



STAFFORDSHIRE  
**POLICE**

# Operation Eustace

---

Independent investigation on behalf of Northumbria Police and the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner for Northumbria following allegations of an alleged incident involving senior officers in 2007 and subsequent testimony provided to the Employment Tribunal of a former employee and Northumbria Police.

Author:	Deputy Chief Constable Nicholas Baker
Date:	26 <sup>th</sup> October 2021
Version:	2.1

# Contents

Forward .....	2
Introduction.....	3-4
Terms of Reference .....	5
Subjects of the investigation.....	6
The Complaints and Allegations .....	7-8
Previous investigations.....	9-10
Employment Tribunal – a former employee .....	11-17
The scope of this report.....	18-20
Overview of Northumbria Police in 2007.....	21-22
Summary of the evidence.....	23-68
Analysis of the evidence.....	69-99
Conclusion.....	100-103
Recommendations.....	104
Appendices.....	105-106
Glossary .....	107-108

## Foreword

---

Staffordshire Police has produced this report following recommendations by the Independent Police Complaints Commission<sup>1</sup> that an external police force should be engaged to conduct an independent investigation into the circumstances outlined in this report.

In considering the terms of reference<sup>2</sup> agreed by Staffordshire Police, Northumbria Police and the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner for Northumbria (OPCC), the investigation conducted by Staffordshire Police seeks to address both the allegations arising out of and complaints raised following the Employment Tribunal brought by a former employee against Northumbria Police. However, in order to do this thoroughly, it has been necessary, to conduct an investigation into the original alleged incident.

The report could not have been completed without the assistance of current and former officers and staff from Northumbria Police working independently with the investigation team and with other partner agencies in the North East. Staffordshire Police are grateful for the unfettered and free access to systems, data and other records provided by Northumbria Police during this investigation.

In conducting this enquiry, Staffordshire Police recognises the extraordinary length of time that has passed from when the rumours first came to light, the fact that since then, they have been widely reported and indeed still continue to attract local and national media attention. We also recognise the impact of the allegations on the individuals who are subjects of the investigation and the reputation of Northumbria Police itself. Indeed, Wikipedia<sup>3</sup> directly references this incident on the history section of its online page for Northumbria Police.

During this investigation we have spoken to a number of current and former officers and staff from Northumbria Police. Almost everyone we have spoken to has been engaging and has tried to assist the investigation to the best of their ability. A small number, in particular current officers and staff, have understandably expressed reservations about the impact of this investigation on them. True to this, in writing this report we will anonymise the details of all of those who have been spoken to who are not already directly named either within the body of the allegations or as part of any other formal process.

Prior to any publication, we have shared the findings of the report with the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner, Northumbria Police and our recommendation is that it should be shared with those who are subjects of the investigation or have recorded complaints.

Inevitably, during an investigation of this nature, material has been reviewed which is considered confidential for a number of reasons. In the main this is where there is legal privilege or where there is reference to sensitive policing techniques and tactics.

**Deputy Chief Constable Nicholas Baker**  
Staffordshire Police

---

<sup>1</sup> On 8 January 2018, the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) became the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC).

<sup>2</sup> The terms of reference are listed on page 5 of this report

<sup>3</sup> The link for the Wikipedia page for Northumbria Police can be found here: [www.wikipedia.co.uk/NorthumbriaPolice](http://www.wikipedia.co.uk/NorthumbriaPolice)

## Introduction

---

In 2016, during the course of the widely publicised Employment Tribunal involving Northumbria Police and a former employee, they raised a number of allegations relating to the behaviour of those chief officers they had worked with during the time of their employment. In particular, these included reference to an alleged incident between the then Chief Constable, Michael (Mike) Craik<sup>4</sup> and a former Chief Superintendent, James (Jim) Peacock<sup>5</sup>.

From 2007 onwards, rumours have circulated within Northumbria Police regarding an incident which was reported to have involved Mr Peacock allegedly assaulting Mr Craik.

Although holding a central theme there are variations to the rumour.

It was rumoured that Mr Peacock had visited the home address of Mr Craik. It was rumoured that that Mr Peacock had assaulted Mr Craik because he had been having an affair with Mrs Peacock<sup>6</sup>, who was herself an assistant chief constable.

It was also rumoured that at the time of the assault, a police issue panic-alarm, allegedly installed within Mr Craik's home address, was activated. It was alleged that a police incident log was created as a result of the alarm activation and officers were dispatched to his address. Part of the rumour was that this incident log was subsequently deleted, in order to cover-up what had taken place.

Mr Craik has always denied there being any truth in these rumours and, at the time they were circulating, sought legal advice. This was in part due to significant media interest in the rumours, albeit nothing was published at that time.

In 2012 the alleged incident was again raised by the Metropolitan Police as part of Operation Elveden<sup>7</sup>. Enquiries were conducted by #PO 278, who was tasked to establish if any officers had leaked information to the press.

In 2013 an employee was dismissed from Northumbria Police following a misconduct hearing. Some of the allegations they were investigated for concerned alleged breaches of confidentiality concerning legal conversations they had with Mr Craik about these rumours and potentially the advice provided to him when the rumours were at their height in 2007.

Following the Employment Tribunal, some of those affected by the allegations also made complaints and alleged criminal conduct by participants to the Employment Tribunal. A review of the circumstances was undertaken by the Northumbria Police Appropriate Authority<sup>8</sup> and the Office of Police and Crime Commissioner for Northumbria (OPCC)<sup>9</sup>.

At that time it was decided by the Appropriate Authority to refer allegations involving former Chief Superintendent Peacock to the IPCC and similarly the OPCC decided to refer the matter in respect of allegations made against former Chief Constable Craik.

---

<sup>4</sup> Mr Craik retired as the chief constable of Northumbria Police in 2010

<sup>5</sup> Mr Peacock retired as a chief superintendent of Northumbria Police in June 2007.

<sup>6</sup> Mrs Peacock retired as an assistant chief constable of Northumbria Police on 30 June 2007.

<sup>7</sup> Operation Elveden was an investigation concerning allegations of inappropriate payments to police officers and other public officials by the press.

<sup>8</sup> The Appropriate Authority is a senior officer nominated to deal with public complaints and breaches of the Standards of Professional Behaviour for police officers and staff up to and including the rank of chief superintendent.

<sup>9</sup> The OPCC have a statutory duty to investigate complaints and allegations concerning executive ranking officers

The IPCC directed that the allegations relating to both former officers should be investigated locally. The caveat added to this, regarding Mr Craik, is reference to an external force being involved in the investigation.

Given the circumstances of this case, a formal request was made for all of the allegations and complaints to be investigated by an external force. In March 2017, Staffordshire Police agreed to undertake an independent investigation and agreed a terms of reference for the investigation.

Over the years that have passed since the rumour first came to light, a number of officers and staff will have been promoted and indeed will have retired. For the purposes of this report we will refer to officers and staff, at given times, in the rank they held at that time.

## Terms of Reference

---

1. Investigate the circumstances surrounding allegations that an incident was reported to Northumbria Police during 2007 involving former Chief Constable Mike Craik and former Chief Superintendent James Peacock – such incident occurring at former Chief Constable Craik's home address. This investigation is to include enquiries into the allegation that public funds may have been used to 'cover up' what had taken place between the above parties and thereby establish the following:
  - Whether any criminal offences, including assault, have been committed, during the alleged incident outlined above, by former Chief Superintendent James Peacock against former Chief Constable Craik.
  - Whether any records in relation to the alleged incident and altercation, between former Chief Constable Craik and former Chief Superintendent James Peacock, were destroyed or deleted and if so, establish the circumstances of such destruction or deletion.
  - Whether Northumbria Police funds, which are believed to have been used to secure external legal advice regarding the media interest around the above circumstances, have actually been used and if so whether such use was appropriate.
2. Investigate and establish the veracity of the witness evidence provided, to the Employment Tribunal of a former employee in 2016.
3. Identify whether the following committed any criminal offence(s) arising from the manner in which they have provided evidence to the Employment Tribunal involving a former employee:

Paul Gilroy
4. Identify whether any subject of the investigation, in the investigator's opinion, has a case to answer for misconduct or gross misconduct, or no case to answer and refer such back to the relevant Appropriate Authority for Northumbria Police.

## Subjects of this Investigation

---

Name	Position
Michael Craik	Former Chief Constable
James Peacock	Former Chief Superintendent
Paul Gilroy	Former Inspector

## The allegations and complaints

<b>Allegation 1</b>	
Standard (s) of Professional Behaviour:	Discreditable conduct: <i>Police officers behave in a manner which does not discredit the police service or undermine public confidence, whether on or off duty.</i>
Subject:	Former Chief Superintendent James Peacock
Allegation:	It is alleged that former Chief Superintendent James Peacock assaulted former Chief Constable Michael Craik.
<b>Allegation 2</b>	
Standard (s) of Professional Behaviour:	Honesty and Integrity: <i>Police officers never use their position to gain an unauthorised advantage (financial or otherwise) that could give rise to the impression that the police officer is abusing his or her position.</i>
Subject:	Former Chief Constable Michael Craik
Allegation:	It is alleged that the assault on former Chief Constable Michael Craik was, on his instruction, not investigated. It is further alleged that all related incident logs were removed from the force system and that efforts were made to prevent any individual speaking to the media regarding the assault/affair.
<b>Allegation 3</b>	
Standard (s) of Professional Behaviour:	Honesty and Integrity: <i>Police officers never use their position to gain an unauthorised advantage (financial or otherwise) that could give rise to the impression that the police officer is abusing his or her position.</i>
Subject:	Former Chief Constable Michael Craik
Allegation:	It is alleged that former Chief Constable Michael Craik inappropriately used force resources to prevent the incident from being made public.
<b>Allegation 4</b>	
Standard of Professional Behaviour:	Honesty and Integrity: <i>Police officers never use their position to gain an unauthorised advantage (financial or otherwise) that could give rise to the impression that the police officer is abusing his or her position.</i>
Subject:	Former Chief Constable Michael Craik

Allegation:	During the Employment Tribunal, a former employee made very public allegations that they believed that Michael Craik had lied about the rumours involving himself and the Peacocks. They clearly stated that in order to 'cover-up' what had taken place he used public funds to pay for advice from an independent barrister regarding the matter. It is believed that such legal advice was obtained and if it were proven that the alleged events had taken place in the manner described, it is alleged that former Chief Constable Michael Craik's actions would amount to gross misconduct and potentially criminal behaviour.
<b>Allegation 5</b>	
<b>Complaint</b>	
Criminal allegation:	Attempting and or conspiring to Pervert the Course of Justice
Standard of Professional Behaviour:	
Subject:	Former Inspector Paul Gilroy and others
Allegation:	It is alleged that former Inspector Paul Gilroy, together with other serving and former police officers and/or staff did attempt and/or conspire to pervert the course of justice, by submitting a statement to the proceedings of the Employment Tribunal, knowing or believing that statement to be false and untrue and/or providing testimony at the Employment Tribunal.
<b>Allegation 6</b>	
<b>Complaint</b>	
Criminal allegation:	Perjury
Standard of Professional Behaviour:	
Subject:	Former Inspector Paul Gilroy
Allegation:	That former Inspector Paul Gilroy submitted to a Judicial hearing an instrument, namely a Northumbria Police pocket note book that appears to have been altered or amended and which he was in any event not entitled to possess.

## Previous investigations

---

### 1. Northumbria Police Professional Standards Department (PSD) records

Prior to this referral, no complaints or allegations had been recorded on the Northumbria Police PSD Centurion<sup>10</sup> system.

Northumbria Police Counter Corruption Unit (CCU) records show that on 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2007, a record was created on the iBase<sup>11</sup> system (CCU MIU/7/07) which reads:

*'Malicious information regarding the Chief Constable of Northumbria Police has been passed to various individuals within the media. Journalists have been asking if there was an incident involving the Chief Constable and Chief Superintendent Peacock'*

This entry primarily concerned elements of the rumour which had been circulated on 'The Policeman's Blog' (an online forum used by police officers country wide at that time) and subsequent research of contact with the force and journalists.

This record was finalised on 17<sup>th</sup> October 2007 to the effect that there was no incident recorded to audit and consequently no lines of enquiry to undertake.

It is clear from the brief record created that the information was suspected to be false.

### 2. Contact from the Metropolitan Police – Operation ELVEDEN

In 2012 a high-profile Metropolitan Police investigation commenced into allegations of criminality arising from the activities of journalists within the United Kingdom. As part of this wider investigation the Metropolitan Police Service commenced Operation Elveden to investigate allegations that police officers and other public officials were receiving corrupt payments from journalists, in return for information.

On Monday 10<sup>th</sup> December 2012, the Operation Elveden incident room contacted Northumbria Police. The Operation Elveden team were in receipt of information about an allegation that former Chief Constable Craik had been involved in an altercation, at his home address, with a former Chief Superintendent Jim Peacock. It suggested that this had resulted from an allegation that Mr Craik was having an extra marital affair with his wife, former Assistant Chief Constable Carolyn Peacock.

This information had been disclosed to the News of the World and the Operation Elveden team made a formal request to Northumbria Police for the following information:

- Did the incident actually happen?
- If yes, did you investigate any leaks around the story?
- Also, if yes, could you provide the names, addresses, dates of birth, telephone numbers and any adverse intelligence re the officers attending?

---

<sup>10</sup> A national IT system used by police forces to record and manage complaints and conduct investigations concerning police officers and staff.

<sup>11</sup> An IT system used for secure intelligence data management.

#PO 278 (now retired) was appointed to conduct enquiries into the questions raised by Operation Elveden on behalf of Northumbria Police. His initial enquiries around the dates provided for the incident did not show any recorded incident log held within the Northumbria Police computer systems. As a result of this, research was conducted with the force ICT department to confirm what capability and or processes would be required for deletion of incident logs. #PO 278 established that the force's communications departments have the capability to 'delete' the text of an incident log, replacing the text with a notice explaining that the incident text has been removed. They cannot delete all traces of the log from the Northumbria Police Integrated Communications & Control System (NPICCS). His enquiries did not identify an incident log relating to an incident.

#PO 278 also made enquiries with the Northumbria Police legal department and corporate communications department. He spoke to a former employee who would not discuss their conversations with Mr Craik with him. Enquiries with the media department did indicate that there had been press enquiries about the alleged incident at a time around when the incident may have happened.

#PO 278 submitted a report to the then #PO 279. In summary, he established that officers and staff were able to recall the rumours but none had any knowledge of the incident being recorded on an incident log or of such later being deleted.

On 15<sup>th</sup> March 2013, #PO 075 (now retired) was asked to review the report and provided a number recommendations to #PO 279. #PO 279 left Northumbria Police on 30<sup>th</sup> March 2013 and was succeeded in post by #PO 280. Similarly, at around this time #PO 075 was succeeded in post by #PO 081.

### 3. Police staff misconduct investigation and hearing

On Friday 14<sup>th</sup> June 2013, a former employee was notified that they were under formal investigation for alleged breaches of the Standards of Professional Behaviour for police staff. Following an investigation, a misconduct hearing took place in their absence between March and April 2014. The hearing was heard by Deputy Chief Constable #PO 282 of Cheshire Constabulary. The employee did submit a response to the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing the employee was found to have breached the standards of professional behaviour and was subsequently dismissed from Northumbria Police on the 24<sup>th</sup> April 2014.

At the time the investigation and hearing took place #PO 292 was the chief constable and #PO 080 was the deputy chief constable.

Following the decision of the hearing, the former employee appealed this outcome but the original decision of the hearing was upheld.

## Employment Tribunal – a former employee and Northumbria Police

---

On 9<sup>th</sup> August 1993, the former employee worked as a solicitor for Northumbria Police. During the course of their career, the former employee provided legal advice to Northumbria Police regarding a range of operational matters and this included providing advice to the chief officer team.

The former employee provided legal advice to Mr Craik during his tenure as chief constable. This included advice in respect of the press interest about the rumours relating to his alleged relationship with Mrs Peacock and the alleged altercation with Mr Peacock.

In 2013 the former employee was subject to an investigation regarding allegations that their behaviour and actions amounted to gross misconduct. Some of the allegations within this investigation were that they had breached confidentiality in relation to professional matters and information. Following a misconduct hearing, the former employee was dismissed from the force on 24<sup>th</sup> April 2014. Having failed in an appeal over this outcome, they subsequently instigated Employment Tribunal proceedings in respect of their dismissal.

On 3<sup>rd</sup> May 2016, an Employment Tribunal commenced at the Royal Quay Offices, North Shields in respect of the former employee's claims. As part of this Tribunal, the former employee submitted a witness statement, dated 14<sup>th</sup> April 2016 consisting of 353 paragraphs. Paragraphs 152 to 158 of the former employee's statement are directly relevant to matters to which this investigation relates.

The Tribunal upheld the decision to dismiss the employee.

The former employee gave evidence at the Tribunal. Their witness statement and other 'live evidence' led to extensive national media reporting which included coverage of:

- The alleged affair between Mr Craik and Mrs Peacock
- The alleged assault by Mr Peacock upon Mr Craik
- Claims that this incident was reported to Northumbria Police
- Reports of a police response to Mr Craik's home as a result of Mr Peacock's assault on Mr Craik
- Allegations that the incident log created in respect of this had been deleted
- An alleged 'cover-up' of the affair, assault and police response
- Allegations that public funds were spent on counsel's advice to cover up the assault and extra marital affair

It is understood that the detail of this and another unrelated matter were used by the former employee as 'comparator cases' as part of their claim for unfair dismissal.

During the course of the Tribunal, evidence, in the form of statements and live testimony was provided by former and serving police officers from Northumbria Police. The 'live' testimony was not recorded, so apart from anecdotal press reporting and a review of the redacted judgement it is not possible to obtain a clear view of what was discussed. Not all of that evidence is linked to the allegations and complaints subject to this investigation.

The following is:

#### Statement of former Inspector Paul Gilroy (ND 5)

Mr Gilroy<sup>12</sup> retired from Northumbria Police on 10<sup>th</sup> April 2010. On 26<sup>th</sup> March 2016, Mr Gilroy provided a signed statement to those representing the former employee in the Employment Tribunal.

In his statement Mr Gilroy states that on 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2007, he was the duty operations inspector, with responsibility for all operational support resources. During the afternoon of that day he states that he was made aware that there had been a panic-alarm activation at Chief Constable Craik's home in Bamburgh, Northumberland to which officers had been despatched. Mr Gilroy outlined that later that day, before finishing duty, he attempted to view the incident log and discovered the text of the log had been deleted.

He will say that he spoke with the attending officers (who are not named) and they outlined what had happened and as a result he had a better understanding of why the incident log had been deleted. Mr Gilroy states he was aware that the incident had involved an altercation between Mr Craik and Mr Peacock.

Mr Gilroy explains that following a meeting with senior officers some days after, he was asked about the incident. He states, it was clear from the discussion that there had been a leak to the media. Mr Gilroy states he was asked to speak with the officers who attended and establish if any had leaked the information. He did not do this.

Mr Gilroy bases his recollection of the event on a pocket note book entry he made at the time. He produces an entry from his pocket note book and explains that the contents of his statement are based on it.

Mr Gilroy did not provide evidence in person to the Tribunal although the statement was submitted.

#### Statement(s) of former Chief Constable #PO 292 (ND 104 & 105)

#PO 292 provides two statements to those representing the former employee in the Employment Tribunal. The first is dated 4<sup>th</sup> November 2015. In so far as matters concerning this enquiry are concerned, they were briefed on the allegations concerning the former employee and says the reason for this was because the deputy chief constable was involved in the case and as such they kept a strategic overview. Their view was that a number of them appeared trivial but the one of concern to them was the allegation that the former employee had disclosed details of confidential and legally privileged conversations with a former chief constable referred to as 'Mr C'.

In this statement #PO 292 states that they had recently been shown a document titled "what was said about ..... and C/P matters" which they state appears to contain all the evidence in relation to what the former employee is alleged to have said in relation to the alleged breach of confidentiality. They explain that it contains details of what the witnesses recorded in their original notes which they state are none, their witness accounts, the evidence they gave at the discipline hearing, the investigating officers report and the finding of the chair of the hearing and the account given by the

---

<sup>12</sup> Inspector Gilroy passed away in 2017.

former employee<sup>13</sup>. #PO 292 goes on to offer opinion of the witness testimony at the hearing and the fact that they relied on information provided by senior members of the organisation.

