest on short-term market loans reflects both the continued low Bank Rate, and a lower borrowing requirement for the year due to increased reserve balances for 2021/22 and reduced spending against the capital programme.
 - Investment interest is forecast at £0.050m, an increase of £0.010m against the budget set for the year. The increased reserve balances for 2021/22 has also allowed the placing of funds on longer terms basis which has helped to achieve some higher rates.
 - There were no breaches of prudential indicators.
 - There was one breach of counterparty limits.

5. CONSIDERATIONS

Freedom of Information	<i>Non-exempt</i>
Consultation	Yes
Link Group (Treasury Management Advisers)	
Resource	No
There are no additional financial considerations arising from this report.	
Equality	No
There are no equality implications arising from the content of this report.	
Legal	No
There are no legal considerations arising from the content of this report.	
Risk	No
There are no additional risk management implications directly arising from this report.	
Communication	Yes
To be reported to the PCC in-line with The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy's (CIPFA) Code of Practice on Treasury Management (the Code).	
Evaluation	No

Treasury Management Performance to 31 September 2021

1 Purpose of the Report

1.1 The purpose of this report is to summarise Treasury Management performance for the six months to 30 September 2021.

2 Background

2.1 The mid-year performance of the Treasury Management service is reported in-line with CIPFA's Code of Practice for Treasury Management and the Treasury Policy Statement and Strategy 2021/22 to 2024/25.

2.2 The PCC operates a balanced budget, which broadly means cash raised during the year will meet its cash expenditure. Part of the Treasury Management operations ensure this cash flow is adequately planned, with surplus monies being invested in low risk counterparties, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering optimising investment return.

2.3 The second main function of the Treasury Management service is the funding of the PCC's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing requirements of the PCC, essentially the longer term cash flow planning to ensure the PCC can meet its capital spending operations.

2.4 Accordingly, Treasury Management is defined as:

“The management of the PCC’s borrowing, investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks.”

3 Borrowing

3.1 The total borrowing as at 30 September 2021 was £86.969m, which was within the operational borrowing limit of £155.000m. This borrowing is made up of £81.969m Public Works Loans Board (PWLB) long-term loans and a £5.000m long-term market loan. Loan details are shown in Appendix I.

3.2 During the first two quarters of the financial year the Commissioner entered into £16.000m short-term borrowing, which was fully repaid when the Pension top-up grant of £61.699m was received from the Home Office in July. Temporary borrowing of £6.500m carried over from 2020/21 has also been fully repaid.

3.3 There are no further plans for any new PWLB borrowing this financial year.

3.4 As at 30 September 2021 the Treasury Management budget for interest on borrowing is forecast to underspend by £0.100m.

Borrowing Interest 2020/21	Budget £000	Forecast £000	Variance £000
PWLB	2,634	2,634	-
Market Loans (Long-term)	176	176	-
Market Loans (Short-term)	130	30	(100)
Total	2,940	2,840	(100)

- 3.5 The cost forecast for interest on borrowing has been reduced by £0.100m reflecting the lower short term borrowing requirement now forecast, due to the increased levels of cash from reduced spending against the capital programme and increased levels of reserves. The forecast includes a contingency of £0.012m to cover any additional cash flow requirements arising between now and the year-end and to mitigate any temporary rise in Local Authority lending rates that might be experienced if there were to be a shortage of cash in the market towards the year-end.

4 Investment Performance

- 4.1 The latest projection of investment income for 2021/22 is £0.050m. This represents increased income of £0.010m when compared to the budget of £0.040m. This increase is based upon the rates achieved at the time of the receipt of the Home Office Pension Top Up grant on 6 July 2021. The reduced spending against the capital programme and increased reserve balances for 2021/22 has also allowed the placing of funds on longer terms basis which has helped to achieve higher rates.
- 4.2 The budget for investment interest was based mainly on expected returns from short-term Money Market Fund (MMF) investments, with rates aligned closely with the Link Group forecast for Bank Rate over the 2021/22 financial year. The average budgeted rate for the year was 0.100%, with the Bank Rate forecasted to remain steady at 0.100% all year.
- 4.3 The average rate of return is monitored for each investment type that the Commissioner enters into and these are used to calculate an average rate of return for the year to date. Investment returns continued to be low following the two cuts to Bank Rate in March 2020. The average rate of return achieved as at 30 September 2021 is 0.1058% which is 0.0058% higher than the budgeted rate.
- 4.4 Given that average MMF returns have averaged around 0.0125%, the achievement of an average rate of return of 0.1058% is worth noting. This has been achieved through proactively managing the cashflow to agree forward deals with a number of Local Authorities for the placement of funds for 6 to 9 months achieving rates of 0.1000% to 0.1500%. Analysis of cash flow forecasts early in the year (March 2021) identified that funds could be placed for this duration once the Home Office Pension top-up grant was received in July 2021, without an increase in the need to borrow. This provided an opportunity to agree 'forward' deals with Local Authorities.
- 4.5 As a means of benchmarking, the average rate of return for the month and year to date is compared to the equivalent 7 day London Interbank Bid Rate (LIBID), which is the rate that banks are willing to borrow money from each other. The monthly return for the PCC in September 2021 is 0.0099% and this exceeds the LIBID 7 day rate equivalent of (-) 0.0047%. The Commissioner's average rate of return of 0.4569% is in excess of the equivalent LIBID 7 day rate of (-) 0.0069%.
- 4.6 Link Group produces a quarterly Investment Benchmarking report that assesses both the rate of return and the risk of the counterparty to calculate a weighted average rate of return, which is used for comparison across other similar Authorities. In the most recent report that covers the position as at 30 September 2021, the Commissioner achieved a weighted average rate of return of 0.1200% on

investments. This is within the risk adjusted expectations as defined in the benchmarking report of between 0.0800% and 0.1600%.

- 4.7 It continues to be a very difficult investment market in terms of earning the level of interest rates commonly seen in previous decades as rates are very low and in-line with the Bank Rate. However, Link Group forecast for Bank Rate now includes five increases within the forecast horizon ending on 31st March 2025:

December 2021	0.10% to 0.25%
Quarter 2 of 2022	0.25% to 0.50%
Quarter 1 of 2023	0.50% to 0.75%
Quarter 1 of 2024	0.75% to 1.00%
Quarter 1 of 2025	1.00% to 1.25%

- 4.8 Details of Link Group latest interest rate forecast can be seen in Appendix 2 and an economic update in Appendix 4.

5 Summary of Mid-year Performance

- 5.1 The projected net impact of investment and borrowing activity to the Commissioner in 2021/22 is an under spend of £0.110m against the budget.

Borrowing Interest 2020/21	Budget £000	Forecast £000	Variance £000
Borrowing Interest	3,940	2,840	(100)
Investment Interest	(40)	(50)	(10)
Total	2,900	2,790	(110)

- 5.2 The underspend in borrowing costs of £0.100m reflects The reduced forecast for interest on short-term market loans reflects the continued low Bank Rate, and a lower borrowing requirement for the year due to increased reserve balances for 2021/22 and reduced spending against the capital programme. Actual temporary borrowing costs in 2021/22 are minimal however, the forecast includes a contingency to cover any additional cash flow requirements arising between now and the year-end and to mitigate any temporary rise in Local Authority lending rates that might be experienced if there were to be a shortage of cash in the market towards the year-end.
- 5.3 Investment interest is forecast at £0.050m, an increase of £0.010m against the budget set for the year. The increase in reserve balances for 2021/22 has also allowed the placing of funds on longer terms basis which has helped to achieve higher rates.
- 5.4 Prudential indicators are set annually to ensure that borrowing is prudent, sustainable and affordable. Performance is monitored against these indicators throughout the year and reported in the quarterly capital monitoring reports. The review of performance against prudential indicators at 30 September 2021 confirms that all indicators were operating within agreed limits with no prudential indicator breaches throughout in the year to date. For completeness a copy of the prudential indicators is attached as Appendix 3.