#PO 292 provides a second statement in 2016<sup>14</sup>. In so far as matters concerning this enquiry are concerned, at paragraph 23 they state that the affair C, the former chief constable had with Mrs P passed them by, they state that this had not even entered their head. At paragraph 64 they state that they knew nothing about the conduct of the investigation until after their retirement and that at the time they did not have the full picture. The remainder of the statement revisits aspects listed in the first statement and focuses on wider issues which are not covered within the terms of reference for this investigation.

#### Statement of former Superintendent #PO 283 (ND 102)

#PO 283 provided a statement to those representing the former employee in the Employment Tribunal. #PO 283 confirms that he was a superintendent in Northumbria Police. He retired in April 2014. He has made a statement having been asked whether he was aware of there being any inappropriate relationship/affair concerning Mr Craik and Mrs Peacock. He was also asked to comment on other matters not relevant to this enquiry.

#PO 283 was aware that there was a rumour or gossip amongst junior police officers and some more senior that Mr Craik and Mrs Peacock were conducting a relationship. He states that he does not know whether there was any foundation to this and cannot recall when the rumour was circulating.

#PO 283 can specifically recall one aspect of the rumour concerning Mr Peacock who attended the home address of Mr Craik. He was said to have confronted Mr Craik and an altercation and blows ensued and as a result of this Mrs Craik activated a panic alarm and armed officers were deployed.

He does not offer any more specific information other than suggesting it was around or prior to 2007.

#PO 283 recalls that at the time he was contacted by #PO 004 who he believes was Mr Craik's staff officer at the time who was clear with him that the incident hadn't happened and 'we should tell people if we heard it being spread by others.'

#PO 283 explains that he was prepared to accept that this was true. However, the rumours continued and some years later in conversation with a friend, Paul Gilroy this topic arose, where he was told by Mr Gilroy that he had been the duty operations inspector on the day it occurred and that the incident did take place and the log which recorded the deployment of officers to Mr Craik's home had been deleted. He then goes on to explain the procedure for the deletion of an incident log.

#PO 283 does provide evidence at the Tribunal.

#### Statement of former Police Constable #PO 284 (ND 103)

#PO 284 provided a signed statement to those representing the former employee in the Employment Tribunal. #PO 284 confirms that he was a police constable in Northumbria Police. He retired in November 2014. He was also a Police Federation representative between 2004 and 2006. He has made a statement having been asked whether he was aware of there being any inappropriate

---

<sup>13</sup> It is unclear what #PO 292 is referring to. The former employee did not attend the Disciplinary Hearing, they provided a written response, or alternatively this may have been in discussion with the former employee when she met them prior to the Employment Tribunal.

<sup>14</sup> The copy made available to the investigation is not signed or dated.

relationship/affair concerning Mr Craik and Mrs Peacock. He was also asked to comment on other matters not relevant to this enquiry. As far as he is concerned there was a relationship between Mr Craik and Mrs Peacock and that this was not confidential.

#PO 284 states that in and around 2007 there were rumours amongst rank and file officers that Mr Craik and Mrs Peacock were conducting an affair/relationship. He states that around late June, early July, many officers were summoned to briefings by their respective shift inspectors. He states that these briefings were a talking point because they were being told about an incident that had occurred concerning Mr Craik and Mr Peacock. He states that they were informed that a rumour was circulating that Mr Peacock had attended Mr Craik's house and had been involved in an altercation with him. As a result Mrs Craik pressed a panic alarm and there was a deployment of an armed response team. He states that they were then told that no incident had occurred.

#PO 284 states that rumours were already rife about this and explains that to his direct knowledge at least one poster of those placed in stations around the force on the senior leaders had been defaced showing Mr Craik with a black eye. He states that staff were warned that anyone caught defacing the posters would be treated as having committed a criminal offence.

#PO 284 states that officers were also told that if anyone searched for the log of the incident this would be identified and individuals subject to discipline by the Professional Standards Department but that in any event any search was pointless as the incident did not take place and there was no log of it.

#PO 284 later discovered that it was rumoured one of the firearms teams who had been deployed to the incident at Mr Craik's home had leaked the incident to the press.

#PO 284 goes on to explain that this sort of thing would generate gossip in the workforce and suggests the police service is probably worse than most but states that in this case the relationship between Mr Craik and Mrs Peacock was different given their positions in the organisation. He adds that he gathered that many saw the promotion of Mrs Peacock to assistant chief constable as being a direct result of the relationship she had with Mr Craik.

#PO 284 did give evidence at the Tribunal.

#### Statement of former Detective Sergeant #PO 285 (ND 101)

#PO 285 provided a signed statement to those representing the former employee in the Employment Tribunal. #PO 285 confirms that he was a detective sergeant in Northumbria Police based in the fraud squad. He retired in May 2011. He has made a statement having been asked whether he was aware of there being any inappropriate relationship/affair concerning Mr Craik and Mrs Peacock.

As far as #PO 285 is concerned there was a relationship and that rank and file officers within the force were aware of it. He states that the fraud squad was comprised of experienced officers from around the force and that this had been a topic of conversation with fellow officers and in the department.

He goes on to say that this was particularly true when there was a report that Mr Craik and Mr Peacock had been involved in a physical altercation at Mr Craik's home. From what he heard Mr Peacock arrived at Mr Craik's house, an argument over Mrs Peacock developed into a fight which resulted in Mrs Craik pressing a panic alarm and that as a result a tactical team were sent to respond.

It is understood that #PO 285 did provide evidence at the Tribunal.

#### Statement of former Chief Constable Mike Craik (ND 6)

Mr Craik confirms that he was the chief constable of Northumbria Police from 2005 until his retirement on 31<sup>st</sup> March 2010. Prior to that he had served as the deputy chief constable for Northumbria Police from July 2000. He states that he has made a statement because the following has been alleged in the Employment Tribunal:

- That he had a 10 year relationship with a former colleague, Assistant Chief Constable Carolyn Peacock. Mr Craik denies having a relationship with Mrs Peacock. He had not met her until he joined the force in July 2000.
- That on Saturday 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2007 he had a barbeque at his home address and at the time he was assaulted by Chief Superintendent Jim Peacock who was the husband of Carolyn Peacock. Mr Craik states that this is also untrue. He did not hold a barbeque or other social event at his home that day, he did not meet the Peacocks on that day and he was not assaulted or received any injury on that day. He states that Jim and Carolyn Peacock have never been to his home.
- That his wife pressed a panic button on an official police alarm and police officers attended his home. Mr Craik states that this is also untrue as there was no such alarm fitted in his house and his wife did not and could not have activated any alarm. No police officer attended.
- That he subsequently deleted or caused to be deleted the Force Wide Incident Number from the computer record. Mr Craik states that this is untrue as there was no alarm therefore there could be no original record. He states that his understanding of the system was and is that such a deletion was not possible.
- That he attempted to cover the incident up. Mr Craik states that this is untrue. He briefed the then Police Authority<sup>15</sup> and members of his senior officer team. Further, due to the widespread, unpleasant and unfounded nature of the rumours he also briefed all the then represented media in person. These briefings took place in his office, either in person or on the phone and in one instance at his home whilst his wife was present. As a result, there was no subsequent press coverage at the time.

Mr Craik did not provide evidence in person to the Tribunal.

#### Statement of Mrs Sharon Craik (ND 7)

Mrs Craik states that she is married to Michael Craik, the former chief constable of Northumbria Police.

In respect of the allegations she provides the following information:

- That she does not believe her husband had an inappropriate relationship with Carolyn Peacock.
- They did not hold a barbeque or other social event on 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2007 at their home, they did not meet the Peacocks on that day, her husband was not assaulted and did not receive any injury. She states that the Peacocks have never been to their home.
- That she did not press a panic button on an official police alarm installed in their home. She states that there was no such alarm fitted and she couldn't set something off that didn't exist. No police officer attended their home.

---

<sup>15</sup> Police Authority's had responsibility to hold chief officers to account for the performance of their force. They were superseded by Police and Crime Commissioners in 2012.

- In respect of her husband deleting or causing to be deleted a record of this alarm call from the computer record she states that this can only be untrue as there was no alarm and therefore there could not be a record.
- Several days after the alleged incident her husband met a reporter at their home, invited him in and advised him of the facts as she has stated.

Mrs Craik did not provide evidence in person to the tribunal.

#### Statement of former Chief Superintendent James Peacock (ND 8)

Mr Peacock joined Northumbria Police in 1974 and retired on or about the 30<sup>th</sup> June 2007 having spent his entire career with the force. His wife, Carolyn Peacock was an assistant chief constable with Northumbria Police and retired at about the same time as he did. In the summer of 2006 he was appointed to the position of chief superintendent and area commander for Newcastle reporting to #PO 292.

Mr Peacock states that he knew the former employee. He describes his contact with them as sporadic other than an occasional passing conversation.

Mr Peacock expresses real concern about the nature of the allegations and the impact of these. He first became aware of rumour and gossip concerning his wife Carolyn, Mike Craik and himself in mid July 2007, a few weeks after he had retired. He was told by a former colleague that the press had been enquiring about an incident which had allegedly occurred at a barbeque at Mike Craik's home on 15<sup>th</sup> July 2007, that Carolyn and he were at the barbeque and he assaulted Mike Craik resulting in police attendance at Mike Craik's home. Further, he had assaulted Mike Craik because of an alleged inappropriate relationship between Carolyn and Mike Craik and that the police attendance was later covered up.

Mr Peacock states that on 15<sup>th</sup> July 2007, he was on holiday and out of the country. He has since been informed that the date of the alleged altercation occurred in late June 2007.

Mr Peacock asserts that he has never been to Mr Craik's home and Mr Craik has never been to theirs and aside from police functions he has never socialised with him.

He wholeheartedly rebuts these claims saying Carolyn Peacock has never had an extra marital affair with Mike Craik, he has never assaulted Mike Craik and accordingly officers were not called to such an incident. He asserts that the tribunal has not been provided with any factual evidence to support the allegations.

Mr Peacock did not provide evidence in person to the Tribunal.

#### Statement of former Assistant Chief Constable Carolyn Peacock (ND 9)

Mrs Peacock joined Northumbria Police in 1975 and retired from the force on 30<sup>th</sup> June 2007 having served her entire career there. Her husband was a chief superintendent with Northumbria Police and retired at the same time. In 2006 she was appointed assistant chief constable under the leadership of Mike Craik.

Mrs Peacock states that she knew the former employee. She describes her contact with them as sporadic other than an occasional passing conversation aside from inviting her to participate in a

'positive action' development programme supporting women and BME (black and minority ethnicity) officers and the former employee attended some of the sessions.

Mrs Peacock expresses real concern about the nature of the allegations and the impact of these. She states that she first became aware of rumour and gossip concerning her husband, Mike Craik and herself in mid July 2007 a few weeks after she had retired. She was told by a former colleague that the press had been enquiring about an incident which had allegedly occurred at a barbeque at Mike Craik's home on 15<sup>th</sup> July 2007, that her and Mike Craik were having an extra marital relationship, her husband assaulted Mike Craik at the barbeque, which the police were called to deal with and that there had been a subsequent cover up.

Mrs Peacock states that on 15<sup>th</sup> July 2007, she was on holiday and out of the country. She has since been informed that the date of the alleged altercation occurred in late June 2007.

Mrs Peacock asserts that she has never been to Mr Craik's home and he has never been to theirs and aside from police functions she has never socialised with Mike Craik.

Mrs Peacock wholeheartedly rebuts these claims saying she has never had an extra marital affair with Mike Craik, her husband has never assaulted Mike Craik and accordingly officers were not called to such an incident. She asserts that the tribunal has not been provided with any factual evidence to support the allegations.

Mrs Peacock did not provide evidence in person to the Tribunal.

## The scope of this report

---

In order to address the allegations in accordance with the terms of reference, it has been necessary to adopt a wider approach to address the facts. The report initially focuses on whether an incident occurred and the enquiries conducted to assess this. It is important that this part of the report is read in full through to its conclusions. The investigation team emphasize that the first section summarises the evidence, including the accounts of both police officers and staff, this is then followed by the analysis of the evidence before moving on to the conclusions. The outcome of this stage of the investigation will have a direct impact on further aspects covering the complaints and allegations which the report then addresses.

### Part 1 – Policing



In order to establish whether any incident was in fact reported to Northumbria Police, it has been necessary to understand how an incident would have been managed. In doing this, a viable 'relevant time' needed to be identified to focus the enquiry on. Although wider time periods during 2007 are not being excluded in elements of the investigation, the primary focus has been between 1<sup>st</sup> June 2007 and 15<sup>th</sup> July 2007. This has been assessed on the following information:

- Anecdotally the rumour has been that this incident occurred at a barbeque at Mr Craik's home in Bamburgh during the summer of 2007 (although other derivatives of this rumour infer that this incident occurred at Mr Craik's secondary residence or elsewhere). Working backwards, it is known that the press first made enquiries about this alleged incident following the weekend of the 13<sup>th</sup> to 15<sup>th</sup> July 2007 and therefore this has been concluded as being the logical cut off point. This is partially supported by the date range that comments about this rumour are raised in the social media forum – The Policeman's Blog. Comments were posted on the blog on 22<sup>nd</sup> July 2007 – by

this time the media had already made enquiries with the Force and in person with Mr Craik and Mr Peacock.

- Mr Gilroy provided a written statement to the employment tribunal that he was aware of an incident at the chief constable's address as he was on duty at the time and provides the date of Saturday 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2007. He indicates that he was called to a meeting at Bedlington police station early the following week where this matter was discussed by senior managers.
- #PO 001 (seen during the course of this investigation) states that at the time the incident was attracting attention in the force, he was contacted by Mr Craik to establish and suppress the rumours in the Northumberland area command. He recalls being required to report back to Mr Craik in person regarding this later the same day. He cannot provide specific dates.
- #PO 003 (seen during the course of this investigation) states that on 19<sup>th</sup> June 2007 he attended a monthly senior officer's management meeting and at this meeting recalls #PO 001 being spoken to by Mr Craik. He recalls that this was at a time when the rumours of the alleged incident were strong.

In trying to establish whether or not an incident occurred, the enquiry has focused on the premise that if one did, was it reported to Northumbria Police. It follows that it is necessary to establish how this would occur (anecdotally the rumour has inferred that this was as a result of a police panic alarm activation) and an incident log<sup>16</sup> created. If one was created, then, did members of Northumbria Police, at the time in 2007, see the incident log, do something with the incident log or were officers assigned to deal with the incident. A key line of enquiry not explored during previous investigations concerned officers and staff serving in Northumbria Police during the relevant time. These include:

- Senior management team
- Line managers for the relevant geographical areas
- Communication centre staff
- Response officers serving within relevant geographical areas including armed response teams, dog support teams and motor patrol officers
- Local neighbourhood or beat officers
- Any other person with knowledge

## Part 2

To examine whether an incident log ever existed and to expand this aspect to an in depth examination of the Northumbria Police Incident Command Control System (NPICCS) IT structure and maintenance at the relevant time. This included the role of developers and those responsible for the maintenance and management of the system and 'back office' functions. This also included any other IT enabled platform to assist the investigation.

## Part 3

To address other matters that arise during the enquiry including:

---

<sup>16</sup> referred to as a Force Wide Incident Number (FWIN) in Northumbria Police

- The rumours
- Inspector Gilroy
- Pocket note books
- Misconduct Proceedings and Employment Tribunal
- Enquiries conducted in 2007 by Northumbria Police Counter Corruption Unit
- Operation Elveden

## Overview of Northumbria Police in 2007

---

1. In 2007 the chief officer team for Northumbria Police were based at the force headquarters at Ponteland and comprised of:

Rank	Officer
Chief Constable	7005 Mike Craik
Deputy Chief Constable	#PO 0286
Assistant Chief Constable	#PO 287
Assistant Chief Constable	7643 Carolyn Peacock (retired 30 <sup>th</sup> June 2007)
Assistant Chief Constable	#PO 292

2. Northumbria Police is responsible for policing the areas of Northumberland and Tyne and Wear. In 2007 the force was divided into six geographical area commands as follows:

Area Code	Area Command
A	Sunderland
B	South Tyneside
C	Gateshead
D	North Tyneside
E	Newcastle
F-G	Northumberland

3. In July 2007 Northumbria Police comprised of a mixed workforce of four thousand and twenty police officers and two thousand three hundred and thirty six police staff totalling six thousand three hundred and fifty six personnel.<sup>17</sup>
4. In 2007 Northumbria Police utilised the Ottawa<sup>18</sup> shift pattern for response, armed response, dog handlers and motor patrol officers and a relief shift pattern for neighbourhood teams and control room staff.
5. In 2007 Northumbria Police operated two communication centres. The northern communication centre (NCC) was based at Ponteland and the southern communication centre (SCC) was based in South Shields.
6. In 2007 Northumbria Police operated a system of silver commanders for 24 hour critical incident management. The silver commanders were either superintendent or chief superintendent rank. Out of hours or during weekends it would be the silver commanders who would authorise the deletion of text from sensitive logs.

---

<sup>17</sup> For a more detailed breakdown please refer to appendix 1.

<sup>18</sup> The Ottawa shift pattern is a bespoke rota system and is one of a number of shift patterns used by law enforcement internationally. It incorporates a combination of day, late and night shifts to provide 24 hour year round cover.

7. The Northumberland area command is the largest geographical area for Northumbria Police. The divisional headquarters for the Northumberland area command was Bedlington Police Station. The command team in 2007 was made up of a chief superintendent, three superintendents covering operations and operations support and five chief inspectors covering, neighbourhoods and crime support. The area command managed and supported the following stations and beat areas:

Area Code	Area stations
F1	Bedlington*
F2	Ashington
F3	Blythe
F4	Cramlington
G1	Ponteland, Broomhill, Morpeth*
G2	Prudhoe
G3	Haltwhistle, Bellingham, Corbridge
G4	Hexham*
G5	Alnwick*, Amble
G6	Wooler, Rothbury, Seahouses
G7	Berwick upon Tweed*

8. Northumberland operated a combination of 24/7 response teams based at primary stations depicted with an asterisk in the list above and neighbourhood teams working out of all the stations. Due to the rural geography it would be relatively common for the neighbourhood teams to cover other areas and for 24/7 response officers to be sent to incidents from other primary stations.

9. In 2007 Mr Craik and Mrs Craik owned two properties:

- Main residence – Bamburgh, Northumberland which is in the G6 command area. Their nearest neighbourhood policing team were based at Seahouses. Incidents in Bamburgh would primarily be covered by Berwick upon Tweed for a 24/7 response. Although, it would not be unusual for officers from Alnwick to attend incidents in Bamburgh.
- Secondary residence – Gosforth, Newcastle which is in the E command area. The nearest neighbourhood and 24/7 response teams would be based at Etal Lane police station.

10. In 2007 Mr and Mrs Peacock lived in Ponteland.

11. On 30<sup>th</sup> June 2007 Mrs Peacock retired from Northumbria Police. Mr Peacock had retired at a similar time. They had a joint leaving party at the Centre for Life in Newcastle and Mr Craik gave a speech at the event.

## Summary of the evidence

---

### Part 1 – Policing

12. In total, the investigation team have identified three hundred and ninety five people who may fit the criteria as outlined in the scope (page 20). These are broken down in finer detail for each relevant section. All officers and staff were asked a series of questions following a pre-defined question set<sup>19</sup>. The report will focus on those officers who provide some direct information to the investigation team and not those who simply recount hearing or being aware of the rumour.

#### Chief Officer Team:

13. All members of the chief officer team of Northumbria Police (covering the period of time 1<sup>st</sup> June 2007 to 15<sup>th</sup> July 2007 inclusive) have been interviewed by the investigation team.
14. **Michael Craik:** Mr Craik was the chief constable of Northumbria Police in 2007 and retired in 2010. In relation to the 'alleged incident' Mr Craik denies there being any truth to it. He first became aware of the rumours in the immediate days after 15<sup>th</sup> July 2007 as there had been significant media enquiries to which he responded personally. Mr Craik provides a statement outlining his responses to the various elements of the rumours:

*He never had an affair or any relationship other than a professional one with Carolyn Peacock.*

*He knew Jim and Carolyn Peacock in a professional capacity as fellow police officers. He has never been socially acquainted with them. He would occasionally meet them at police related social functions like retirement events, annual carol services and formal functions in their capacity as police officers.*

*Neither Mr nor Mrs Peacock have ever been to his home in Bamburgh or his flat in Gosforth. He has never had a social event at his home address which Mr or Mrs Peacock attended. Similarly, he has never attended or been invited to any social event at their home address.*

*He has never been assaulted by, or involved in any sort of confrontation with Mr Peacock, either at his house or elsewhere in any other circumstances.*

*Mr and Mrs Peacock both retired from Northumbria Police at the end of June 2007. He recalled that they had a joint leaving party at the Centre for Life in Newcastle. He attended this event where he made a brief speech. Following their retirement he has not seen or spoken to either Mr or Mrs Peacock. That is until 20 May 2016, which was part way through the Employment Tribunal of the former employee.*

*He did not have a police panic alarm fitted at his address in 2007 and his wife has never activated any alarm. Similarly he did not have any type of alarm capable of initiating direct contact with the police fitted at their house in 2007.*

*He has never asked for or instructed any officer or member of staff to delete any incident log relating to an alleged incident. There would be no need for this to have happened as no incident occurred and no incident log could have been created.*

---

<sup>19</sup> A copy of the question set is at appendix 2

*That it had subsequently been alleged that he used force funds to seek legal advice to prevent the media reporting on this matter. At the time the rumours were circulating, he did inform the Police Authority about the nature of the rumours. Further, he did seek advice from a former employee. He believes that they in turn sought advice from a barrister. His instructions in this matter were clear, the rumours were false and the allegations unfounded. Due to the damaging effects of such rumours, a number of options were considered. These included potential libel proceedings and efforts to remove the content from various on line sources. Consideration was also given to a joint statement with Mr and Mrs Peacock. However, by this time, it was his view that the press had concluded there was no factual basis to the rumours and did not in fact publish anything. In all events, obtaining such advice was proper and lawful.*

*He recalled the spread of the rumour and the fact that it was reported on social media sites was so distracting to the organisation as a whole, that he believes he did provide general instruction that this was not to be discussed or gossiped about and that there may be consequences, as the rumour was untrue and defamatory.*

15. Mr Craik provided further detail around later events, specifically in relation to the Employment Tribunal of the former employee and his subsequent complaints. (A336, S122)
16. #PO 286: He was the deputy chief constable of Northumbria Police in 2007 and retired in 2008. He informs the investigation team that he remains good friends with Mr Craik. He recalls that he was aware of hearing second hand information of there being some confrontation between Mr Craik and Mr Peacock but was never formally made aware of any incident. He believes that had an incident occurred then he would have been made aware of it and his belief is that the report is malicious. Prior to Mr Craik being chief constable, the chief officer team did hold occasional dinner parties but this did not continue into Mr Craik's tenure as chief constable. Mr Craik did not hold barbeques and he had never been to Mr Craik's house when either Mr or Mrs Peacock were also present. (A387)
17. Carolyn Peacock: Mrs Peacock was an assistant chief constable in Northumbria Police in 2007 up to her retirement on 30<sup>th</sup> June 2007, at which time her husband, Jim Peacock, also retired at the rank of chief superintendent. Following her retirement, on 2<sup>nd</sup> July 2007, Mrs Peacock went to Spain with her husband for approximately three weeks. Following her return from Spain she was contacted by #PO 287 who informed her about press enquiries into an alleged incident and relationship between Mr Craik and herself. Mrs Peacock had a meeting with Mr Craik at police headquarters where the situation was discussed and he informed her that the matter was being investigated and he was dealing with the press. Mrs Peacock provides a statement outlining her responses to the various elements of the rumours:

*Her relationship with Mr Craik was always one as professional colleagues. She has never had a personal or social relationship with Mr Craik. Outside of the work environment she has met him at occasional police functions or formal events in their capacity as police officers. She has never been out with either Mr Craik, or Mr Craik and his wife socially and has never been to their home or any private social event such as the alleged barbeque.*

*At the time she was unaware of where he lived, thinking he lived in Jesmond and only became aware that he had a house in Bamburgh later on. To her knowledge Mr Craik has never been to their home and definitely has never been to her home when she has been present.*

*She is not aware of any occasion when her husband has attended the home address of Mr Craik.*

*She has never seen an altercation or fight between her husband and Mr Craik, and has never seen him punch or assault Mr Craik in any way.*

*She has never been witness to the police attending to a call for service over any matters involving her husband and Mr Craik.*

*After her meeting with him in July 2007, she had no further contact with Mr Craik until 20<sup>th</sup> May 2016.*

18. Mrs Peacock provided further detail around later events, specifically in relation to the Employment Tribunal of the former employee and her subsequent complaints. (A338, S119)
19. #PO 287: He was an assistant chief constable in Northumbria Police in 2007 and retired in 2013. He was personally informed by Mr Craik that the press were in possession of a story along the lines of Mr Peacock turning up at a barbeque at Mr Craik's home and that the police had been called, this apparently being in reaction to a supposed relationship between Mr Craik and Mrs Peacock. He recalled that Mr Craik had informed him that there was no truth in the story and that at the alleged time he had been in London and Mr and Mrs Peacock had been in Spain. He was never made aware of any incident outside of what Mr Craik had told him. He personally informed Mr and Mrs Peacock of the alleged story at their home address as they had both retired by this time. He was never aware of any chief officer team private social events but did recall that he once attended a music concert with his son, #PO 286, Mr Craik and Mr Craik's son. (A388)
20. #PO 292: They were an assistant chief constable in Northumbria Police in 2007 and retired as chief constable in 2015. During their earlier time in post that there were some chief officer team and spouse social events but does not recall there being any at Mr Craik's house or indeed #PO 287 or Mrs Peacock's addresses and does not recall when the events specifically stopped or why. #PO 292 recalls that Mr Craik informed the chief officer team that allegations had been made, the media were making enquiries and an injunction was being obtained which was being dealt with by the head of media and communications and the head of legal services. Mr Craik did not specify what the allegations were at the time and that they did not learn the detail until a number of years later.
21. #PO 292 became the chief constable following Mr Craik's retirement in 2010 and around this time recalls hearing that Mr Craik had had an affair with one of the assistant chief constables. They do not recall receiving any forward briefing from Mr Craik of the 'alleged incident' or the 'alleged affair'. Similarly they recall a former employee making it clear that they would not discuss any previous 'closed matters' that they had dealt with for Mr Craik.
22. #PO 292 was the chief constable of Northumbria Police at the time of the investigation concerning a former employee and the subsequent hearings and dismissal. #PO 292 outlines concerns that they had been misled about the investigation into the former employee and their subsequent involvement in the Employment Tribunal.
23. #PO 292 confirms that as chief constable of Northumbria Police they were never provided with a panic alarm. (A546, S126)

#### Senior officers - Chief Inspector to Chief Superintendent:

24. During the course of this enquiry the investigation team identified a total of twenty six senior officers within Northumbria Police during the summer of 2007 who either worked within the Northumberland

area command and therefore likely to have had information which may assist the enquiry or were referenced by others as being individuals that may be able to assist the enquiry. Out of the identified twenty six officers, twenty five were interviewed. One has died.

#### Northumberland area command:

##### Chief Superintendent:

25. The Northumberland area command was led by a chief superintendent. During the relevant period of time there was an exchange of command and therefore both chief superintendents were interviewed and neither had any direct knowledge outside of rumour. (A82, A197)

##### Superintendents:

26. There were three superintendents covering the Northumberland area command all of whom were interviewed by the investigation team. One provides no direct information outside of rumour (A45) whilst two provide accounts as summarised below:
27. #PO 001: During the summer of 2007 he was a superintendent based at Bedlington, Northumberland. He cannot recall an exact date but explains that one day on his arrival at work there was discussion about an incident at the chief constable's address which was somewhere near Bamburgh. Either that same week or the following week he attended a senior leader's management meeting at Ponteland. At the meeting Mr Craik took him to one side and they had a 'cryptic' conversation. Mr Craik said that there may or may not have been an incident up the coast and asked if he could check whether anyone at area command was involved or attended. He returned to Bedlington and made enquiries with the 24/7 response teams which included calling the inspector on rest days. No one recalled such an incident. Having made these enquiries he returned to Ponteland and updated Mr Craik to this effect. He did not check with motor patrol or firearms teams. The officer did not make any enquiries about whether a log had been created or subsequently deleted. He was aware that the matter was reported in the media and that the stance from Northumbria Police was that it did not happen. (A48, S26)
28. #PO 002: During the summer of 2007 he was a superintendent based at Bedlington, Northumberland. He recalled being at a senior leader's meeting at Ponteland which was attended by officers of the rank of superintendent and above. The discussion at the meeting was directed towards managing the rumours that were circulating concerning an alleged incident involving Mr Craik and Mr Peacock. Officers were instructed to return to their respective divisions to discreetly gauge the spread of the rumour and what was being said. He had no direct knowledge of, or involvement in any incident. (A95, S53)

##### Chief Inspectors:

29. In 2007 there were five chief inspectors covering the Northumberland area command all of whom were interviewed by the investigation team. None of these officers had any direct knowledge outside of having heard the rumour. (A28, A90, A91, A224, A259)

#### Communications – control room (northern and southern)

30. In 2007 the head of communications was a superintendent who had overall responsibility for both the northern and southern communication centres in Northumbria Police. Chief inspectors were based at each communication centre.

#### Superintendent:

31. There was one superintendent in post as head of communications during the summer of 2007. (A81)
32. #PO 003: The officer was aware of rumours circulating around the force about an alleged incident involving Mr Peacock and Mr Craik that resulted in the police being called to Bamburgh. He had no direct knowledge of any incident. He confirms from his own records that over the weekend of 22<sup>nd</sup> – 24<sup>th</sup> June 2007, inclusive, he was the silver commander on call and no such incident was brought to his attention. Furthermore, as head of communications at the time, he did not authorise the deletion of any incident log that bore any resemblance to the rumours. He recalls being present at a meeting at Ponteland, which he believed to have been on 19<sup>th</sup> June 2007, in which Mr Craik spoke with #PO 0001 (A48) about addressing the rumours of the alleged incident. (A81, S48)

#### Chief Inspectors:

33. There were two chief inspectors posted to the communications department in the summer of 2007, one based at NCC and one based at SCC. Both of these officers have been interviewed by the investigation team and provide no information outside of having heard the rumour. Neither have seen or had any input on any incident log relating to the alleged incident. (A75, A89)

#### Other senior officers

#### Chief Superintendent:

34. The investigation team spoke to one further chief superintendent – Mr Peacock.
35. James Peacock: Mr Peacock was the chief superintendent in charge of Newcastle city centre in 2007 and officially retired on a date in July 2007 but completed his last working day on a date in June 2007. His retirement coincided with that of his wife – Carolyn Peacock.
36. Mr Peacock explains that shortly before his retirement, he had been subject to a complaint of bullying a sergeant and was investigated by Durham Police. This matter was concluded as 'unfounded' and finalised prior to his retirement.
37. Mr Peacock had a good professional relationship with Mr Craik but was not close to him and there was no social relationship between himself and his wife and Mr Craik. Other than the occasional police function, attended by other colleagues, he has never been out socially with Mr Craik. He had a joint retirement party with his wife that was attended by many colleagues at The Centre for Life in Newcastle. Mr Craik attended this function, he was their guest of honour. Shortly after this event, together with his wife, he went to Spain.
38. Upon returning from Spain, he was made aware by #PO 287 that the press were enquiring about an incident which had allegedly occurred at Mr Craik's home on 15 July 2007. The story he was told was that he and his wife were at a barbeque at Mr Craik's home, that he had assaulted Mr Craik because of an alleged inappropriate relationship between his wife and Mr Craik, that the police had attended

the incident and that the incident had been then subject of a 'cover up'. He knew that both he and his wife were in Spain on the 15 July 2007 and so as far as he was concerned the whole thing was ridiculous. He never heard anything directly from Mr Craik in relation to the matter but was made aware that there had been Police Authority backing for legal action if any rumours were published.

39. Mr Peacock explains that around this same time, whilst at home in his garden, members of the press came to his house asking if he was Chief Superintendent Peacock and asking him to comment on the rumours. He recalls telling the press that there was no truth in the matter, he reiterated to them that Mr Craik had been to their retirement function weeks earlier and reminded them that legal action would be taken if unfounded rumours were printed.

40. Mr Peacock provides a statement outlining his responses to the various elements of the rumours:

*The alleged incident has no truth to it.*

*He has never suspected or been told that his wife was having an extra-marital affair with Mr Craik or any other person on the executive command team.*

*He has never been to either of Mr Craik's homes in Bamburgh or Gosforth.*

*He did not and has never assaulted Mr Craik in any way whatsoever and as such Northumbria Police could never have been called to deal with any incident.*

41. Mr Peacock provided further detail around later events, specifically in relation to the Employment Tribunal of a former employee and his subsequent allegations and complaints. (A339, S118)

#### Superintendents:

42. The investigation team have identified a further nine superintendents based within other areas of Northumbria Police during 2007, including the head of operations (which includes firearms, traffic and dog section) and the head of the performance and standards unit. Seven of these officers did not provide any direct knowledge of the alleged incident outside of having heard the rumour. (A84, A148, A182, A218, A548, A590, A595) One former superintendent who is believed to have taken command of Northumberland area at a later time had died. (A83) One further former superintendent was seen.

43. #PO 283 was a superintendent at Gateshead in 2007. #PO 283 chose not to assist the investigation team when they visited him but he did make a number of comments documented by the officers who saw him. He had been Paul Gilroy's chief inspector around the time of the alleged incident. At the time, Mr Craik's staff officer had told him that nothing had happened. He believes that at the time there was a semi unplanned computer outage for maintenance which was unusual as they were normally planned months in advance. After he had retired he met up with Mr Gilroy who informed him that he was giving evidence at the tribunal for a former employee. #PO 283 queried why he would do this as the incident had never happened but recalls that Mr Gilroy was adamant that it had and told him he had read the incident log and spoken to armed response officers who had attended.

44. He later gave evidence at the Employment Tribunal. (A77, S86 & 90)

### Chief Inspectors:

45. The investigation team interviewed a further three chief inspectors within other areas of Northumbria Police during 2007. Two were only aware of the rumour and had no direct knowledge of the alleged incident. (A222, A589) The third was Mr Craik's staff officer at the time. (A183)
46. #PO 004: He was Mr Craik's staff officer between 2006 and 2008. He knew nothing of an incident occurring but was made aware of a rumour that had circulated through a 'police blog'. He could not recall what actions he undertook or was asked to undertake following the rumour coming out in his role as Mr Craik's staff officer. (A183)

### Inspectors within Northumberland area command in 2007:

47. From records provided by Northumbria Police the investigation team identified twenty four officers at the rank of inspector (or acting inspector) working within a neighbourhood sector or 24/7 response role. The investigation team have interviewed twenty one, two have died (A504, A609) and the other has not been located.<sup>20</sup> (A483)

### Neighbourhood Sector Inspectors:

48. Thirteen neighbourhood sector inspectors were interviewed by the investigation team, this included the inspector for Alnwick. None of these inspectors had any direct information about the alleged incident, twelve recounted knowledge of the rumour at the time and one stated they had heard nothing about it at all until many years later. (A1, A2, A14, A15, A17, A31, A43, A44, A68, A219, A220, A223, A360) The sector inspector for Berwick at the relevant time has died. (A609)

### 24/7 Response Inspectors:

49. Eight of the 24/7 response inspectors (including acting inspectors) were interviewed by the investigation team. Of those interviewed, seven recounted knowledge of the rumour at the time (A16, A18, A27, A452, A495, A519, A526) and one provided detail of their recollection of events on the night of the alleged incident. (A508) Of the two remaining inspectors, one has died (A504) and the other has not been located. (A483)
50. #PO 005: This officer was a 24/7 acting inspector covering Northumberland area command at points in 2007. He remembers being called or contacted by the control room during a night shift whilst travelling on the A1 and being asked to view an incident log. Once he arrived at the next station, he attempted to look at the log but all the content / text had been deleted. He made enquiries with the control room but was told that the log had been deleted and he didn't need to worry about it. The following day he was informed by outgoing late turn inspector (possibly #PO 037 (A1) or #PO 038 (A519)) that there had been an incident at the chief constables house and that firearms officers had attended. He believed this was the log he had been asked to view. He goes on to say that following this, talk of the incident was that Mr Peacock had turned up at the chief's house and punched Mr Craik. Sometime later he had a conversation with Mr Gilroy who told him that firearms officers had gone to the incident.<sup>21</sup> (A508)

---

<sup>20</sup> Those identified and actioned are documented in appendix 3.

<sup>21</sup> Refer to paragraphs 326-327, 346-355 & 408-412 in the analysis section.

### Berwick area command (G7):

51. Berwick area command was made up of a number of resources that included a 24/7 response shift as well as neighbourhood beat officers. As well as providing a 24/7 police capability to incidents in and around Berwick, this team of resources would also, on occasion be called upon to provide a response to areas slightly further afield which would include incidents within the G6 rural north Northumberland area. The G6 area includes Seahouses and Bamburgh. It was therefore determined by the investigation team that officers from Berwick were a likely deployable resource to any alleged incident at Mr Craik's address in Bamburgh. The investigation team identified thirty nine police officers and police staff to be seen as a part of this enquiry – these include all identified 24/7 sergeants and constables.<sup>22</sup>

### 24/7 Response:

52. The investigation team identified twenty five officers from records provided by Northumbria Police who worked 24/7 response roles across five shifts at Berwick in 2007. These consisted of four sergeants, three constables who also performed acting sergeant roles during this time and eighteen constables.

### Sergeants:

53. All seven sergeants and acting sergeants interviewed, recalled being aware of the rumour of the incident but had no direct knowledge or involvement. (A166, A181, A235, A240, A345, A347, A536)
54. Two of these officers did say that despite having had no direct knowledge or involvement of the incident, they were told by other officers that the rumour was that they had attended. (A181, A235)
55. #PO 006: In 2007 he was a sergeant on 24/7 response at Berwick. He had heard the rumours of an incident at Mr Craik's house in Bamburgh and was told by a dog handler (#PO 039 (A291)) that the rumour was he had attended. He is clear that he did not. He pointed out that there was another rumour that this incident had happened in Newcastle around the time of Mrs Peacock's retirement and most likely occurred at Mr Craik's address in Gosforth. He never attended any incident and has no direct knowledge of any incident. He stated that it was all rumour and gossip and he had apparently been on a night shift when this allegedly occurred. (A235)
56. #PO 007: In 2007 he was a 24/7 response officer at Berwick and would often be the duty supervisor (acting sergeant) if his sergeant (#PO 006) (A235 above) was not at work. He was aware of the rumour and at the time received a number of phone calls from colleagues telling him that he had attended the incident and asking him about it. He is clear that he has never dealt with any incident and has never been to Mr Craik's house. This officer stated that there was other rumour that this incident happened at another former assistant chief constable's house in Hexham. He was aware that there was talk of a redacted/deleted incident log but he did not see one. He also said that the other rumour was that armed response officers had attended.<sup>23</sup> (A181, S125)

---

<sup>22</sup> Those identified and actioned are documented in appendix 4.

<sup>23</sup> Refer to paragraphs 396-401 in the analysis section.