5.5 In the period to the 30 September 2021 there has been one counterparty limit breach. On 06 August 2021 there was a counterparty breach with Svenska Handelsbanken bank. On that day an additional £14,158,000 was invested that took the balance on the account to £19,158,000. The Treasury Strategy allows investments in Svenska, a high rated bank, to be up to a maximum of £20,000,000 or 20% of the total investment funds available that day, whichever is the lower. Whilst the absolute limit of £20,000,000 was not exceeded, due to an error in the method of calculation for total funds available on the day, the 20% the lower limit was overstated. The total invested should have been capped at £17,779,000 instead of £19,158,000. Therefore an additional £1,379,000 was placed in that account.

On 09 August 2021 (the next working day) the error became apparent within the limit check spreadsheet. Action was taken to reduce the value held with Svenska to a level within counter party limits.

For this short-term breach there was considered no risk to the Commissioner's funds as Svenska is a high-rated bank with an absolute limit of £20,000,000 which is greater than the amount invested. The breach was reported to Kevin Laing, Head of Finance on 09 August 2021 and reported at the monthly Treasury Management meeting on 16 August 2021. An explanation was also included in the August Treasury Management report to the Chief Finance Officer.

Further instructions and checks have been added to the daily investment proposal templates to ensure that the limits are always calculated correctly and consistently.

Total Borrowing as at 30 September 2021

PWLB Loans

PWLB Ref.	Principal £	Start Date	Maturity Date	Rate %	Years to Maturity
479387	3,663,710.14	21/05/1997	21/05/2057	7.125	35.66
479687	3,663,710.14	17/07/1997	05/07/2057	7.000	35.79
479976	454,300.06	06/10/1997	05/09/2057	6.625	35.96
479977	696,104.92	06/10/1997	05/09/2057	6.625	35.96
480186	659,467.82	22/10/1997	05/09/2057	6.500	35.96
480880	1,831,855.07	23/04/1998	23/04/2058	5.625	36.59
496086	5,000,000.00	13/10/2009	05/09/2024	3.910	2.93
497288	5,000,000.00	25/05/2010	23/04/2060	4.290	38.59
499079	5,000,000.00	31/10/2011	31/10/2022	3.730	1.08
502361	5,000,000.00	02/05/2013	02/05/2023	2.520	1.59
503622	5,000,000.00	09/01/2015	09/01/2050	3.160	28.30
503623	5,000,000.00	09/01/2015	09/01/2030	2.790	8.28
505904	5,000,000.00	22/03/2017	22/03/2067	2.460	45.50
505920	5,000,000.00	27/03/2017	27/03/2066	2.370	44.52
506307	5,000,000.00	31/08/2017	31/08/2065	2.300	43.95
507097	5,000,000.00	22/03/2018	22/09/2064	2.330	43.01
507986	2,000,000.00	02/11/2018	02/05/2028	2.180	6.59
507987	2,000,000.00	02/11/2018	02/11/2068	2.550	47.12
508203	3,500,000.00	12/12/2018	12/06/2028	1.980	6.70
508204	3,500,000.00	12/12/2018	12/06/2063	2.430	41.73
508961	5,000,000.00	26/03/2019	26/03/2029	1.860	7.49
117885	5,000,000.00	01/10/2019	01/10/2027	1.170	6.01
Total	81,969,148.15				

Market Loans


Lender	Principal £	Start Date	Maturity Date	Rate %	Years to Maturity
Barclays	5,000,000.00	01/06/2010	01/06/2040	3.520	18.68
Total	5,000,000.00				

Total Borrowing

Lender	Principal £
PWLB	81,969,148.15
Market Loans	5,000,000.00
Total	86,969,148.15

Maturity Structure of Borrowing

The following chart shows how the Police and Crime Commissioner is managing exposure to interest rate risk by spreading the maturity of borrowing over future years.



Link Group Interest Rate Forecast

The Council’s treasury advisor, Link Group, provided the following forecasts on 8 November 2021 (PWLB rates are certainty rates, gilt yields plus 80bps):

Link Group Interest Rate View 8.11.21														
	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24	Jun-24	Sep-24	Dec-24	Mar-25
BANK RATE	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.25
3 month ave earnings	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.60	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
6 month ave earnings	0.40	0.50	0.60	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10
12 month ave earnings	0.50	0.60	0.70	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.10	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20
5 yr PWLB	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00
10 yr PWLB	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.40
25 yr PWLB	2.10	2.20	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.60	2.70	2.70
50 yr PWLB	1.90	2.00	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50

The coronavirus outbreak has caused huge economic damage to the UK and to economies around the world. After the Bank of England took emergency action in March 2020 to cut Bank Rate to 0.10%, it left Bank Rate unchanged at its subsequent meetings.

- The forecast for Bank Rate now includes five increases, one in December 2021 to 0.25%, then quarter 2 of 2022 to 0.50%, quarter 1 of 2023 to 0.75%, quarter 1 of 2024 to 1.00% and, finally, one in quarter 1 of 2025 to 1.25%.
- Medium and long-dated gilt yields and, therefore, PWLB rates fell sharply after the Budget on 27 October, when the Debt Management Office announced the cancellation of nearly all gilt sales until the end of the financial year. Accordingly, Link Group have revised their forecasts in line with this movement but forecasts after that period have moved upwards only by 10 bps or not at all.
- LIBOR and LIBID rates will cease from the end of 2021 and will be replaced by other measures. In the meantime, the forecasts are based on expected average earnings by local authorities for 3 to 12 months.

The balance of risks to the UK economy: -

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is now to the downside, including residual risks from Covid and its variants - both domestically and their potential effects worldwide.

Forecasts for Bank Rate

We are not expecting Bank Rate to go up fast after the initial rate rise; our view is that the supply potential of the economy has not taken a major hit during the pandemic: it should, therefore, be able to cope well with meeting demand after supply shortages subside over the next year, without causing inflation to remain elevated in the medium-term, or to inhibit inflation from falling back towards the MPC’s 2.00% target after the spike up to 5.00%. We are therefore forecasting five increases in Bank Rate over the forecast period to March 2025, ending at 1.25%. However, we are far from confident that these forecasts will not need changing within a relatively short timeframe for the following reasons: -

- There are increasing grounds for viewing the economic recovery as running out of steam during the summer and now into the autumn. This could lead into stagflation which would create a dilemma for the MPC as to whether to focus on combating inflation or supporting economic growth through keeping interest rates low.
- Will some current key supply shortages spill over into causing economic activity in some sectors to take a significant hit? Rising gas and electricity prices in October and next April and increases in other prices caused by supply shortages and increases in taxation next April, are already going to deflate consumer spending power without the MPC having to take any action on Bank Rate to cool inflation.
- On the other hand, consumers are sitting on over £160bn of excess savings left over from the pandemic so when will they spend this sum, in part or in total?
- It is estimated that there were around 1 million people who came off furlough at the end of September; how many of those would not have had jobs on 1 October and would therefore be available to fill labour shortages which are creating a major headache in many sectors of the economy? So, supply shortages which have been driving up both wages and costs, could reduce significantly within the next six months or so and alleviate one of the MPC's key current concerns.
- We also recognise there could be further nasty surprises on the Covid front, on top of the flu season this winter, and even the possibility of another lockdown, which could all depress economic activity.
- If the UK invokes article 16 of the Brexit deal over the dislocation in trading arrangements with Northern Ireland, this has the potential to end up in a no deal Brexit.