### Constables:

57. All eighteen 24/7 response constables were interviewed by the investigation team. Thirteen of these officers recall being aware of the rumour of the incident but had no direct knowledge or involvement. (A237, A238, A239, A241, A242, A356, A357, A454, A456, A457, A461, A466, A487) Two officers had no recollection of any incident or rumour. (A453, A464) The remaining officers provided the following information:
58. #PO 008: In 2007 she was a 24/7 response officer at Berwick. She recalled coming on duty on a day shift and looking at the incident logs for her geographical area and seeing an incident log from which the text had been removed. She has only seen this three or four times in her service. During the handover from the previous shift it was mentioned that the deleted log was an incident at Mr Craik's house in Bamburgh and that no one wanted to discuss the incident. She believes that this occurred at a time when Mr Craik was the chief constable.<sup>24</sup> (A164)
59. #PO 009: In 2007 she was a 24/7 response officer at Berwick. She had heard the rumour of an incident where Mr Peacock had confronted Mr Craik over an alleged affair, the police had attended and the incident log had been subsequently censored. She does not believe that she was on duty on the day but came in on day shift the following day and on searching incidents on the computer for her area (G7/G6) saw a log with limited details and deleted text.<sup>25</sup> (A467)
60. #PO 010: In 2007 he was a 24/7 response officer at Berwick working with #PO 006 (A235) and #PO 007 (A181). During early evening in the summer of 2007 he was crewed with #PO 007 when there was a call from the control room for a 'high 1' incident, a panic alarm activation in Bamburgh which they started to attend and as they neared the location were then instructed to stay out of the area. They returned to Berwick where #PO 007 was shut in his office on the radio and or phone. He recalls seeing an incident log with 'text deleted'. He states that #PO 007 was very discreet and doesn't recall them discussing the matter. When he returned to duty the log itself was no longer on the system. He recalled that shortly after there was a lot of talk about the rumour of Mr Peacock having turned up at Mr Craik's address over an alleged affair.<sup>26</sup> (A381)

### Neighbourhood beat officers and others:

61. During the relevant time in 2007 the investigation team identified a further fourteen officers and staff from records provided by Northumbria Police who worked as neighbourhood officers and other localised roles at Berwick. These consisted of two sergeants, ten constables and two police staff.

### Sergeants:

62. The two sergeants interviewed by the investigation team had no direct information other than to confirm that they were aware of the rumour and talk about the alleged incident. One sergeant was the neighbourhood sergeant (supervising the neighbourhood beat officers) (A353) and the other was a detective sergeant supervising the local CID. (A346)

---

<sup>24</sup> Refer to paragraphs 346-355 in the analysis section

<sup>25</sup> Refer to paragraphs 346-355 in the analysis section

<sup>26</sup> Refer to paragraphs 360-363, 408-417 in the analysis section

### Constables:

63. Seven constables were identified as neighbourhood beat officers and interviewed by the investigation team. Three further constables occupying roles within CID, intelligence and youth offending were also seen. Other than to confirm that they were aware of the rumour and talk about the alleged incident they had no direct knowledge or information to assist the investigation. (A382, A384, A455, A458, A459, A462, A463, A465, A478, A488)

### Police staff:

64. Two police staff were interviewed by the investigation team, both of whom worked as front office enquiry clerks at the relevant time, neither had any information to assist the investigation. (A98, A92)

### Alnwick area command (G5):

65. Alnwick area command was made up of a number of resources that included a 24/7 response shift as well as neighbourhood beat officers. As well as providing a 24/7 police capability to incidents in and around Alnwick this team of resources would also on occasion be called upon to provide a response to areas slightly further afield which would include incidents within the G6 rural north Northumberland area. The G6 area includes Seahouses and Bamburgh. It was therefore determined by the investigation team that officers from Alnwick were a likely deployable resource to any alleged incident at Mr Craik's address in Bamburgh. The investigation team identified thirty eight police officers and police staff to be seen as part of this enquiry – these include all identified 24/7 sergeants and constables.<sup>27</sup>

### 24/7 Response:

66. During the relevant time in 2007 the investigation team identified thirty officers from records provided by Northumbria Police who worked the 24/7 response role across five shifts at Alnwick. These consisted of five sergeants and twenty five constables.

### Sergeants:

67. All five sergeants were interviewed by the investigation team. They recall being aware of the rumour of the incident but had no direct knowledge or involvement. (A79, A178, A236, A348, A349)

### Constables:

68. Twenty two of the twenty five 24/7 response constables were interviewed by the investigation team. Twenty of these officers recall being aware of the rumour of the incident but had no direct knowledge or involvement. (A243, A350, A380, A470, A471, A472, A473, A474, A475, A479, A481, A482, A490, A496, A501, A506, A509, A513, A520, A525) The investigation team have been unable to locate two of these officers (A489, A529) and one has died. (A352) The remaining two provided the following information:
69. **#PO 011:** In 2007 he was a 24/7 response constable at Alnwick. He was at work when an incident came in of a fight at a barbeque in Bamburgh. He believes he may have offered to attend but didn't. He could not recall any further detail from the incident log but when he looked again later, the log

---

<sup>27</sup> Those identified and actioned are documented at appendix 5.

had been deleted. He does not know who attended. He recalled a lot of talk that the names of Mr Craik and Mr and Mrs Peacock were being associated to the incident. He declined to sign a statement that had been prepared after giving his account.<sup>28</sup> (A469)

70. #PO 012: In 2007 he was a 24/7 response constable at Alnwick. He was on a day or late shift and heard an incident come in for an alarm activation in Bamburgh which he believed to have been a high priority call. He was not assigned to the incident but made his way towards the location until he heard other patrols being cancelled and so resumed his duties back to Alnwick. He was told by #PO 016 (A349) not to look at the job in Bamburgh as it involved senior officers and they would get into trouble if they looked at it. The gossip at the station was that the incident was a domestic at a barbeque in Bamburgh involving Mr Craik and Mr & Mrs Peacock. He later viewed the log and it related to some sort of domestic incident with a threat of violence and vaguely recalls the name Peacock being in the body of text. Later that same shift he also drove up to the address that had been shown on the log in Bamburgh. The following morning whilst looking at incidents he noticed that this one was no longer there.<sup>29</sup> (A514)

#### Neighbourhood beat officers and others:

71. During the relevant time in 2007 the investigation team identified a further nine officers from records provided by Northumbria Police who worked as neighbourhood beat officers and other localised roles at Alnwick. These consisted of two sergeants, five constables and one special constable.

#### Sergeants:

72. The two sergeants interviewed by the investigation team had no direct information other than to confirm that they were aware of the rumour and talk about the alleged incident. One was the neighbourhood sergeant (supervising neighbourhood beat officers) (A351) and the other was a detective sergeant supervising the local CID. (A354)

#### Constables:

73. Four constables were identified as neighbourhood beat officers and were interviewed by the investigation team. One further constable occupying a role within CID was also seen. Other than to confirm that they were aware of the rumour and talk about the alleged incident they had no direct knowledge or information to assist the investigation. (A460, A477, A480, A485, A502)

#### Special Constables:

74. The investigation team identified one special constable who they had been directed towards as someone that had knowledge of the incident.
75. #PO 013: In 2007 he was a special constable working at Alnwick. He believed he was on duty when the incident came in and was on route to the job with a regular traffic officer (possibly #PO 024 (A280)) but got cancelled whilst en route. There was a lot of talk afterwards about a disturbance at Mr Craik's address in Bamburgh and they were told that this was the incident they had been cancelled whilst en

---

<sup>28</sup> Refer to paragraphs 346-355 & 408-412 in the analysis section

<sup>29</sup> Refer to paragraphs 346-355, 364-367 & 408-417 in the analysis section

route to. There was general talk of a Berwick and Wooler officer getting there first followed by an armed response officer. He only knew that he was attending a disturbance but was cancelled.<sup>30</sup> (A359)

### Rural North Northumberland area (G6 Seahouses, Wooler & Rothbury):

76. Rural north Northumberland area in 2007 operated out of three stations – Rothbury, Seahouses and Wooler. Two sergeants supervised the G6 area and each station was allocated a small team of neighbourhood officers. Seahouses was the local station that serviced Bamburgh.<sup>31</sup>

#### Sergeants:

77. The two sergeants were interviewed by the investigation team, both recalled being aware of the rumour of the incident but had no direct knowledge or involvement. (A177, A217)

#### Constables:

78. Eleven constables, working as neighbourhood officers in the G6 area were identified and interviewed by the investigation team. Seven of these officers recalled being aware of the rumour of the incident but had no direct knowledge or involvement. (A72, A80, A244, A245, A468, A503, A516) Four officers had heard nothing at all about the alleged incident or rumour. (A246, A484, A527, A540)
79. Despite having had no direct involvement or knowledge of the incident two officers were told by other officers that the rumour was that they had attended. (A72, A80)
80. **#PO 014:** Between 2006 and 2007 he was neighbourhood officer at Seahouses. At some point in June 2007 he was were working a Saturday and Sunday weekend shift (1600hrs-0200hrs). He would routinely check for incidents in the area he covered. Following the weekend he had a call from his supervisor, #PO 017 (A177) who was talking in riddles. He then spoke to #PO 017 in person on his return to work and was asked if he had attended an incident at the chief constable's house over the weekend. He had no idea what the sergeant was on about but knew that Mr Craik lived in Bamburgh. #PO 017 then recounted the allegations. He did not attend an incident and didn't see any incident log on the computer. The rumour and story that he had attended the alleged incident has followed him throughout the remainder of his career. He has always denied this.<sup>32</sup> (A72, S29)
81. **#PO 015:** Between 2003 and 2013 he was neighbourhood officer at Seahouses. He recalled at the time that rumours began to circulate about an incident at Mr Craik's address and was asked about it by lots of colleagues. He had not attended any incident and was not aware of any incident occurring. He provided details of three occasions he had attended incidents connected to Mr Craik during the ten years he was neighbourhood officer for the area unrelated to this investigation.<sup>33</sup> (A80 – S93)

#### Firearms Support Unit:

82. The Northumbria Police firearms support unit was located at Jarrow in 2007. The unit was under the direct management of a superintendent, a chief inspector and two inspectors. From records obtained

---

<sup>30</sup> Refer to paragraphs 376-379 & 408-417 in the analysis section

<sup>31</sup> Those identified and actioned are documented in appendix 6.

<sup>32</sup> Refer to paragraphs 384-389 in the analysis section

<sup>33</sup> Refer to paragraphs 390-395 in the analysis section

from Northumbria Police the investigation team identified that the firearms support unit operated 6 shifts with a total of six sergeants and seventy five constables (ten of whom also performed the role of acting sergeant during the relevant time period). The firearms support unit were not aligned to a specific area command but were a centrally based, force wide support arm.

83. It was acknowledged by the investigation team that one of the rumours repeated during the course of this enquiry and in the information provided to the Employment Tribunal of a former employee in 2016 was that 'the incident' was resourced by firearms officers. A number of firearms officers have been interviewed by the investigation team. Although a centrally deployable resource, analysis of the duty deployments tended to be geographical. The investigation team considered it disproportionate to interview all eighty one inspectors, sergeants and constables. The investigation team concluded that a number of constables would be interviewed but this would be targeted to those most likely to be deployed based on the analysis of duty deployment. However, both inspectors and all identified sergeants and acting sergeants across the 6 shifts would be spoken to. This decision was factored on the basis that as a unit operating a 24/7 resource cover there would always be a supervisor on duty and therefore if any units had been deployed to such an incident this would be in the knowledge of the duty supervisor.<sup>34</sup>

#### Inspectors:

84. Both inspectors were interviewed by the investigation team and recall being aware of the rumour of the incident but had no direct knowledge or involvement. (A361, A370)

#### Sergeants:

85. All six sergeants were interviewed by the investigation team and recall being aware of the rumour of the incident but had no direct knowledge or involvement. (A4, A53, A55, A373, A374, A375)

#### Constables:

86. Thirty one constables, including eight that performed acting sergeant duties within the relevant times, have been interviewed by the investigation team. Twenty nine recall being aware of the rumour of the incident but had no direct knowledge or involvement. (A11, A23, A24, A25, A33, A34, A37, A40, A47, A54, A56, A57, A58, A60, A62, A63, A64, A87, A88, A94, A180, A216, A365, A376, A396, A398, A537, A541, A542) Two officers stated had heard nothing at all about the alleged incident or rumour. (A10, A161)

#### Traffic:

87. In 2007 Northumbria Police had a traffic department known locally as motor patrols. Motor patrols were not central but were spread across the region at various locations. In 2007 the Northumberland area motor patrols officers were based at three locations – Blyth, Hexham and Alnwick. Officers working on motor patrols in this area primarily covered their own areas, however had the potential to be deployed anywhere within the Northumberland and wider Northumbria area.
88. The force motor patrols section was under the command of the operations department which also included the firearms and dog section. The force motor patrols section were directly supervised by two inspectors, one being Mr Gilroy. Within the Northumberland area command the investigation team identified from records provided by Northumbria Police, that motor patrols had three sergeants

---

<sup>34</sup> Those identified and actioned are documented in appendix 7.

and thirty seven constables working across the three locations. Aside from Mr Gilroy, all inspectors, sergeants and constables from the Northumberland area motor patrols section were interviewed by the investigation team.<sup>35</sup>

### Inspectors:

89. Mr Gilroy had died prior to the commencement of this investigation. The remaining inspector was interviewed and could not remember seeing an incident log. He was aware of many canteen rumours surrounding the fight at the barbeque but was not aware of anyone who had attended and no one disclosed as much to them. He knew Mr Gilroy and worked on the opposite shift to him. (A30)

### Sergeants:

90. All three former sergeants were interviewed by the investigation team, they were all aware of the rumour but had no direct knowledge or involvement in the alleged incident. All three knew Mr Gilroy well as their direct supervisor and commented on what Mr Gilroy had said about the rumour:
91. **#PO 018:** He was a motor patrols sergeant, his supervisor was Mr Gilroy and they were friends. In the summer of 2007 (he can't recall the exact date) he was on duty and was approached by Mr Gilroy who told him 'don't look at a certain log or log number'. Mr Gilroy did not elaborate and as he respected and trusted him, he didn't. A few days later the rumour and gossip started about the incident concerning Mr Craik and Mrs Peacock. He believed that officers from Seahouses and a firearms resource attended and named #PO 029 (A180) as possibly attending. He had a vague memory of speaking to the firearms officers who went and recalled they got lost as the house is hidden away. In 2015 he met with Mr Gilroy who told him that he had made a statement for the Tribunal. When asked how he could remember that far back, Mr Gilroy told him something like it's all in my pocket note book. (A69, S33)
92. **#PO 019:** In 2007 he was a motor patrols sergeant working out of Blyth. He had heard rumour and speculation of an incident during the July/August time that Mr Craik was having an affair with Mrs Peacock and all had attended a barbeque where Mr Peacock punched Mr Craik and a firearms car attended. He believed the incident may have occurred on a Sunday as he recalled coming into work on the Monday and it was general gossip at work. He did not know anyone that attended and heard rumour that the incident log had been deleted. He knew Mr Gilroy well having joined with him in October 1978. He didn't recall any specific conversations with Mr Gilroy about the incident itself but remembered him expressing his views about the way in which the firearms crew that attended were dealt with by those that were there as being wrong. He said that Mr Gilroy expressed some frustration that it wasn't properly investigated. He didn't recall him speaking of any specifics about the incident itself and he never mentioned the Employment Tribunal. (A340)
93. **#PO 020:** In 2007 he was a motor patrols sergeant in the northern area. He was aware of a rumoured incident through word of mouth over a domestic dispute in Bamburgh where a panic alarm was activated and firearms officers had been deployed. Local officers were talking about it, describing it as 'bait room banter'<sup>36</sup>. He recalled rumours that the incident log was deleted. He did not attend or have any involvement and never saw an incident log. If a motor patrol resource had attended he would expect to have known about it. (A379)

---

<sup>35</sup> Those identified and actioned are documented in appendix 8.

<sup>36</sup> Local slang for canteen discussions

### Constables:

94. All thirty seven motor patrols constables identified were interviewed by the investigation team. Thirty two officers recalled being made aware of the rumour of the incident but had no direct knowledge or involvement. (A280, A310, A311, A312, A313, A314, A315, A316, A317, A318, A319, A320, A321, A322, A323, A324, A326, A327, A328, A329, A331, A332, A333, A334, A486, A493, A497, A507, A511, A512, A517, A524) The remaining five provided the following information:
95. #PO 040: In 2007 she was a motor patrols officer. She recalled the rumour and gossip concerning an alleged incident involving Mr Craik. She had no direct involvement or knowledge of the incident but stated that on the evening of the alleged incident she had attended a traffic incident on the A1 at Shilbottle (single crewed) at about 7pm. She recalled that other officers were not available to assist her as they were tied up at an incident. When she returned to Alnwick Police Station, finishing her late shift, Mr Gilroy told her about a domestic at Mr Craik's address in Bamburgh and the incident log having disappeared.<sup>37</sup> (A93, S51, S107)
96. #PO 021: In 2007 he was a motor patrols officer, based at Alnwick police station. He was sent to the incident in question, which was a personal attack alarm at the chief constable's house but was cancelled before he got there. The information he was given at the time was just a panic alarm in Bamburgh but when he returned to the station later he saw the incident log and that it was a panic alarm at the chief constable's house and they were named on it. He did not recall any of the detail on the log other than that there had been two firearms and two local officers arrive before him but he cannot recall who they were. He believed this was about 10pm when he was on either a full or half night shift. He recalled being near the Warenford area of the A1 when he was cancelled. The following day he was at Alnwick police station with others and they looked at the incident log again which now had the text removed and replaced with the phrase similar to 'removed by supervisor'. Some years later he was asked about the incident by #PO 080 and Winton Keenan (A590) and he told them both the above account. He understood the immediate rumour to be that Mr Peacock had gone and confronted Mr Craik as he had covered up for Mrs Peacock having an affair with another unknown person. He had known Mr Gilroy throughout his career but they had never discussed the incident and no one else spoke to him about the incident in the immediacy of the event.<sup>38</sup> (A325, S104)
97. #PO 041: In 2007 he was a motor patrols officer based at Hexham. He was aware that an incident had occurred at the chief constable's house the following day as when he came on duty it was the talk of the station. He had no involvement in the incident. He did see an incident log on the police computer but never read it, he just saw a job description although he can't remember what it was. (A330)
98. #PO 042: In 2007 she was a motor patrol officer based Berwick and Alnwick. She was aware only of rumour of there being a fight at a barbeque in Bamburgh. She recalled that it was general talk in the police station and it was said that #PO 039 (A291) from dog section may have been there. The talk suggested that the text on the incident log was deleted and when she did a search of incidents saw a log with text deleted which at time she believed to be the log they were referring to. (A342)
99. #PO 023: In 2007 he was a motor patrols officer working out of Bedlington or Blyth. He recalled an incident coming over the radio as a concern and fight at the chief constable's address. He responded to the call but was cancelled en route. He later saw Mr Gilroy who had attended the incident and told

---

<sup>37</sup> Refer to paragraphs 408-412 in the analysis section

<sup>38</sup> Refer to paragraphs 346-355, 368-371 & 408-417 in the analysis section

him that it had been a fight between Mr Peacock and Mr Craik and waved a copy of the incident log at him but he never read it. He checked his pocket note book for June and July 2007 and there was no entry relating to the incident.<sup>39</sup> (A522, S123)

### Dog section:

100. In 2007 Northumbria Police had a force wide dog section. They were not central but were spread across the region at various locations. In 2007 the Northumberland dog handlers were based at various locations, including Bedlington, Ashington, Blyth, Hexham and Alnwick. Officers working on the dog section had the potential to be deployed anywhere within the Northumberland and wider Northumbria area.
101. The dog section was under the command of the operations department that also included the firearms and motor patrols section. The northern dog section officers were directly supervised by one sergeant and the investigation team identified fifteen constables across the various locations of which, with the exception of one constable, have all been interviewed.<sup>40</sup>

### Sergeant:

102. The sergeant has been interviewed by the investigation team and, although aware of the rumour, had no direct knowledge or involvement in the alleged incident. (A343)

### Constables:

103. Fourteen of the identified fifteen dog section constables were interviewed by the investigation team. Thirteen of these officers recalled being made aware of the rumour of the incident but had no direct knowledge or involvement. (A282, A283, A284, A285, A286, A287, A289, A290, A292, A293, A491, A494, A505) The investigation team have been unable to locate one of these former officers (A288). The remaining officer provided the following information:
104. #PO 039: In 2007 he was a dog handler covering the northern rural area operating out of Bedlington or Alnwick police station. He was told of an incident taking place, said to have been a violent domestic in the Bamburgh area. He recalled being dispatched to a disturbance at the Victoria Hotel in Bamburgh. He attended with his dog, which was deployed, the disorder was dealt with and he then left. Other officers from Berwick were also in attendance. He didn't see Mr Craik or Mr and Mrs Peacock at the location but was told afterwards that the incident at the pub was a spin-off of an incident at Mr Craik's house where Mr Peacock had assaulted Mr Craik. He cannot recall who else attended but that he was on D rota and believes rural officers from Wooler and Seahouses were also present. He believed it had occurred in the summer, maybe August of 2007 or 2008. The following morning, when he was updating incident logs at Alnwick police station, there was no longer a log present to update.<sup>41</sup> (A291)

### Communications Centre staff:

105. In 2007 Northumbria Police operated two communications centres where police officers and staff undertook the management of calls for service and the subsequent dispatch and management of resources, police officers and staff to incidents across the county. One control room was based in the

---

<sup>39</sup> Refer to paragraphs 372-375 & 408-417 in the analysis section

<sup>40</sup> Those identified and actioned are documented in appendix 9.

<sup>41</sup> Refer to paragraphs 380-383 & 408-412 in the analysis section

southern communication centre (SCC) situated at South Shields police station. The northern communication centre (NCC) was based at the then police headquarters at Ponteland. Whilst the communication centres worked with interoperability and either could manage incidents anywhere in the force area, generally the NCC covered all stations and commands north of the River Tyne and the SCC covered all stations and commands south of the River Tyne.

106. Both communications centres operated 24/7 and were managed by a 'top table' which consisted of a police inspector – known as the Critical Incident Manager (CIM), a police sergeant and a police staff supervisor.
107. From records provided by Northumbria Police the investigation team identified there having been three hundred and fifty eight police officers and police staff working within these centres within the relevant time frame of June 2007 and July 2007.
108. A number of communications centre officers and staff have been interviewed by the investigation team but to interview all three hundred and fifty eight was considered excessive. The investigation team concluded that a number of officers and staff would be interviewed but as a minimum all 'top table' supervisors across both centres would require identifying, tracing and interviewing. This decision was factored on the basis that as a department operating 24/7 there would always be 'top table' supervision on duty at each centre. Furthermore there would be at least one inspector on duty at one of the centres at all times to manage 'critical incidents'. If an incident had been reported to the police it would undoubtedly have been referred to the 'top table' for management.<sup>42</sup>

#### Inspectors:

109. Eleven inspectors were identified by the investigation team as having worked on the 'top table' within the communication centres as a CIM (critical incident manager) during the relevant time. Ten had been aware of the rumour of the alleged incident and deletion of the log but none had any direct knowledge or involvement in the incident itself or any subsequent incident log deletion. (A31, A49, A85, A117, A118, A211, A214, A221, A229, A294) One inspector has died. (A610)

#### Sergeants:

110. Fourteen sergeants were identified by the investigation team as having worked on the 'top table' within the communication centres during the relevant time. All fourteen have been interviewed. Three had no knowledge of any rumour or incident during their time working within the communication centres. (A281, A305, A309) Nine had been aware of the rumour of the alleged incident and deletion of the log but none of them had any direct knowledge or involvement in the incident itself or any subsequent incident log deletion. (A66, A215, A228, A296, A306, A308, A533, A538, A544) The remaining two provided the following information:
111. #PO 044: In 2007 he was a sergeant in the NCC. He believed that he deleted the incident log. He didn't think he was on duty when the incident occurred and thinks he may have been on nights. He referred to the incident having been an alarm activation. He did not recall the exact detail of the incident as there were lots of rumours but knew that it concerned Mr Craik and Mr Peacock. The

---

<sup>42</sup> Those identified and actioned are documented at appendix 10 which includes a breakdown of each shift's top table staff.

incident log would have been deleted on the authority of a Superintendent but he couldn't remember who.<sup>43</sup> (A96, S54)

112. #PO 046: In 2007 she was a sergeant in the SCC. She was made aware that there had been an incident at Mr Craik's house in Bamburgh where a PPU alarm had been activated and an armed response unit deployed. She was informed that the incident log had been deleted and saw a "text removed" log in the filters. She believed she was on day shift the following day. She believed that the incident had been dealt with by the SCC as all PPU alarm activations went into that centre. She could not recall who told her about it and has no details of the armed response officers who attended. (A307)

#### Other supervision:

113. In addition to the inspector and sergeant there would also be a police staff supervisor working the 'top table', this role would normally be fulfilled by a police staff supervisor. There would also be occasion that other police staff or constables would fulfil this role in an acting supervisor capacity. The investigation team identified thirty five police staff supervisors, police staff and constables that performed this role at the two communication centres on at least one occasion during the relevant time.
114. All thirty five staff have been interviewed. Four had no knowledge of any rumour or incident during their time working within the communication centres. (A29, A390, A528, A535) Twenty nine had been aware of the rumour of the alleged incident and deletion of the log but none had any direct knowledge or involvement in the incident itself or any subsequent incident log deletion. (A3, A6, A7, A8, A9, A20, A26, A36, A46, A50, A59, A70, A92, A104, A226, A476, A492, A498, A499, A500, A510, A515, A521, A523, A530, A531, A532, A534, A539) The remaining two provided the following information:
115. #PS 301: In 2007 he was a control room supervisor in the NCC. He was aware of the rumour. He heard that the incident took place on a Sunday and that a traffic officer may have attended the incident. He recalls that the officer had a '3' in their collar number. He did not have any involvement in or see the incident log. (A67, S27)
116. #PS 302: In 2007 he was a resource controller in the NCC. Some years ago when he was working during a weekend, during daylight hours. He was made aware of a panic alarm activation at the chief constable's house in Bamburgh. He dispatched a 24/7 response to the address and also thought an armed response unit was allocated to it. Following this, he heard rumour and gossip that there had been an altercation at the address between Mr Craik and Mr Peacock.<sup>44</sup> (A518, S117)

#### Other police staff and constables:

117. The investigation team identified an additional thirty four police staff and constables working in the communication centres to trace and interview. Twenty had been aware of the rumour of the alleged incident and deletion of the log but none had any direct knowledge or involvement in the incident itself or any subsequent incident log deletion. (A21, A22, A35, A38, A41, A42, A86, A97, A102, A103, A106, A107, A108, A110, A111, A113, A114, A115, A116, A198) Six had no knowledge of any rumour or incident during their time working within the communication centres. (A12, A13, A99, A105, A112, A395) One could not be traced (A233) and one had died. (A109) The remaining six provided the following information:

---

<sup>43</sup> Refer to paragraphs 289-296, 346-355 & 433 in the analysis section

<sup>44</sup> Refer to paragraphs 321-322, 346-355 & 408-412 in the analysis section

118. **#PS 303:** In 2007 she was a call taker/dispatcher at the NCC. She saw and viewed an incident log involving two senior police officers and an altercation at a garden party at the then chief constable's house in Northumberland and recalled that it involved Mr and Mrs Peacock. She did not deal with the incident but heard rumour that the log had been deleted. She recalled that this was during summertime a couple of years before she retired (which was in August 2009).<sup>45</sup> (A5, S1)
119. **#PS 304:** In 2007 she was a dispatcher at the NCC. She recalled that in either June or July 2007 an incident was sent to her from a call taker. The incident related to a personal attack alarm at an address in Gosforth, which they were aware was the chief constable's address. A number of officers were dispatched to the incident, she dispatched #PO 047 (A51, S28). She remembered joking with the officer a few days later about the 'incident that didn't happen'. The officer went on to describe the incident to them as being a scuffle in the back garden between Mr Peacock and Mr Craik over an alleged affair. She believed that the personal attack alarm had been pressed by the chief constable's wife. She was revisited by the investigation team due to the conflicting account provided by #PO 047 (A51, S28). She was concerned, having conducted some online research that she was wrong as it happened in Bamburgh (according to the reports) but she still believed it to have been Gosforth. It may have been that she had dispatched the officer but then cancelled him. She couldn't understand why the officer talked about it with her if they hadn't gone.<sup>46</sup> (A39, A65, S11)
120. **#PO 057:** In 2007 he was a call taker and dispatcher in the NCC. One evening in the summer he was aware of talk on the 'top table' of the panic alarm being activated at the chief constable's house. He could hear that armed response and traffic officers were being dispatched. Someone from the top table went around to all the staff saying there was an ongoing incident, providing them with the incident number and told them not to look at it. Not long after this the story came out about the alleged incident concerning Mr Craik and Mr Peacock. He can't be sure if the resources made it or not or were cancelled en route.<sup>47</sup> (A101, S57)
121. **#PS 306:** In 2007 he was a communications operator in the SCC. He was aware of the rumours but not personally aware of the incident. He used to manage the operations channel and would review incidents on that filter. On one occasion he saw a blank incident log with no name or address or comments. He had no idea what this log was in relation to but saw it at a time when the rumour was rife. He did clarify that he has seen numerous blanked out logs during his service. (A369)
122. **#PS 307:** In 2007 he was a call handler in the NCC. He believes that his colleague #PS 309 (A395) took the initial call for the incident but does not think they were aware of this at the time. He recalled that the incident was in Ponteland. Aside from #PS 309, he was not aware who else in the communications centre was involved. He did not see the incident log and does not know who attended.<sup>48</sup> (A391)
123. **#PS 308:** In 2007 he was a resource controller and contact handler in the NCC. He recalls an occasion when an incident was switched to him for resourcing. The incident referred to a call from a neighbour of trouble at a barbeque next door at an address in Seahouses and there were police officers involved. He looked at the available resources and saw #PO 015 (A80) available and passed him the details of the incident. He recalled the officer saying that he would wait for supervision prior to attending. He never received an update and did not transfer the incident to the top table but when tidying up his

---

<sup>45</sup> Refer to paragraphs 317, 346-355 & 408-412 in the analysis section

<sup>46</sup> Refer to paragraphs 311-316, 346-355 & 408-412 in the analysis section

<sup>47</sup> Refer to paragraphs 318 & 408-412 in the analysis section

<sup>48</sup> Refer to paragraphs 319-320 in the analysis section

incident queues at the end of the shift the log relating to this incident was showing as 'text deleted'. The following day there was discussion in control room that Mr Peacock had punched Mr Craik over an alleged affair. He never spoke to the officer about the incident.<sup>49</sup> (A393, S113)

### Other Northumbria police officers and staff:

124. Although the primary focus of the investigation team has been aimed at identifying those officers and staff who were most likely to have had some footprint on the police handling and response to an incident being reported, it has been necessary to trace and interview other personnel that operated outside of these parameters. This would often be, but not isolated to, having been directed to them whilst interviewing others, as people who may have some knowledge that could assist this investigation.
125. During this investigation an additional forty two police officers and staff were identified within this category to be interviewed by the investigation team.

### Inspectors:

126. Seven inspectors were identified by the investigation team who have all have been interviewed. One had no knowledge of any rumour or incident, having retired in December 2006. (A213) Five had been aware of the rumour of the alleged incident they did not have any direct knowledge or involvement. (A212, A249, A251, A371, A386) The remaining one provided the following information:
127. #PO 048: From May 2006 she was the staff officer to Mrs Peacock, when she was assistant chief constable, and continued in that role until Mrs Peacock retired. She attended Mr and Mrs Peacock's joint retirement party where Mr Craik gave a speech. A short time after the retirement party Mr and Mrs Peacock went to Spain and whilst they were away the rumours started to circulate about 'the alleged incident'. She was advised not to discuss anything with Mrs Peacock if she called and #PO 287 would be meeting with her personally. At the time of the rumours she recalled Mr Craik asking her to research NPICCS for incidents within the Seahouses area as he was looking for an incident involving a suspicious vehicle. She does not recall finding anything and believes she used Mr Craik's collar number to authorise search.<sup>50</sup> (A196, S94)

### Sergeants:

128. Thirteen sergeants were identified by the investigation team who have all been interviewed. Ten had been aware of the rumour of the alleged incident but did not have any direct knowledge or involvement. (A52, A100, A224, A227, A363, A372, A378, A385, A392, A545) The remaining three provided the following information:
129. #PO 049: In 2007 he was either a custody sergeant or patrol sergeant based in Sunderland/Washington. He recalled being on either half nights or nights in 2007. He is unsure if he was alerted to or was monitoring incidents when he viewed an incident log concerning a personal attack alarm at the chief constable's home address. He does not recall the content of log other than it being a personal attack alarm and Mr Craik's name on the log. He viewed the log on his own. Following this, he recalled rumours were rife about the alleged incident.<sup>51</sup> (A120, S65)

---

<sup>49</sup> Refer to paragraphs 323-325, 346-355 & 408-412 in the analysis section

<sup>50</sup> Refer to paragraphs 456-459 in the analysis section

<sup>51</sup> Refer to paragraphs 337-339, 346-355 & 408-412 in the analysis section

130. #PO 050: In 2007 she would have been a neighbourhood sergeant or acting inspector at Sunderland. She recalls being on duty when an officer told her that something had happened at the chief constable's house. She then viewed the incident log which was an alarm activation at a location in the Northumberland area. She only saw the front page but couldn't remember what the content was. When she looked again later, the log had gone. She believes she was alone in the sergeant's office at Farringdon police station at time. The rumour about an altercation between Mr Craik and Mr Peacock followed almost immediately after.<sup>52</sup> (A250, S108)
131. #PO 051: He was a 24/7 response sergeant at Hexham. In 2006 or 2007 he was on a late shift or half nights and recalls that he received a phone call from the 24/7 response inspector #PO 005 (A508, S129), to have a look at a particular incident. As he looked on the system he was told this was the chief's house. The incident log had something on it about a disturbance, an assault, a breach of the peace or shouting in the street. He was told that there were lots of resources going to the incident and to keep an eye on it. He recalled telling the officers on duty, including the traffic officers, not to view the log but thought that #PO 041(A330) had said he had already looked at it. He believed traffic and firearms officers may have been attending. By the end of the shift the contents of the log had been removed or deleted. He asked the inspector about it a number of months later and was told he 'could not talk about it' and so believed the inspector had been 'knobbed'.<sup>53</sup> (A593, S130)

#### Other police officers and staff:

132. Twenty two other police officers and staff were identified by the investigation team, twenty have been interviewed. Of the remaining two, one officer has died (A364) and the other person not interviewed is the former employee concerned in the Employment Tribunal.
133. In response to a request, the former employee has declined to meet with the investigation team. Additional efforts to obtain any relevant information from them were made through their solicitor. This included a set of questions to which they had been invited to respond. To date the investigation team have had no response to those questions. (A547)
134. Of the twenty staff that have been interviewed one had no knowledge of any rumour or incident. (A134) Thirteen were aware of the rumour of the alleged incident but did not have any direct knowledge or involvement. (A51, A73, A78, A119, A135, A136, A165, A341, A358, A362, A394, A543, A580) The remaining six provided the following information:
135. #PO 052: In 2007 he was a 24/7 response officer at Hebburn. He was on a night or late shift when he saw the incident log (over another officer's shoulder) along with other colleagues but can't recall who. The incident log related to a panic alarm and there was mention of a barbeque and a firearms unit attending. Some hours later he was again looking on NPICCS with another officer who was logged on and saw that the message 'deleted' or 'record deleted' had replaced the incident detail. He was on rest days shortly after and on returning to work at the shift briefing the sergeant (A100) told them about rumours that were circulating about the incident and they were not to talk about it as it was rumour and not true. They did not know who attended the incident.<sup>54</sup> (A121, S66)

---

<sup>52</sup> Refer to paragraphs 340-341, 346-355 & 408-412 in the analysis section

<sup>53</sup> Refer to paragraphs 346-355 & 408-412 in the analysis section

<sup>54</sup> Refer to paragraphs 342-343, 408-412 in the analysis section

136. #PO 284: In 2007 he was a 24/7 response officer at South Shields. On the day in question, which he says was in June 2007 there were rumours going round that Mr Peacock had taken Mrs Peacock around to Mr Craik's address and an altercation occurred where Mr Peacock was alleged to have hit Mr Craik in the eye. He had not taken much notice as it was simply rumour that there had been an affair between Mrs Peacock and Mr Craik. However, everybody was annoyed because the incident log had been deleted. He recalled a briefing on the day he heard about the rumour and one of the supervisors had a script with a warning not to look for the log as action would be taken against those who did. He couldn't recall who the supervisor was. Anecdotally he had been told the names of people who had attended the incident but couldn't confirm this as he had never spoken to them. #PO 284 said that the incident didn't happen at a barbeque, it was a totally random event and names one of the traffic resources attending as being #PO 014 (A72) and #PO 013 (A359) who was a special constable at the time. He had never spoken to them. #PO 284 also named two solicitors who saw the log as #MP 401 (A367) and #MP 402 (A368). He also named a member of police staff, #PS 306 (A369) from the control room who said they had seen the log. #PO 284 attended the Employment Tribunal to give evidence of the rumour. He named #PO 049 (A120) as having mentioned something on social media. #PO 284 referred to another officer, #PO 056 (A366), who had attended the Employment Tribunal with him, as the person who told him #PO 014 (A72) had attended. He describes how #PO 056 (A366) had been subject to a misconduct process and reduced in rank by Mr Craik. He also named #PO 045 (A543) (special constable) as posting something on social media recently. He had no direct evidence to provide regarding the incident or the incident log.<sup>55</sup> (A335)
137. #PO 056: He contacted the investigation team direct by letter (SD 38) and was subsequently spoken to. In 2007 he was a 24/7 response officer at Ashington and Prudhoe. He never attended the alleged call to the chief constable's address and never saw the alleged incident log. This officer informed him of the alleged incident at Mr Craik's address and refers to this incident having occurred on 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2007. He reported that the following week this same officer again contacted him saying that the incident log had been removed from the computer.
138. #PO 056 was later informed by #PS 311 (A389) that the computers had been switched off for over four hours on 25<sup>th</sup> June 2007 and that all incidents that were on the system after the call to Mr Craik's house had been re numbered, in effect reduced by one to hide the removal of the entire incident.
139. The following year he was approached by another officer who told him that they had attended the incident with a traffic officer but on arrival were informed that they were not required. He confirms that the investigation team had spoken to this particular officer in October 2019 (#PO 013).
140. In more recent times a retired detective inspector, #PO 053 (A386), had told him that he had been working on the weekend in question, knew about the incident, had assisted the professional standards department and obtained a copy of the incident log.<sup>56</sup> (A366)
141. #PO 054: In 2007 he was a 24/7 response officer based at Whitley Bay. He was in the front office at Whitley Bay police station on either a half or full night shift when it was brought to his attention that there had been a panic alarm at chief constable's house and dogs and firearms officers were attending. He believed one of the dog handlers, but could not recall who, came back and said Mr Peacock had chinned the chief for having an affair with his wife. He said that the incident log had

---

<sup>55</sup> Refer to paragraphs 465-468 in the analysis section

<sup>56</sup> Refer to paragraphs 470-471 in the analysis section

been deleted, it didn't exist anymore. He recalled putting a comment on the Facebook 'Friends of Northumbria Police' page saying that he had seen the log.<sup>57</sup> (A377, S114)

142. #PS 311: In 2007 he was based in the central ticket office for Northumbria Police and retired in 2008. He came into work on a Monday morning and was told not to use the computers as IT were working on them. He did not use or have access to a computer. He believes that this was associated with rumours of an alleged incident involving Mr Craik. He believed the incident happened on a Sunday and believed the computers were down because that was when they deleted the incident log. He did not see any log and could not offer any further information.<sup>58</sup> (A389)
143. #PO 055: He worked in the video unit at Ashington police station. He was aware of a rumour that Mr Peacock had visited Mr Craik's address in Bamburgh and there had been an altercation. This was a rumour he believed was known to most of the force. He recalled being contacted by his sergeant to install some cameras to an address overlooking Mr Craik's property in Bamburgh and then also installing a panic alarm in Mr Craik's address. He believed this to have been around the same time that he heard of the rumour of the alleged incident. The equipment would have been booked out on the 'Consolidare' system.<sup>59</sup> (A591)