In summary, with the high level of uncertainty prevailing on several different fronts, we expect to have to revise our forecasts again - in line with what the new news is.

It should also be borne in mind that Bank Rate being cut to 0.10% was an emergency measure to deal with the Covid crisis hitting the UK in March 2020. At any time, the MPC could decide to simply take away that final emergency cut from 0.25% to 0.10% on no other grounds than it no longer being warranted, and as a step forward in the return to normalisation. In addition, any Bank Rate under 1% is both highly unusual and highly supportive of economic growth.

Forecasts for PWLB rates and gilt and treasury yields

As the interest forecast table for PWLB certainty rates above shows, there is likely to be a steady rise over the forecast period, with some degree of uplift due to rising treasury yields in the US.

There is likely to be **exceptional volatility and unpredictability in respect of gilt yields and PWLB rates** due to the following factors: -

- How strongly will changes in gilt yields be correlated to changes in US treasury yields?
- Will the Fed take action to counter increasing treasury yields if they rise beyond a yet unspecified level?

- Would the MPC act to counter increasing gilt yields if they rise beyond a yet unspecified level?
- How strong will inflationary pressures turn out to be in both the US and the UK and so impact treasury and gilt yields?
- How will central banks implement their new average or sustainable level inflation monetary policies?
- How well will central banks manage the withdrawal of QE purchases of their national bonds i.e., without causing a panic reaction in financial markets as happened in the “taper tantrums” in the US in 2013?
- Will exceptional volatility be focused on the short or long-end of the yield curve, or both?

The forecasts are also predicated on an assumption that there is no break-up of the Eurozone or EU within our forecasting period, despite the major challenges that are looming up, and that there are no major ructions in international relations, especially between the US and China / North Korea and Iran, which have a major impact on international trade and world GDP growth.

The balance of risks to the UK:

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is now to the downside, including residual risks from Covid and its variants - both domestically and their potential effects worldwide.

Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates include: -

- Labour and supply shortages prove more enduring and disruptive and depress economic activity.
- Mutations of the virus render current vaccines ineffective, and tweaked vaccines to combat these mutations are delayed, resulting in further national lockdowns or severe regional restrictions.
- Bank of England acts too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.
- The Government acts too quickly to cut expenditure to balance the national budget.
- UK / EU trade arrangements – if there was a major impact on trade flows and financial services due to complications or lack of co-operation in sorting out significant remaining issues.
- A resurgence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. The ECB has taken monetary policy action to support the bonds of EU states, with the positive impact most likely for “weaker” countries. In addition, the EU agreed a €750bn fiscal support package which has still to be disbursed. These actions will help shield weaker economic regions in the near-term. However, in the case of Italy in the longer term, the cost of the virus crisis has added to its already huge debt mountain and its slow economic growth will leave it vulnerable to markets returning to taking the view that its level of debt is unsupportable. There remains a sharp divide between northern EU countries favouring low debt to GDP and annual balanced budgets and southern

countries who want to see jointly issued Eurobonds to finance economic recovery. This divide could undermine the unity of the EU in time to come.

- Weak capitalisation of some European banks, which could be undermined further depending on the extent of credit losses resulting from the pandemic.
- German general election in September 2021. Germany faces months of uncertainty while a new coalition government is cobbled together after the indecisive result of the election. Once that coalition is formed, Angela Merkel's tenure as Chancellor will end and will leave a hole in overall EU leadership.
- Other minority EU governments. Austria, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Ireland and Belgium also have vulnerable minority governments dependent on coalitions which could prove fragile and, therein, impact market confidence/economic prospects and lead to increasing safe-haven flows.
- Geopolitical risks, for example in China, Iran or North Korea, but also in Europe and Middle Eastern countries, which could lead to increasing safe-haven flows.

Upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates: -

- The Bank of England is too slow in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflationary pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a later rapid series of increases in Bank Rate faster than we currently expect.
- Longer term US treasury yields rise strongly and pull gilt yields up higher than forecast.

The balance of risks to medium to long term PWLB rates: -

- There is a balance of upside risks to forecasts for medium to long term PWLB rates.

Prudential Indicators

Authorised Limit for External Debt			
	2021/22 Reported Indicator £000	2021/22 Position at 30 Sep £000	2021/22 Max YTD £000
Borrowing	175,000	86,969	102,969
Other Long Term Liabilities	0	0	0
Total	175,000	86,969	102,969
No breach of the Authorised Limit			

Operational Boundary for External Debt			
	2021/22 Reported Indicator £000	2021/22 Position at 30 Sep £000	2021/22 Max YTD £000
Borrowing	155,000	86,969	102,969
Other Long Term Liabilities	0	0	0
Total	155,000	86,969	102,969
No breach of the Operational Boundary			

Upper / Lower Limits for Maturity Structure of Fixed Rate Borrowing				
Maturity	2021/22 Reported Indicator		2021/22 Position at 30 Sep 2021	
	Upper Limit	Lower Limit	Actual Percentage	Maximum YTD
< 1 year	60%	0%	0.00%	14.71%
1 - 2 years	40%	0%	17.25%	17.25%
2 - 5 years	40%	0%	0.00%	10.70%
5 - 10 years	40%	0%	23.57%	23.57%
> 10 years	80%	0%	59.18%	59.18%
All borrowing is within the limits set for the year				

Upper Limit on principal amounts invested beyond 365 days			
	2021/22 Reported Indicator £000	2021/22 Position at 30 Sep £000	2021/22 Maximum YTD £000
Investments	15,000	0	0

Gross Debt and CFR		
	2021/22 £000 Reported Indicator	2021/22 £000 Forecast Position
Forecast Borrowing as at 31 March	86,969	86,969
Capital Financing Requirement at 31 March	122,178	122,687
Amount of borrowing (over) / under CFR	35,209	35,718

The year-end borrowing position is forecast at £86.969m which is lower than the CFR by £35.718m. CFR (as at 31 March 2022) is forecast at £122,178m, which is broadly in-line with the estimate at the start of the year.

The £35.718m under borrowing reflects the availability of reserves and the positive impact on the working capital position as at the year-end. This position satisfies the Code of Practice requirements.

ECONOMIC UPDATE

- The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) voted unanimously on the 24 September 2021 to leave Bank Rate unchanged at 0.10% and made no changes to its programme of quantitative easing purchases due to finish by the end of this year at a total of £895bn; two MPC members voted to stop the last £35bn of purchases as they were concerned that this would add to inflationary pressures.
- There was a major shift in the tone of the MPC's minutes at this meeting from the previous meeting in August which had majored on indicating that some tightening in monetary policy was now on the horizon, but also not wanting to stifle economic recovery by too early an increase in Bank Rate. In his press conference after the August MPC meeting, Governor Andrew Bailey said, "the challenge of avoiding a steep rise in unemployment has been replaced by that of ensuring a flow of labour into jobs" and that "the Committee will be monitoring closely the incoming evidence regarding developments in the labour market, and particularly unemployment, wider measures of slack, and underlying wage pressures." In other words, it was flagging up a potential danger that labour shortages could push up wage growth by more than it expects and that, as a result, CPI inflation would stay above the 2% target for longer. It also discounted sharp increases in monthly inflation figures in the pipeline in late 2021 which were largely propelled by events a year ago e.g., the cut in VAT in August 2020 for the hospitality industry, and by temporary shortages which would eventually work their way out of the system: in other words, **the MPC had been prepared to look through a temporary spike in inflation.**
- So, in August the country was just put on alert. However, this time the MPC's words indicated there had been a marked increase in concern that more recent increases in prices, particularly the increases in gas and electricity prices in October and due again next April, are, indeed, likely to lead to **faster and higher inflation expectations and underlying wage growth, which would in turn increase the risk that price pressures would prove more persistent next year than previously expected. Indeed, to emphasise its concern about inflationary pressures, the MPC pointedly chose to reaffirm its commitment to the 2% inflation target in its statement;** this suggested that it was now willing to look through the flagging economic recovery during the summer to prioritise bringing inflation down next year. This is a reversal of its priorities in August and a long way from words at earlier MPC meetings which indicated a willingness to look through inflation overshooting the target for limited periods to ensure that inflation was 'sustainably over 2%'. Indeed, whereas in August the MPC's focus was on getting through a winter of temporarily high energy prices and supply shortages, believing that inflation would return to just under the 2% target after reaching a high around 4% in late 2021, now its primary concern is that underlying price pressures in the economy are likely to get embedded over the next year and elevate future inflation to stay significantly above its 2% target and for longer.
- **The MPC's forward guidance on its intended monetary policy** on raising Bank Rate versus selling (quantitative easing) holdings of bonds is as follows: -
 1. Placing the focus on raising Bank Rate as "the active instrument in most circumstances".
 2. Raising Bank Rate to 0.50% before starting on reducing its holdings.
 3. Once Bank Rate is at 0.50% it would stop reinvesting maturing gilts.
 4. Once Bank Rate had risen to at least 1%, it would start selling its holdings.