#### Information Service and Technology (IS&T) team:

144. The investigation team have interviewed twelve former IS&T staff, focussed primarily on senior management and those who were responsible for NPICCS, known locally as the Tandem Team.
145. All senior management within the IS&T have been interviewed by the investigation team and outside of being aware of the rumour were unable to offer any information to assist the investigation. (A132, A142, A147)
146. #PS 312: In 2007 he was employed in IS&T as the manager of the Tandem Team. At a time between 2005 & 2008 he was requested by one of the senior management team to delete an incident log from NPICCS, which was to effectively remove all data associated to an incident. He was made aware that the request had come from the senior force management team and he should not discuss this with anyone. As far as he was concerned a request like this had never been made before or since. He tasked #PS 313 (A129) to write a program to remove all of the information leaving only the incident reference number in place. Normal practice with any IS&T job would be to create formal computerised job numbers. He believed the incident log concerned an incident at the chief constables house in Bamburgh. (A130, A162, S77)
147. #PS 313: In 2007 he was employed as a programmer to maintain NPICCS on the Tandem Team. He recalled receiving instruction around late summer / early autumn of 2007 from #PS 312 (A130) to create a program to erase the contents of an incident log on NPICCS. He recalled completing the task on the belief that the instruction had been received from top level and was not a formal request made through any auditable system. He recalled querying with #PS 314 (A131) if this had been done before. He completed the task, recalling that shortly after this he heard of the rumours of the incident at Mr Craik's address. He assumed at the time this was the incident he had removed the content from.<sup>60</sup> (A129, A140, A170, A175, A200, A262, S74, S78, S109)

---

<sup>57</sup> Refer to paragraphs 344-345 & 408-412 in the analysis section

<sup>58</sup> Refer to paragraphs 441-442 in the analysis section

<sup>59</sup> Refer to paragraphs 289-296 in the analysis section

<sup>60</sup> Refer to paragraphs 446-453 in the analysis section

148. #PS 314: In 2007 he was a software developer on the NPICCS Tandem Team. At some point in 2007 #PS 313 (A129) asked them what technical hurdles would be involved to delete an incident log, explaining that they couldn't discuss the log. He provided #PS 313 with a list of technical issues. He recalled that immediately before being asked this he had seen #PS 313 go into #PS 312's (A130) office. (A131, S76, S85, S112)
149. #PS 315: In 2013 he was asked by #PO 278 to make enquiries with IS&T concerning the alleged incident at Mr Craik's address in 2007. He recalled that he had a general meeting with IS&T staff who denied doing anything but made him aware of anecdotal stories about a member of staff who had left the organisation who may have deleted the log. He provided an email trail of communications from 2013 with #PO 278 and the counter-corruption unit. He provided a copy of a request for change (RFC) relating to a request to delete two incident logs from 2002 as mentioned in the report. This was an official request that was fully documented and allocated to #PS 313 (A129) by #PS 312 (A130) in 2008. (A179)
150. Five other members of the Northumbria Police IC&T team have also been interviewed by the investigation team, they do not provide any further information to assist the investigation. (A133, A144, A163, A232, A295)

#### Other non-police:

151. The investigation team have identified and interviewed five other people who were not employees of Northumbria Police who may have had relevant information to assist the investigation. Three of these were solicitors who, although being aware of the rumour, having been told about the alleged incident by officers at the time, had no direct knowledge or information to assist the enquiry. (A76a, A367, A368)
152. Mrs Gilroy: Mrs Gilroy was not aware of the rumours and Mr Gilroy had never discussed it with her. She located Mr Gilroy's pocket notebook from the relevant time and handed it to the investigation team. (A71, S87)
153. Mrs Sharon Craik: Mrs Craik was interviewed by the investigation team and provided a statement. During the summer of 2007, a local media reporter had called at their home address and was asking Mr Craik about an alleged incident occurring at their home a few days earlier. Mr Craik informed the reporter that there was no truth to the alleged incident and that appeared to have been an end to the matter. Mrs Craik knew at that time that there had been no incident at their home in the days and weeks before. In relation to the alleged incident, Mrs Craik provides a statement outlining her responses to the various elements of the rumours:
154. *The allegations are nothing more than unfounded rumour that have had significant, continuing impact on herself, her husband and Mr and Mrs Peacock.*
155. *She does not believe that, at any time, her husband has had any inappropriate relationship with Carolyn Peacock.*
156. *They did not hold any barbeque or social event at their home on 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2007, her husband was not assaulted that day, he did not receive any injury that day and they did not meet or see Mr or Mrs Peacock that day. Furthermore, to her knowledge neither Mr nor Mrs Peacock have ever been to their homes, either in Bamburgh or their flat in Gosforth.*

157. *She did not press any panic-button, there was no alarm fitted in either of their homes in 2007 and no police officers attended their home.*
158. *There was no incident as alleged on the day suggested or indeed, any other date.*
159. Mrs Craik provided further detail around later events, specifically in relation to the Employment Tribunal of a former employee and her subsequent complaints. (A337, S121)

## Part 2 – Northumbria Police IT Systems & Data

### Northumbria Police Integrated Computer and Control System (NPICCS)

#### NPICCS overview

160. Generally, all police forces in England and Wales operate a command and control system to manage the receipt of calls for service and the subsequent dispatch and management of officers, staff and other resources at incidents. Generally once a call for service has been received the details of the call are inputted onto an incident log. As incident logs are created during a 24 hour period they are allocated a unique sequential number aligned to the date the incident was created. All forces will have slightly differing operating models in respect of the role of the incident log during the life of the incident and through to its conclusion when the incident may be closed. Invariably the details obtained following the creation of an incident log will be used to populate other police systems (for example but not confined to crime reporting systems, custody systems etc.) A number of forces operate integrated systems that will link details from within the incident log to other applications automatically or following a link manually by an operator.
161. From time to time, for a number of operational reasons, it is necessary for a police force to restrict or control access to certain incident logs by people in the organisation. Police forces will apply different criteria aligned to their local policy or procedure and processes according to the capability of the system they have in operation.
162. In 1985 Northumbria Police had a bespoke operating system developed and managed by their own IS&T team called NPICCS. This system combined numerous core functions including command and control which allows incident logs to be linked to numerous other operating platforms. Each incident log could have up to fifty tables linked to it.
163. The team that managed this system in 2007 were called the Tandem Team. The system is still in use in 2020 and a number of personnel who were in the Tandem team in 2007 are still employed by Northumbria Police with responsibility for NPICCS.
164. NPICCS operates on two platforms, Enscribe and Structured Query Language (SQL). For the first thirty days of an incident log it is held on both platforms. Enscribe is what front end users will tend to interact with. After thirty days the incident log and associated tables will remain solely on the SQL platform.
165. The SQL platform allows for extensive audit capability. All functions carried out within NPICCS leave a footprint which will identify any actions carried out by a user on the system and will identify the user by their individual identification number. These are referred to as 'system or living archive audits'. Similarly isolating a specific incident log would allow an audit.

## Incident logs (FWIN's)

166. Within Northumbria Police, incident logs recorded on the NPICCS system are more commonly referred to as FWIN's<sup>61</sup> (force wide incident numbers). Every incident log recorded on the system will be allocated a unique four digit sequential number relevant to the date it is inputted in six digits. For example, if an incident was reported on 1<sup>st</sup> January 2007 and was the 165<sup>th</sup> incident to be inputted that day the incident log number would read 0165 010107. The numbering would continue through that day until midnight when the number would reset to 0001 of the new date. All resourcing and updates associated to that incident would then be inputted onto that incident log.
167. The investigation team have obtained copies of all incident logs created by Northumbria Police between 1<sup>st</sup> June 2007 and 29<sup>th</sup> July 2007. (E. PD 171018 1500 & S72) On average Northumbria Police record between one thousand five hundred and two thousand incident logs force wide per day which is in excess of one hundred thousand incident logs.
168. On occasion the police can receive multiple calls relating to the same incident, for example a number of people call to report the same traffic collision. When this occurs it is impractical to update and manage multiple incident log with the same repeated information. Where this occurs NPICCS has a facility to cross reference incident logs. One incident log will be identified as the main log or the 'parent log' and all others will be associated to it as 'child logs'. The incident will then be solely managed on the parent log and the other logs will be closed and referenced to the parent.
169. All operational staff within Northumbria Police have access to NPICCS and have the ability to view or update any incident log on the system. It is sometimes a requirement for operational or sensitive reasons to restrict the contents of an incident log in order to control who has access to the information within it. NPICCS has a function within it to remove the contents from an incident log so that the original text would be no longer visible to any users. These types of incident logs are referred to locally as 'deleted logs'. This process is explained in more detail in the next section. It is important to note that the term 'deleted logs' is somewhat misleading as the incident log is not actually deleted, it remains on the system with its unique sequential number but the content has been removed from it.
170. There is also a feature on NPICCS to create what are referred to as 'deferred incidents'. There will be occasion whereby there could be planned or unplanned system downtime whilst the need to maintain a command and control function continues. When this occurs control room staff have the ability to create 'paper records', this is where an incident is recorded on paper and all resourcing and updates are documented onto the paper record. Once the system is back up and running it is necessary for the paper logs to be transferred over to NPICCS and assigned an incident log. This is a manual process and can take a number of hours or even days to complete depending upon the length of time the system had been down. The deferred incident process allows the user to back date a new log onto the system. For example, an incident may have occurred during a system downtime on 1<sup>st</sup> January 2007 and recorded onto a paper log. It may then be inputted onto the system two days later but the user can inform the system that this incident actually occurred on 1<sup>st</sup> January 2007 and the system will then allocate the next available sequential incident log from that date. This feature is also used for other administrative reasons where a back dated incident log is required.
171. The investigation team identified an example where the above process has been used on 29<sup>th</sup> June 2007 to create an incident log for 24<sup>th</sup> June 2007. On this occasion a male was arrested following a report of a fight in Wallsend and recorded on incident log 1492 240607. Once in custody the male

---

<sup>61</sup> For the purposes of this report and to avoid confusion FWIN's will be referred to as incident logs

was found to be in possession of a controlled substance and a new incident log was required in order to record this second offence. A new incident log was then created on 29<sup>th</sup> June 2007 to record the possession of controlled substance and was allocated incident log number 1732 240607, this being the next sequential number available for that date as the last recorded incident log on that day had been 1731 240607.

### Deleted Incident Logs

172. NPICCS does not have the functionality to simply restrict access to incident logs which are considered sensitive. In order to achieve this a program was written by the Tandem team in 2001. This program would allow front end supervisors in the communication centres to delete certain content or text within the incident log. This process requires the authority of the control room superintendent, or out of hours, the silver commander and once authorised, a control room supervisor would then print off the complete incident log and seal it in an envelope for retention by the control room superintendent in a secure environment. The supervisor would then request NPICCS to execute the delete function for predefined specified lines of the incident log (which would include caller details, location, content etc.) and replace the lines with the phrase 'text removed' quoting the authorizing officer's identification. This function would only be performed by members of the 'top table'. This program was only capable of dealing with incident logs within the period of time they were still on the Enscribe platform. Once these incident logs have dropped off the Enscribe platform and were only accessible on the SQL platform, front end users or supervisors did not have the capability to perform this delete function. The delete function is contained on an 'I30' screen within NPICCS. An audit of NPICCS has been obtained to identify all delete functions completed force wide through the I30 screen between 1<sup>st</sup> May 2007 and 31<sup>st</sup> October 2007 (E. PD 121218 011). The audit identified the following deleted incident logs:

Deleted FWIN	Date
1193	10/05/2007
1381	27/05/2007
0074	31/05/2007
1563	21/06/2007
1600	19/07/2007
0571	24/07/2007
0632	02/08/2007
0501	28/08/2007
1252	16/09/2007
0977	26/09/2007
0444	21/10/2007
0379	24/10/2007

173. Only one deleted incident log was identified within the relevant times.
174. The investigation team attended the NCC and were given access to the safe from which they removed all the paper copies of 'deleted incident logs'. The team were then shown to the chief superintendent's office and provided access to a locked drawer from within which further 'deleted incident logs' were removed. The paper logs that were reviewed had a date range from 2000 through to 2018. The paper logs were in a variety of states – some were sealed within an envelope according to policy, some were in an envelope but not sealed and others were not in any form of envelope at all. The investigation team then arranged the thirty one paper incident logs into year order and from there seized all paper incidents from the year 2007. (A124, S69, S70 & S71)

Date	FWIN	Exhibit Reference
13/01/2007	0521	KT 161018-1400
23/01/2007	1271	KT 161018-1403
27/01/2007	1866	KT 161018-1401
30/01/2007	1215	KT 161018-1404
04/02/2007	0336	KT 161018-1406
22/02/2007	0837	KT 161018-1405
01/03/2007	1472	KT 161018-1412
03/03/2007	1814	KT 161018-1411
05/03/2007	1061	KT 161018-1410
08/03/2007	0546	KT 161018-1402
11/03/2007	0920	KT 161018-1407
15/03/2007	0344	KT 161018-1408
26/03/2007	0015	KT 161018-1413
28/03/2007	0572	KT 161018-1409
24/05/2007	0633	KT 161018-1417
27/05/2007	1381	KT 161018-1415

Date	FWIN	Exhibit Reference
31/05/2007	0074	KT 161018-1416
21/06/2007	1563	KT 161018-1418
19/07/2007	1600	KT 161018-1419
24/07/2007	0571	KT 161018-1420
02/08/2007	0632	KT 161018-1421
28/08/2007	0501	KT 161018-1422
20/09/2007	0283	KT 161018-1424
26/09/2007	0977	KT 161018-1423
21/10/2007	0444	KT 161018-1427
24/10/2007	0379	KT 161018-1425
31/10/2007	1808	KT 161018-1426
17/11/2007	0850	KT 161018-1429
20/11/2007	1204	KT 161018-1428
09/12/2007	0155	KT 161018-1431
19/12/2007	0438	KT 161018-1430

175. Only one deleted incident log was recovered from within the relevant times as highlighted above on 21<sup>st</sup> June 2007. This also identified that one further log, on 24<sup>th</sup> May 2007, had been deleted but was not identified during the 'I30' audit as detailed above.
176. The investigation team conducted an NPICCS system check designed to capture any 'missing incident logs' on the system. This captured the total number of recorded incidents on the system each day and compared against the total number of incident logs that remained on the system to identify any disparity in the numbers. There were no missing incidents identified within the relevant time. The check identified only one date where there was any disparity, this being on 12<sup>th</sup> September 2002, where incident logs 0041 120902 and 0214 120902 were missing.

### Duties audits

177. The NPICCS system captures all officer and staff duties in both their rostered/expected duty times and also an actual book on/book off duty times. The rostered duty start and finish times are what would have been prepopulated into the system showing their expected start and finish time according to their shift pattern. The actual book on/book off time is what would be manually recorded on that day as the time in which the officer manually books on and off duty. This process could be completed by the officer themselves or by their supervisor or member of the control room on their behalf. As this is a manual process there could be both delays in booking on and off or even times where the officer does neither so there is significant margin for error.
178. For the purpose of this investigation the team have primarily focussed on the rostered tour of duty when considering officer duties on a day by day basis. The investigation team have obtained the records of all Northumbria Police personnel duties from 1<sup>st</sup> May 2007 to 31<sup>st</sup> August 2007. (ND22, ND94, ND95, PD 260220 08gg & PD 260220 08hh)

### NPICCS systems audits

179. As previously explained, all actions carried out within NPICCS leave a footprint which will identify any actions carried out by a user on the system and will identify the user by their individual identification number. These are referred to as 'system or living archive audits'. For the purpose of this investigation

in trying to establish if a particular officer/staff member or group of officers/staff members have seen or done an action to the alleged incident the investigation team have obtained system audits for fifty three officers and staff for analysis<sup>62</sup>.

180. During the management of any incident individual officers or specialist support, such as air support or firearms support teams, will be allocated to the incident. This is more commonly referred to as being 'resourced'. NPICCS records this information and as such audits can be obtained for a particular 'resource' to identify what incident they have been resourced to. The investigation team have obtained resource audits for forty five resources for analysis<sup>63</sup>.

### Global Positioning System (GPS)

181. GPS is a satellite navigation system used to determine the ground position of an object. In modern policing GPS receivers are fitted to a number of devices including both personal and vehicle police radios. In 2007 GPS data was only available in Northumbria Police from police radios installed in police vehicles. GPS data was not available for individual issue personal radios until an upgrade in November 2007. The police vehicle radios will only associate to an individual officer if they had been assigned to that set.
182. Given that the assigning of officers to radio sets required human action, errors could occur in that the wrong officer number could be assigned to a set or an officer number could remain assigned even after that officer had finished their tour of duty. The reality being that the available data is accurate in the GPS position of a car but the officer assigned to that car radio cannot be depended upon as reliable.
183. Furthermore, if a vehicle was being used by more than one officer, then only one would be assigned to the radio set. An in car police radio set equipped with GPS would have to be switched on in order to work and create data.
184. GPS data can be audited in two ways. Firstly on an individual user basis and secondly to all users in a defined geographical area.
185. Whilst keeping an open mind about the accuracy of the GPS data possessed by Northumbria Police, taking into account the above potential anomalies, the investigation team have obtained a number of GPS audits both for individual officers and geographical areas<sup>64</sup>.

### Northumbria Police Communications Centre recordings for incoming and outgoing telephone calls and radio transmissions

186. Northumbria Police communications centres operate both telephone and radio systems. Each system records all incoming and outgoing communications onto a hard drive. Northumbria Police use Weston Digital System for recordings. Both the NCC and SCC have their own system and record their own communications. The NCC would record all telephone communications coming in or out of that centre together with the radio transmissions for the areas it covered (north of the River Tyne). The SCC would record all telephone communications coming in or out of that centre together with the radio transmissions for the areas it covered (south of the River Tyne). There are also a number of 'force

---

<sup>62</sup> See appendix 11 for the full list of 53 system audits

<sup>63</sup> See appendix 12 for the full list of 45 resource audits

<sup>64</sup> See appendix 13 for GPS audits

wide' radio channels, known as talk groups, such as firearms, air operations (helicopter), special event channels, mutual aid and hailing talk groups. These talk groups are also recorded but split between the northern and southern systems – for example the 'firearms talk group' would be recorded on the NCC system.