- **COVID-19 vaccines.** These have been the game changer which have enormously boosted confidence that **life in the UK could largely return to normal during the summer** after a third wave of the virus threatened to overwhelm hospitals in the spring. With the household saving rate having been exceptionally high since the first lockdown in March 2020, there is plenty of pent-up demand and purchasing power stored up for services in hard hit sectors like restaurants, travel and hotels. The big question is whether mutations of the virus could develop which render current vaccines ineffective, as opposed to how quickly vaccines can be modified to deal with them and enhanced testing programmes be implemented to contain their spread.

NORTHUMBRIA POLICE

JOINT INDEPENDENT AUDIT COMMITTEE

22 NOVEMBER 2021

EMERGENT INTERNAL AUDIT PLAN 2022/23–2024/25

REPORT OF INTERNAL AUDIT MANAGER

1 Purpose of the Report

- 1.1 The purpose of this report is to present to Committee the emergent Internal Audit Plan 2022/23-2024/25 to allow sufficient time for consultation prior to the presentation of the proposed plan to Committee in February 2022.

2 Background

- 2.1 Public Sector Internal Audit Standards (PSIAS) outline that the Internal Audit Manager must establish a risk-based plan, consistent with the organisation's goals, taking into account the organisation's risk management framework, input from senior management and the Committee. The plan should remain flexible in both content and timing to respond to changes in the organisation's business, risks, operations, programs, systems and controls.
- 2.2 The risk-based plan must take into account the requirement to produce an annual audit opinion on the assurance framework. It must be linked to a strategic statement of how the internal audit service will be delivered and developed in accordance with the Internal Audit Charter and how it links to the organisation's objectives and priorities outlined in the Police and Crime Plan.

3 Approach

- 3.1 The current three-year Internal Audit Plan was agreed by Committee on 22 February 2021. This forms the basis of the annual review with the Internal Audit Plan being rolled forward for an additional year and will be assessed against the following factors by the Internal Audit Manager:

- Objectives of the Police and Crime Plan
- The risks documented in the strategic risk register
- Findings and outcomes from audits carried out during 2021/22
- The outcomes of external inspections and other combined assurance e.g. External Audit or HMICFRS
- Any relevant changes in legislation or regulatory requirements
- Time elapsed since previous audits

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- The ongoing impact of the current pandemic, recognising areas of both increasing and reducing risk
- 3.2 To support the annual review the Internal Audit Manager also consults with Chief Officers and the Committee to ensure all significant changes or risks to the organisation have been identified and included within the scope of the Audit Plan. This consultation also includes identifying suitable audit approaches to gain appropriate assurance while remote working.
- 3.3 As with previous years, to strengthen the annual review of the Internal Audit Plan, the emergent plan is shared with the Committee prior to discussions taking place with senior managers.
- 3.4 The emergent Internal Audit Plan 2022/23-2024/25 is attached at Appendix A for review and comment.

4 Equal Opportunities implications

- 4.1 It is considered that there are no equal opportunities implications arising from the report.

5 Human Rights implications

- 5.1 It is considered that there are no human rights implications arising from the report.

6 Risk Management implications

- 6.1 There are no additional risk management implications arising directly from this report. The emergent audit plan supports the adequate and appropriate use of resources.

7 Financial implications

- 7.1 There are no financial implications directly arising from this report

8 Recommendations

- 8.1 The Committee is asked to review and comment on the emergent Internal Audit Plan 2022/23-2024/25.

Internal Audit Plan 2022/23 – 2024/25

Core Plan						
Risk	Frequency	Audit Area	2021/22	Emergent 2022/23	2023/24	2024/25
		Police & Crime Commissioner				
High	Annual	Treasury Management	80	80	80	80
High	Annual	Grant Distribution	50	50	50	50
		Chief Constable				
		ICT Audits				
High	Annual	ICT Security - Application & Data; Cyber; Infrastructure	60	60	60	60
High	Annual	Patch Management	40	40	40	40
Medium	Biennial	ICT Strategic Implementation & Reporting		60		60
Medium	Biennial	Asset & Device Management		60		60
Medium	Biennial	Licence & Certificate Management		60		60
Medium	Biennial	Configuration Management	60		60	
Medium	Biennial	Resilience & Disaster Recovery	60		60	
Medium	Biennial	ICT Governance and Policy & Procedures	60		60	
		Departmental Audits				
Annual	Annual	Police Charities Fund	40	40	40	40
		Theme Based Audits				
High	Annual	Property	120	120	120	120
High	Annual	Programme/Project Management	40	40	40	40
		Combined Areas				
		Financial Systems				
High	Annual	Creditors & Procurement	140	140	140	140
High	Annual	Payroll & Pensions	100	100	100	100
High	Annual	Main Accounting System	50	50	50	50
High	Annual	Budgetary Control	50	50	50	50
High	Annual	Employee Claims	60	60	60	60
		Other Combined Areas				
High	Annual	Governance	50	50	50	50
High	Annual	Information Governance & Data Security	80	80	80	80
High	Annual	Annual Governance Statement - Review of Managers' Assurance	100	100	100	100
		Other				
		Follow Up & Contingency	70	70	70	70
		General Advice, Consultancy & Systems Review	150	150	150	150
		Joint Independent Audit Committee - Preparation & Support	120	120	120	120
		Hours	1,580	1,580	1,580	1,580
Supporting Contingent Audits						
		Chief Constable				
		Departmental Audits				
Medium	Biennial	Asset Management	100		100	
Medium	Biennial	Fleet Management		70		70
Medium	Biennial	People Services & Development	100		100	
Medium	Biennial	Legal & Insurance Arrangements		90		90
Medium	Biennial	Operational Support & Firearms Licencing		80		80
		Combined Areas				
		Financial Systems				
Medium	Biennial	Debtors		70		70
		Other Combined Areas				
Medium	Biennial	Cash Advances & Income Arrangements		60		60
Medium	Biennial	Risk Management & Business Continuity Arrangements	90		90	
Medium	Biennial	Health & Safety		60		60
Medium	Biennial	Performance Management & Data Quality		60		60
Medium	Biennial	VAT	50		50	
Medium	Biennial	Complaints	100		100	
Medium	Biennial	Counter Fraud & Corruption Arrangements	60		60	
Medium	Biennial	Equality & Diversity		50		50
Medium	Biennial	Key Partnerships - NERSOU		50		50
		Hours	500	590	500	590
		Total Hours	2,080	2,170	2,080	2,170