187. Due to the amount of data being recorded and stored both centres regularly transfer the recorded data from the hard drives across to compact disc. The discs are retained at each centre in order for the data to be retrievable when required.
188. The investigation team made initial enquires with Northumbria Police to establish whether any telephone and radio communication recordings were still retained or retrievable from 2007. Northumbria Police policy was that all recordings be retained for a period of seven years and supplied a copy of the Northumbria Police Call Handling Plan effective from 24<sup>th</sup> September 2013. Within this document under paragraph headed 'Digital Audio Recording' it states that call data will be retained on the Weston Digital system initially on line then on DVD, for a period of 7 years and can be retained indefinitely upon request:

<p><b>Northumbria Police Call Handling Plan</b>  <b>Issued:</b> 24/09/2013 <b>Effective:</b> 24/09/2013 <b>Next Review:</b> 16/02/2015</p> <hr/> <p><b>NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED</b></p> <p><b>PROCEDURE TITLE:</b> Northumbria Police Call Handling Plan</p> <p><b>IN SUPPORT OF POLICY:</b> <a href="#">Call Handling Policy</a></p> <p><b>CONTACT DETAILS:</b> Head of Communications, Communications Department (Ext 68050)</p>
<p><b>Digital Audio Recording</b></p> <p>The force has acquired a digital voice recording solution (Weston Digital). All calls and Airwave transmissions to and from operational workstations within Communications Department will be recorded. The Weston Digital system allows for instantaneous access to voice recordings, and enables easy capture and transportation (via email) around the force network.</p> <p>Call data will be retained on the Weston Digital system initially on line then on DVD, for a period of 7 years and can be retained indefinitely upon request. Communications Department will assist Area Commands and Departments in the monitoring, reporting and provision of voice data for evidential purposes.</p>

189. In theory all recordings from 2007, unless specifically previously requested, should have been destroyed as the seven years elapsed during 2014 into 2015. (ND36 & ND37)
190. Communications System Support Advisor #PS 316 has responsibility for the retention and destruction of the recorded communications. She conducted an inspection of all retained recordings and found that recordings were only in existence from October 2007 onwards. All recordings from the relevant time of the alleged incident had been destroyed as per policy. This task had been completed in 2014.
191. In October 2018 the investigation team visited the NCC and met with #PS 316 who showed them the audio extract archive room. From here the investigation team removed a number of cardboard boxes containing the compact discs of the audio recordings and conducted a search through the boxes. From within the boxes the team seized four discs:
- Two discs with no markings or label (E. ICB161018-1335)
  - Disc marked 'CFFA start 8/6/07 0932:45 End 6/7/07 0919:1336' (E. ICB161018-1336)
  - Disc marked '19 Jun 07' (E. ICB171018-0945)

No other discs were recovered. (A127, S70 & S71)


192. In February 2019 the investigation team visited the SCC and met with #PS 316. The team conducted a search of the retained discs at this location and found no recordings that pre dated October 2007. #PS 316 explained that she had last completed weeding of discs in September 2014 in line with the seven year retention policy. She confirmed that no further weeding had taken place since. (A193)
193. The four recovered discs have been examined and contained the following data:
- Two discs with no markings / label (E. ICB161018-1335) were blank discs.
  - The disc marked 'CFFA start 8/6/07 0932:45 End 6/7/07 0919:1336' (E. ICB161018-1336) was recordings from within the 'training room' covering the stated time period but there was no content on the disc.
  - Disc marked '19 Jun 07' (E. ICB171018-0945) was a NCC data disc covering the time period of 21:15:21 on 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2007 to 14:33:48 on 27<sup>th</sup> June 2007. (A192)
194. Further examination of disc '19 Jun 07' showed that it contained both telephone communications and radio communications from a number of talk groups between the stated times. The talk groups included all four firearms channels as well as talk group (Northern 07 (F6/F7/F8/F9 – N/Land ACU 1)) covering Northumberland areas from Alnwick up to Berwick. Although this data could not be reviewed without the supporting software it could be downloaded into a more standard format. Due to the huge volume of data contained and the extensive hours that would be required to both transfer the data and then review it the investigation team requested the following for review:
- Copy of all radio communications for the ACU 1 (Northumberland F6,7,8,9) between the following time and date parameters:
    - 2115hrs – 2300hrs on 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2007
    - 1100hrs – 2300hrs on 24<sup>th</sup> June 2007
  - Copy of all radio communications on Firearms 1,2,3,4 channels between the following time and date parameters:
    - 2115hrs on 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2007 to 0100hrs on 25<sup>th</sup> June 2007

(A194 & A195)


## Panic alarms

195. Police issued panic alarms known locally in Northumbria as 'PPU alarms' were introduced in 2001. These devices were linked to the telephone network. They had a 'panic button' which, when pressed would send an immediate signal to the police communications centre so that resources could be deployed. These alarms also had an open microphone facility so that when activated, the operator could hear what was happening at the address.
196. Both the deployments and records of deployments of PPU alarms were managed by crime prevention officers at local area commands in 2007. On installing an alarm officers would notify the communications centre by way of a message switch on NPICCS in order for the alarm code to be validated against the address where it had been installed, allowing for this information to be immediately available in the event of an activation on NPICCS.
197. Northumbria Police have no record of a 'PPU alarm' having been installed at the home address of Mr and Mrs Craik in Bamburgh during the summer of 2007.
198. Research of the NPICCS system confirmed that although there was no record of there being any alarm fitted at the address in 2007, a record was found referring to the installation of a PPU alarm in


2009 in response to a specific threat. The alarm was installed by #PO 055 from the Northumberland Video Unit. Data from the NPICCS system captures the marker being placed onto the address on 16<sup>th</sup> October 2009: (ND 78)



199. Research of NPICCS confirmed that there was an alarm activation at this address on 23<sup>rd</sup> October 2009 and incident log 0680 23/10/2009 is created. The incident refers to male voices being heard and an officer identifies himself as on scene trying to disable the alarm, this officer is #PO 055 and the incident is finalised and the alarm reset: (ND 78)



200. A further check of NPICCS within the address history screen shows this to be the only recorded incident to have occurred at Mr Craik's address. The PPU alarm was removed from the address on 10th November 2009, having been installed for a period of four weeks: (ND78)



201. Northumbria Police also used a system which recorded the deployment of safeguarding equipment. A check of this system records two installations of equipment in 2009, one at Mr Craik's address and one at a neighbours address in Bamburgh – these are both recorded as CCTV equipment. There is no record on the system of any equipment installations at either of Mr Craik's addresses in 2007. (ND96)

### Airwave radio

202. Police officers of all ranks in Northumbria Police were issued with personal Airwave radios. Airwave radios have unique serial numbers and when issued are assigned to the collar number of the officer. This provides the communications centres with the knowledge of identifying a radio transmission to a particular officer.
203. All Airwave radios have a built in emergency button which, when activated, sends an emergency signal across the channel and allows the officer activating it the facility to pass an urgent message as a priority over any other ongoing communications. This facility is normally used when an officer requires emergency assistance. This is clearly visible to the staff in the communications centre operating on the channel so that they can then manage the required response.
204. #PS 317 is part of the Northumbria Police Airwave team. He has produced records showing that whilst that whilst he was the Chief Constable, Mr Craik was issued with two Airwave radios under his collar number of 7005. On 7<sup>th</sup> October 2003 Mr Craik was issued with radio serial number 157TCS1037 and then on 23<sup>rd</sup> August 2007 this radio was upgraded and replaced by radio serial number 890THN3574. (A204, S103 & E MP-270319-05)

205. Once a radio has been assigned to an officer, the Airwave team would issue the radio with its own Individual Short Subscriber Identity (ISSI). For all personal issue radios this would always be the number "192" followed by the officers four digit collar number. In the case of Mr Craik both radios would have been issued with ISSI "1927005".
206. The ISSI provides the Airwave team with the ability to follow or audit the activity of an individual's personal issue radio in terms of usage and activations. #PS 317 has conducted an audit of emergency calls and radio activity for personal radios during June and July 2007: (S103)

Exhibit	Description
MP-270319-01	Emergency calls from June 2007
MP-270319-02	Emergency calls from July 2007
MP-270319-03	Radio activity from June 2007
MP-270319-04	Radio activity from July 2007

207. There was no activity within these audits for ISSI 1927005 indicating no usage during June and July 2007.

### Northumbria Police Communications Centre Short Message Logs

208. As part of the communications centre IT software on NPICCS, Northumbria Police have a system in place that operates similar to 'instant messenger service'. In basic terms this is an application that sits within the communication centre on all desk top computers where individuals logged into their terminals can message each other on a private one to one basis or to post group announcements.
209. The principle purpose of this system is to allow people within the centres to communicate with each other promptly without the need to phone or shout across the room and so help streamline the operations of the centre. An example being that the system may be used to request someone to look at a particular incident log or for call takers to pass information or updates across to dispatchers and vice versa.
210. The system operated across both sites and therefore people within the SCC could message those both within their own centre and also those in the NCC.
211. Primarily, this system is in place to communicate policing messages between users but by its very nature it can and is used between individuals for private chatter and gossip.
212. Given the wide scope that this system can be used for both in terms of live policing and personal chat it was a reasonable line of enquiry to ascertain whether any of the data from this system was still retained and retrievable for the relevant period during 2007. Had an incident been reported within the communications centre of an incident at Mr Craik's home then this is one system that could have been used to raise awareness to those who need to know as well as for persons on duty to chat about what had allegedly been reported.

213. Enquiries conducted through the IS&T team within Northumbria Police confirmed that this data did still exist. All 'short message logs' from two distinct periods (a) 1<sup>st</sup> May 2007 to 1<sup>st</sup> October 2007 inclusive to cover the relevant time of the alleged incident and (b) 1<sup>st</sup> May 2016 to 1<sup>st</sup> July 2016 to cover the time of the employment tribunal of a former employee were retrieved and provided to the investigation team by #PS 318. This data has been reviewed and is subject to further comment in the analysis section of the report. (S89, A168 – E PD/121218/01J and PD/121218/01K)

### North East Ambulance Service (NEAS)

214. Similar to the police service, ambulance services across the country utilise a system of command and control to manage and prioritise their response to calls for service. They use a similar process to log calls and manage the response in the form of incident logs. It is common for the two emergency services to respond to the same incidents or call upon each other to assist at a particular incident. In an area the size of Northumberland, this will occur on multiple occasions daily. It is standard practice across the country for either service to cross reference their incident logs, normally by recording the incident number of the corresponding service within the body of the incident log. Northumbria is serviced by the NEAS. The NEAS refer to incident logs as case numbers. Their system is unique from Northumbria Police in so much as case numbers are particular to an incident. They are not sequential numbers for a given date.
215. It is necessary to address the inference concerning the complete deletion of the incident log and a suggestion that the remaining incident logs for the 24 hour cycle were re-sequenced and renumbered. It has previously been explained that a check of the system identified two incident logs that had been totally deleted in 2002. In that particular circumstance there was a clear break in the numbering sequence with the two incident logs missing. Another consideration, which is technically possible, is deleting an incident log and resequencing and renumbering the incident logs that are recorded after the deleted log. Whilst being possible, this has been described by IS&T staff as requiring a significant outage of the IT estate to reconfigure NPICCS. Indeed #PO 283 makes specific reference to an unplanned IT outage around the time of the allegations. Any outage and work to renumber and re-sequence incident logs could only apply to Northumbria Police incident logs and not to other agencies who operate independently of the police. Accordingly, the investigation team reviewed incident logs where there had been an interaction with the NEAS. If a Northumbria Police incident log had been completely deleted and the remaining logs for that day re-sequenced and renumbered then it would be reasonable to expect a mismatch in NEAS incident logs and the details recorded on them.
216. A total of two hundred and forty three NEAS incident logs were extracted from incident logs on NPICCS between 1<sup>st</sup> June and 15<sup>th</sup> July 2007. This equated to an average of five incident logs a day. Reasonable efforts were made to get logs at differing times in the 24 hour cycle.
217. The investigation team only sent the ambulance case numbers to the NEAS who were asked to review those logs and extract the corresponding police incident number from their logs and return these to the investigation team. (A397, S128, E JR/1 and JR/2) Once they had provided the data, this was analysed by the investigation team.

## Part 3 – Additional Matters

### Disparity of the rumours

218. During the course of this enquiry a number of different versions of the allegation or 'rumour' have been provided to the investigation team with differing accounts about who attended the incident and how it was resolved. These have included the following versions:
219. Mr Craik held a barbeque at his home address in Bamburgh. At this time Mr Peacock assaulted him and Mrs Craik activated a panic alarm installed in the house.
220. Mrs Peacock and Mr Peacock were in the general area where Mr Craik lived. They had a domestic argument in their vehicle about the alleged affair. Mr Peacock went to the address of Mr Craik. They argued and Mr Peacock assaulted Mr Craik. Mrs Craik activated a panic alarm.
221. The alleged assault occurred following the joint leaving party for Mr and Mrs Peacock at which the Mr Craik had given a leaving speech. This leaving party was supposed to have taken place in Newcastle.
222. Mr Peacock assaulted Mr Craik because it was alleged that he was aware that Mrs Peacock was having an affair with another assistant chief constable, who had by this time transferred to another force and had not told him.
223. Mr Craik was found in a compromising position at the house of a former Chief Superintendent with the Chief Superintendents wife
224. Mr Peacock had gone to Mr Craik's flat in Gosforth and assaulted him. A panic alarm had been activated and #PO 047 attended the flat.
225. In terms of the rumour about who attended, the investigation team have spoken with a range of officers from different teams and departments who provide limited consistency around the nature of the rumour and who may have attended. These have included, neighbourhood officers, response officers, and specialist units, including firearms, traffic and dogs. This disparity is replicated across different areas of the organisation as summarised below.
226. Within the accounts of the rumour provided by the Berwick officers and staff the investigation team noted the following:
  - Seven state that #PO 007 (A181) (Berwick supervisor) attended or may have attended the alleged incident. (A166, A239, A356, A357, A381, A384, A487)
  - Six state that #PO 015 (A80) (Seahouses beat officer) attended or may have attended the alleged incident. (A164, A166, A239, A241, A459, A462)
  - One states that #PO 021 (A325) (Motor patrols officer) attended or may have attended the alleged incident. (A592)
  - One states that #PO 022 (A580) (24/7 response officer at Blyth) was dispatched to the alleged incident as a taser response. (A458)
227. Within the accounts of the rumour provided by the Alnwick officers and staff, the investigation team noted the following:

- Two state that Inspector Gilroy (traffic inspector) may have attended or had some involvement in the alleged incident. (A473, A506)
- Two state that #PO 007 (A181) (Berwick supervisor) attended or may have attended the alleged incident. (A178, A520)
- One states that #PO 025 (A380) (Alnwick 24/7 response officer) attended or may have attended the alleged incident. (A473)
- One states that #PO 021 (A325) (motor patrols officer) attended or may have attended the alleged incident. (A506)
- One states that #PO 026 (A243) (Alnwick beat officer) attended or may have attended the alleged incident. (A525)

228. Within the accounts of the rumour provided by the firearms officers, the investigation team noted the following:

- Twelve state that #PO 014 (A72) (Seahouses neighbourhood officer and former firearms officer) attended or may have attended the alleged incident. (A23, A24, A33, A47, A57, A62, A64, A165, A216, A396, A398, A537)
- One states that #PO 027 (A398) (firearms officer) attended or may have attended the alleged incident. (A375)
- One states that a #PO 028 (described as a neighbourhood officer and former firearms officer) attended or may have attended the alleged incident. (A541) This officer has not been identified by the investigation team, however the way in which the officer describes this person it is believed they may actually be referring to Mr Young (A72)
- One states that a firearms car attended or may have attended the alleged incident, but does not name any specific officer. (A94)

229. Within the accounts of the rumour provided by the traffic officers, the investigation team noted the following:

- Two state that Inspector Gilroy attended or may have attended the alleged incident. (A327, A522)
- One states that #PO 007 (A181) (Berwick 24/7 response officer) attended or may have attended the alleged incident. (A316)
- One states that #PO 015 (A80) (Seahouses neighbourhood officer) attended or may have attended the alleged incident. (A316)
- One states that #PO 043 (A365) (firearms officer) attended or may have attended the alleged incident. (A329)
- One states that #PO 039 (A291) (dog section officer) attended or may have attended the alleged incident. (A342)
- One states that #PO 029 (A180) (firearms officer) attended or may have attended the alleged incident. (A69)
- One states that #PO 006 (A235) (Berwick 24/7 response officer) attended or may have attended the alleged incident. (A524)
- Four state that a firearms resource attended or may have attended the alleged incident, but do not name any specific officer. (A320, A328, A329, A333)
- One states that a traffic resource attended or may have attended the alleged incident, but does not name any specific officer. (A327)
- One states that a dog resource attended or may have attended the alleged incident, but does not name any specific officer. (A327)

230. Within the accounts of the rumour provided by the dog section officers the investigation team do take note of the following:
- One states that Inspector Gilroy (traffic inspector) attended or may have attended the alleged incident. (A285)
  - One states that a traffic resource attended or may have attended the alleged incident, but does not name any specific officer. (A289)
  - One states that a firearms resource attended or may have attended the alleged incident, but does not name any specific officer. (A289)
  - One states that a Seahouses beat officer attended or may have attended the alleged incident, but does not name any specific officer. (A286)
231. Within the accounts of the rumour provided by the control room staff the investigation team do take note of the following:
- Two stated that #PO 015 (A80) (neighbourhood officer) attended or may have attended the alleged incident. (A66, A393)
  - One states that #PO 047 (A51) (24/7 response officer) attended or may have attended the alleged incident. (A39)
  - One states that a local resource attended or may have attended the alleged incident, but does not name any specific officer. (A102)
  - One states that a 24/7 response resource attended or may have attended the alleged incident, but does not name any specific officer. (A518)
  - Two state that a traffic resource attended or may have attended the alleged incident, but do not name any specific officer. (A67, A101)
  - Seven state that a firearms resource attended or may have attended the alleged incident, but do not name any specific officer. (A41, A70, A101, A307, A308, A518, A544)
  - Two state that a dog section resource attended or may have attended the alleged incident, but do not name any specific officer. (A308, A544)
  - One states that air support were allocated to the alleged incident. (A544)
232. Within the accounts of the rumour provided by other officers and staff, the investigation team do take note of the following:
- Two say that Inspector Gilroy (traffic inspector) attended or may have attended the alleged incident. (A249, A251)
  - One states that #PO 015 (A80) (neighbourhood officer) attended or may have attended the alleged incident. (A251)
  - Three say that #PO 014 (A72) (neighbourhood officer) attended or may have attended the alleged incident. (A165, A335, A372)
  - One states that #PO 013 (A359) (Alnwick special constable) attended or may have attended the alleged incident. (A335)
  - Five say that a firearms resource attended or may have attended the alleged incident, but no specific officer is named (A119, A121, A165, A377, A378)
  - Two say that a dog handler attended or may have attended the alleged incident, but no specific officer is named. (A51, A377)

### Inspector Paul Gilroy

233. Mr Gilroy retired from Northumbria Police on 10<sup>th</sup> April 2010. He retired with a certificate of exemplary service.
234. On 26<sup>th</sup> March 2016 Mr Gilroy provided a statement to the Employment Tribunal on behalf of a former employee. He had made the statement having been asked whether he had been aware of an incident that occurred at the home address of Mr Craik with another officer Mr Peacock at which time Mrs Craik activated the chief constables panic alarm and which took place at a time between the end of June and beginning of July 2007.
235. Mr Gilroy recalls an incident as he made a pocket note book entry at the time and recalls the events that occurred immediately after. He exhibits his pocket note book asserting that his statement is based on this. At 07:40am on Saturday 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2007, he started duty as the operations inspector at Northumberland area command, assuming force wide responsibility for operational support resources, which included dog support, area support, armed response vehicles and supervision of motor patrols. During the afternoon he received information from the communications centre supervisor that officers had been deployed to the home of Mr Craik residing in Bamburgh, Northumberland following the activation of the personal attack alarm. He intended to monitor any updates from the incident. He states that before completing his duty at 4:00pm that day, he had not had any updates and so viewed the computer generated log for the incident and found that all the text on the incident log had been deleted. Having spoken to officers dispatched to the incident, it was apparent to Mr Gilroy why the 'the log had been deleted' as the incident had apparently involved an altercation between the Chief and Mr Peacock.
236. On Monday 25<sup>th</sup> June 2007 at 08:30am Mr Gilroy attended a supervisors meeting at Bedlington police station which is a routine event to discuss events of the previous weekend or 24 hour period. He recalls that at the end of the meeting he was instructed to remain behind to discuss the incident with the Chief that had occurred over the weekend. He believes that by this stage there appeared to be a leak to the media. Mr Gilroy recalls that he was instructed to make enquiries with officers who had attended the personal incident to establish who may have leaked information. He did not make these enquiries. A copy of the relevant entry in the pocket note book was made available to the tribunal. (ND 5)
237. Mr Gilroy did not provide live evidence to the Tribunal. It is unclear why he did not attend the Tribunal in person. #PO 058 (A178) was a close friend of Mr Gilroy who told him about the incident log within a month of it occurring. Mr Gilroy had also told him that he had provided a statement for the tribunal and had received a call to attend the hearing but had been unable to do so as he was working as a lorry driver
238. Mr Gilroy died in 2017.
239. On 11<sup>th</sup> December 2018 officers from the investigation team attended the home address of the late Mr Gilroy and his wife. Mrs Gilroy was not aware that her late husband had provided a statement to the Tribunal. Mrs Gilroy searched the loft of the family home where personal possessions of Mr Gilroy were stored. This included a pocket note book of Mr Gilroy which covered a period between April and October 2007 and was handed to the investigation team. (E CLG 111218 1630)
240. An examination of the pocket note book found that at page twenty three a 'post it note' was attached to the entry he refers to in his statement regarding the meeting on Monday 25<sup>th</sup> June 2007. There is

no entry relating to knowledge or involvement of an incident on Saturday 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2007. A review of the pocket note book in finer detail, does not assist the investigation in so much as there is no ancillary entry concerning the contents as referred to in his statement.

### Pocket Notebooks

241. In 2007, Northumbria Police had the following policy in place with regard to pocket notebooks (ND 26):

Police officers, police community support officers (PCSO's), scientific support staff and traffic wardens will be issued with a pocket notebook, which they must carry when on operational duty.

The following must be recorded:

Evidence where no other primary record exists - however see below regarding CIS/VIS entries and taped interviews

Any decision made which may impact on Human Rights. (This will include, where applicable, the decision making process and reasoning behind any decision made).

Any other exceptional item at the discretion of the user.

Notebooks may be dormant between entries, however, any entry must be clearly dated and timed. Each entry must be made at the time of occurrence or as soon as possible afterwards.

It is not necessary to record:

Any matter recorded in police records elsewhere. However there are 2 important exceptions to this:

The admissibility of computer records, for example CIS 'sightings' in court will depend on satisfying the judge or magistrates that the record was made by the person who witnessed the event, and that the record was made while the event was fresh in that person's mind. A written record made at the time of the sighting is desirable to support any later computer entry.

PACE Code of practice E para 5.1 requires a record to be made in the officers pocketbook of the fact that a taped interview has taken place, its time and duration and the identification (POFP) number of the master tape.

Northumbria Police procedure (effective date 18<sup>th</sup> October 2004) for the retention of pocket note books states that:

Pocket notebooks will be retained by users upon completion for 2 years.

Following this, pocket notebooks will be stored for a further 5 years in the area command or department administration before being destroyed – except in serious cases where they should be retained with the case papers.

All pocket notebooks in the possession of staff leaving the force must be returned to the area command or other designated administrator.

242. Consideration has been given to the possibility that any officer attending the alleged incident may have recorded doing so within their pocket notebook and the investigation team has made enquiries with Northumbria Police to locate pocket notebooks from the relevant period (in 2007) and review them.
243. The investigation team were directed to both Berwick and Alnwick police stations as locations where pocket notebooks would have been issued and stored upon completion for officers serving within the area where Mr Craik lived (both as neighbourhood officers and 24/7 response officers).
244. The investigation team attended Berwick police station and were shown a number of boxes and a filing cabinet within which were a number of completed pocket notebooks. There was no clear system of how the books were stored and therefore the team searched through the books reviewing any that covered the relevant period and no entries were identified that could in any way be attributed to this

investigation. There was an issuing register present which documented the issuing and return of pocket notebooks to and from officers. Copies covering the relevant time period were obtained. (ND 81)

245. The investigation team attended Alnwick police station and were shown a number of boxes stored within the property store which contained a number of completed pocket notebooks. There was no clear system of how the books were stored and therefore the team searched through the books reviewing any that covered the relevant period and no entries were identified that could in any way be attributed to this investigation. There were a number of paper sheets that appeared to represent the issuing and return of pocket notebooks to and from officers. Copies covering the relevant time period were obtained. (ND 82)

### Misconduct Proceedings (a former employee)

246. Upon review of the material supplied by Northumbria Police concerning the Employment Tribunal of a former employee (ND12 & ND31) the investigation team established that a part of the misconduct proceedings (CM/56/13) concerned alleged disclosures of sensitive information around the matters subject to this investigation. These alleged disclosures were made to #PS 319, #PS 320, #PS 321, #PS 322 and #PS 323. The material referred to evidence provided by these individuals by way of written statements and subsequent interviews. Nothing that was reported assisted in determining the truthfulness of matters being discussed or whether an incident had occurred. (A261 - ND 80)
247. #PS 319 was a senior solicitor working within the Northumbria Police legal department in 2013. On 6<sup>th</sup> June 2013 she was present, together with #PS 320, #PS 321 and #PS 322, during a meeting held by the former employee. During the meeting the former employee referred to their handling of an incident involving Chief Constable Craik and Assistant Chief Constable Peacock and their intimate personal relationship.
248. #PS 319 also said that she had heard previously that Mike Craik and Carolyn Peacock had been involved in a personal relationship but could not recall the context in which she had been told this or when, albeit thought that it may have been the former employee who had also told her this previously. (A261 - ND 80)
249. #PS 320 was a senior solicitor working within the Northumbria Police legal department in 2013. On 6<sup>th</sup> June 2013 he was present, together with #PS 319, #PS 321 and #PS 322, during a meeting called by the former employee. During this meeting the former employee referred to having saved the force from considerable embarrassment over the years and mentioned one matter which involved Mr Craik having been found at the home of a former Chief Superintendent in a compromising situation with the Chief Superintendent's wife.
250. #PS 320 was not sure if he had heard of this alleged affair through any prior rumour. (A261 - ND 80)
251. #PS 321 was an assistant force lawyer working within the Northumbria Police legal department in 2013. On 6<sup>th</sup> June 2013 he was present, together with #PS 319, #PS 320 and #PS 322, during a meeting called by the former employee. During this meeting the former employee referred to having previously dealt with some sensitive matters relating to senior officers saying that Mr Craik had been having an affair with another officer's wife, which they had been involved in sorting out.
252. #PS 321 explains that he had heard rumour of an affair between Mike Craik and another officer's wife. He clarifies that he had only been with Northumbria Police since June 2011. (A261 - ND 80)

253. #PS 322 was the legal services manager working within the Northumbria Police legal department in 2013. On 6<sup>th</sup> June 2013 she was present, together with #PS 319, #PS 320 and #PS 321 during a meeting called by the former employee. During this meeting the former employee referred to having had been involved in dealing with an affair between Mr Craik and Mrs Peacock and the difficulties in the working relationship between Mr Craik and Mr Peacock.
254. #PS 322 had heard rumour on the grapevine five or six years earlier of an affair between Mr Craik and Mrs Peacock but at the time that had just been rumour which she had paid little attention to. (A261 - ND 80)
255. #PS 323 was a data protection and disclosure advisor in the disclosure and barring service of Northumbria Police in 2013. She had a telephone conversation with the former employee on the evening of 9<sup>th</sup> June 2013, during which the former employee said that they had 'covered the arses of command several times' and referred to 'Mr Craik's shenanigans'. (A261 - ND 80)

### Northumbria Police Anti-Corruption Unit investigation 2007

256. Within the report and documentation provided by Northumbria Police Anti-Corruption Unit there is reference in communication with the media department and #PO 004 that the rumours may have been started by a disgruntled former employee of Northumbria Police who may have been dismissed, resigned whilst under investigation or was required to resign following a misconduct investigation. Eleven officers were dismissed, resigned or were required to resign in 2007. None of these former officers have been spoken to by the investigation team as it is considered that they do not meet the criteria or fall into the range of personal highlighted in the scope of this report.

Rank	Outcome and date
PC	Dismissed - 27/04/07
PC	Required to resign - 06/06/07
PC	Required to resign - 20/03/07
PC	Resigned - 26/07/07
PC	Required to resign - 19/04/07
PC	Dismissed - 06/11/07
PC	Required to resign - 2007
PC	Required to resign to but reinstated with reduction in rank on appeal - 2007
PC	Resigned - 28/03/07
PC	Dismissed - 19/02/07
PC	Required to resign - 26/07/07

### Operation Elveden Enquiries

257. As referenced in the previous investigations, in December 2012 Northumbria Police were contacted by the Operation Elveden investigation team from the Metropolitan Police. The Operation Elveden team were in receipt of information about an allegation that former Chief Constable Craik had been involved in an altercation, at his home address, with a former Chief Superintendent Jim Peacock. It suggested that this had resulted from an allegation that Mr Craik was having an extra marital affair with his wife, former Assistant Chief Constable Carolyn Peacock. This information had been disclosed to the News of the World and the Operation Elveden team made a formal request to Northumbria Police for the following information:

- Did the incident actually happen?
  - If yes, did you investigate any leaks around the story?
  - Also, if yes, could you provide the names, addresses, dates of birth, telephone numbers and any adverse intelligence re the officers attending?
258. #PO 278 conducted enquiries into the questions raised by Operation Elveden on behalf of Northumbria Police.
259. #PO 278 made enquiries with #PS 315, the force information systems manager, which did not identify any record or partially deleted record relating to the matter, similarly his enquiries identified two incident logs having been totally deleted from the system – these being the two also identified by this enquiry as having been deleted by #PS 313 – incident logs 0041 and 0214 of 12<sup>th</sup> September 2002.
260. #PO 278 made direct enquiries with #PO 003 as he had been the head of communications at the time, who informed him that no incident had been deleted.
261. #PO 278 made further enquiries with the head of the legal department and also #PS 383 as head of corporate communications, both of whom recalled the media interest at the time in 2007.
262. #PO 278 concludes at that time that no paper trail exists supporting the existence of an incident.
263. #PO 278 reported direct to #PO 279 on 21<sup>st</sup> February 2013. (ND 2) Within this report he outlines the outcome of enquiries conducted as:
- The Incident Logging system contains no recorded or partially deleted incident relating to this matter.
  - IS&T Department have no record of a manual programme being created to completely remove such an incident although such facilities are available and have been used for other matters.
  - Senior members of the organisation spoken to during my investigation can all recall the matter, some of whom have spoken about it with Mr Craik, but none have revealed to me their knowledge of such a matter being recorded with Northumbria Police.
  - No paper trail exists supporting the existence of such an incident.
264. #PO 278 recommends the following responses be directed to the Operation Elveden team:
- The inquiries I have so far conducted have not established conclusively that an incident did or did not happen. My inquiries with the force control room supervisors and other technical experts have uncovered no record of a recorded incident at any addresses relating to former Chief Constable Craik.
  - There was no formal investigation at the time that the Press showed an interest in the story though some checks of the internal telephone system were conducted by the Counter Corruption Unit in an apparent attempt to identify any person within the organisation who may have contacted a reporter. These proved negative at the time.
  - As I am unable to establish conclusively that such an incident took place no officers could be identified.
265. #PO 075 was asked to review the report and provided a number recommendations in a report to #PO 279 on 15<sup>th</sup> March 2013. (ND 3) Within this report #PO 075 agrees with the recommended responses suggested by #PO 278 direct to the Operation Elveden senior investigating officer (SIO) along with options for further investigation:
- Contact all officers of Northumbria Police to inquire whether any officer attended any call to any address linked to former Chief Constable, Mr Craik, and if so, to contact Professional Standards Department. They

could then be de-briefed and any information of value to the Elveden team sent on.

- Interview former Chief Constable Craik.
- Interview former Chief Superintendent Peacock.
- Interview #MP 403 (local media reporter).

266. #PO 075 recommends that these should be decisions for the Operation Elveden SIO to consider and should be subject to a written request to the Chief Constable, he further advises that it would be more appropriate for the latter three options to be conducted by Operation Elveden officers themselves.
267. No records of further communication with Operation Elveden were evident.
268. The investigation team takes note that the enquiries conducted by #PO 278 are referred to by the former employee both in their statement to the Employment Tribunal in April 2016 (ND 4) and in direct correspondence to the Staffordshire Police SIO and others in August 2018. (SD 36) The former employee refers to #PO 278's investigations being deliberately restricted by #PO 279 within these documents alluding to this being an example of a continued deliberate cover up by Northumbria Police.
269. The investigation team have obtained a copy of and reviewed the statement and verbal transcript provided by #PO 278 to the Misconduct Hearing in 2014. (ND 80)
270. The investigation team have also interviewed both #PO 278 (A548, S124) and #PO 075 (A595, S131) about the Operation Elveden investigation.
271. #PO 278 joined Northumbria Police on 29<sup>th</sup> April 2007 as a superintendent having transferred from Durham Police. He recalls that Mr and Mrs Peacock both retired soon after he had arrived in the force. He recalls hearing of rumour of an alleged incident involving Mr Peacock and Mr Craik in which Mr Peacock had allegedly attended the home address of Mr Craik over an alleged affair. #PO 278 recalled hearing this at some point after he joined Northumbria Police, within the same year in the summer months. The rumour suggested this had occurred at Mr Craik's house in Bamburgh, at night time over a weekend and some form of panic alarm had been activated.
272. #PO 278 was detective superintendent within the Professional Standards department and Counter Corruption Unit for Northumbria Police in 2012. He recalled being tasked by #PO 279 to undertake a sensitive enquiry which had been passed to Northumbria Police by the Metropolitan Police Service, Operation Elveden team. He recalled #PO 279 tasked him to see what he could find out.
273. #PO 278 undertook a number of enquiries which included IT enquiries as well as speaking with #PS 383 and a former employee. He recalled that the former employee was very professional and did not disclose anything about the advice they provided to Mr Craik but confirmed that Mr Craik had been very strong in wanting the allegations rebutted. He also recalled the former employee inferring that everyone was looking in the wrong place and asked if anyone had considered Mr Craik's flat in Gosforth as an alternative location. He prepared a report for #PO 279 and believed a further report was also prepared by #PO 075 but was not sure if Northumbria Police ever reported back to Operation Elveden.
274. #PO 278 was asked about comments he had made within his evidence to the former employee's misconduct hearing 'don't go there' and 'that's likely to lift a stone'. He explains these comments stating that he had considered there was further work which could have been undertaken to properly respond to the Operation Elveden team but he had been given instruction from #PO 279 not to

pursue the matter any further, he believed at the time that #PO 279 was concerned about reputational issues and risk for Northumbria Police and was therefore protective over the response to an external force.

275. #PO 278 believed that he had documented the actions he had carried out within a policy book, which was submitted to storage prior to his retirement. (A548, S124)
276. #PO 278's day books have been retrieved from the relevant time. A review of these books found two entries, both of which relate to him having found no evidence of the incident outside of anecdotal rumour. There were no entries relating to conversations with #PO 279 about this matter:
- 21<sup>st</sup> February 2013: A note regarding the enquiry and the fact that his enquiries were inconclusive as to whether the incident had taken place or not. Likewise it was inconclusive as to any contact with the press. His recommendation at the time was a copy of his report should be forwarded to the Operation Elveden Incident Room.
  - 21<sup>st</sup> March 2013: A note regarding the 'Chief' having sanctioned #PO 278 to write to the SIO of Operation Elveden to notify them that rumour exists in force, but no documentary evidence. If Operation Elveden identified any officers involved, then #PO 278 would like to carry out the resultant enquiries on their behalf.  
(ND 98, ND 99 & ND 100)
277. #PO 075 was chief superintendent, head of crime, in 2007. He recalled a rumour of a confrontation at Mr Craik's house over an alleged affair, a call being made to the police by Mrs Craik and that the incident had been hushed up and the incident log deleted.
278. #PO 075 recalled that at around this time both Mr and Mrs Peacock retired and held a large joint leaving party which was attended by Mr Craik who made a speech. He recalled thinking at the time that if there had been any truth in the rumour then it would have been unlikely that Mr Craik would have been invited to the event and make a speech.
279. #PO 075 was the chief superintendent in charge of the Professional Standards Department during 2012 and early 2013. He recalled that towards the end of 2012 or early 2013 he was approached by #PO 278 who informed him that he had been allocated an enquiry by #PO 279 which had come from the Metropolitan Police Service and was a matter he had to report directly to #PO 279 upon. The enquiry concerned the alleged incident from 2007 and #PO 278 voiced concern that he had been allocated the enquiry due to its nature. #PO 075 explains that it would not be unusual for such an enquiry to be managed in this way and he offered him advice and support if he needed it. #PO 278 did ask him whether he knew if the incident had happened and he told him he did not know but recounted his view about the retirement party. He recalled them having a discussion about approaching Mr Craik, now retired, and that he had advised this should be a decision at chief officer level given his former position as chief constable. He was aware that #PO 278 had submitted his report to #PO 279.
280. #PO 075 recalls being asked by #PO 279 to review the report and make recommendations. He made a number of recommendations as options to be considered by the SIO from the Metropolitan Police enquiry team, which included speaking with Mr Craik, Mr and Mrs Peacock, #MP 403 and approaching officers within force to come forward with any first-hand knowledge, and submitted his report alongside #PO 278's.

281. #PO 075 explained that #PO 279 retained possession of the reports for a period of time whilst he considered it and it was around this time that #PO 279 left Northumbria Police on promotion and #PO 280 inherited his work as the new deputy chief constable.
282. #PO 075 had a discussion about the matter with #PO 280 but cannot recall the specifics of that conversation. Both he and #PO 278 also left the department around a similar time and their positions were taken over by #PO 080. He believes that he made #PO 281 aware of this outstanding matter. He did not know if any response was ever submitted to the Operation Elveden investigation team. (A595, S131)
283. The investigation team have also contacted the Metropolitan Police to obtain the detail of what response Operation Elveden received from Northumbria Police to their enquiry.
284. The Metropolitan Police Service have responded that they were unable to locate a record of any formal action or response from Northumbria Police in relation to the Operation Elveden requests. (SD 37)
285. The investigation team have spoken directly with the officer who made the initial enquiries with Northumbria Police in 2012. He remembered the action but no longer has any access to the files. He recalled that the response from Northumbria Police at the time was either none existent or very minimal and negative with little or no information shared. He did highlight that this was one of a number of similar enquiries conducted with other police forces at the time as part of their investigation and the response he recalled from Northumbria Police was not unique. (A603)

## Analysis of the Evidence

---

### Did Mr Craik have a panic alarm installed and was it activated?

286. In statements provided to the investigation team and Tribunal both Mr and Mrs Craik strenuously deny having possession of a police issue alarm at their house in Bamburgh in 2007. They also deny ever activating a panic alarm on the basis that there wasn't one present.
287. Enquiries with Northumbria Police to identify a centralised system that recorded the deployment of PPU alarms proved negative. The system in place in 2007 was locally managed at area command level who were responsible for the recording and deployment of alarms within their command. As such, any records were locally created at the time and have not been retrieved by the investigation team.
288. It has however been established that in practice, at the time of the deployment of such assets, a record would be created against the address to which it had been installed on the NPICCS system and therefore would be documented within the 'address history' field on NPICCS.
289. No record exists on NPICCS to support the claim that Mr Craik had a police issued panic alarm installed in his house in either Bamburgh or Gosforth in 2007.
290. There is however, a record that one was installed in the house in Bamburgh in 2009 for a period of 4 weeks and this is fully recorded on NPICCS. Records for this alarm installation suggest that an activation occurred whilst it was being installed which generated a police response (incident log 680 of 23<sup>rd</sup> October 2009). (ND 78)
291. NPICCS records that this installation is completed by #PO 055 who is present at the time of the false activation on 23<sup>rd</sup> October 2009. #PO 055 has been interviewed by the investigation team and was at the time a local area command video unit operative involved in the deployment of such alarms and assets. #PO 055 also recalled having installed CCTV cameras at the location at the same time and directed the team to a system called 'Consolidare'.
292. Northumbria Police have confirmed that there is a record on Consolidare of two installations in 2009 – these are CCTV equipment at the addresses of Mr Craik and a neighbour in Bamburgh, consistent with the recollection of #PO 055 and the NPICCS history. The installation of the PPU alarm is not captured on Consolidare, but this is not unusual given the arrangements in place in 2007. (ND 96)
293. There is no record on Consolidare of a technical deployment at either of Mr Craik's addresses in 2007.
294. Of note, a review of incident log 0680 231009 (ND 78) shows that #PO 044 oversaw the incident from the communication centre. Four officers are dispatched to the incident who include #PO 060, #PO 061, #PO 008 and an officer who was not in force in 2007.
295. Neither #PO 044, #PO 060, #PO 061 nor #PO 008 reference this event when spoken to by the investigation team.
296. It is significant that there is a record of an alarm being installed at Mr Craik's address in 2009 – the obvious inference is that one needed to be installed as there wasn't one already fitted.

297. In considering whether panic alarms were issued to chief constables within Northumbria Police, the investigation team identified that one former chief constable (pre Mr Craik) did have an alarm fitted at their address for many years both during service and beyond. This was issued on an individual circumstances basis as opposed to simply because they were chief constable.
298. The investigation team have confirmed that neither the current chief constable or #PO 292 had panic alarms fitted as normal procedure as part of their role as chief constable.
299. An additional means of summoning urgent assistance available to all police officers is through the activation of an emergency button on their airwave police radio. It is uncommon for officers to have their radios on whilst off duty but it is a consideration that senior officers or those performing on call roles may have access to their radios away from the work place.
300. The investigation team have identified the airwave radios assigned to Mr Craik during the relevant time period and have established through an audit that there was no usage of the device and no evidence that he activated the emergency button on his personal radio. Further, it is unlikely Mrs Craik would know how to operate a police radio.
301. In summary, no evidence has been identified by the investigation team to support the assertion that a panic alarm was activated by Mrs Craik to summon a police response to their address in Bamburgh during the relevant time period, in fact there is no evidence of an alarm having been installed at the address at the time.

#### Was an incident received in the communication centre?

302. #PS 316 has responsibility for the management and retention of telephony and radio transmission data on the Weston Digital system in both Northumbria Police communication centres. In September 2014, as part of her responsibilities and in order to comply with MOPI (which includes a seven year retention requirement as per Northumbria Police procedure in place at the time) she undertook weeding of discs with telephony and radio transmission data held with in the communications centres that was older than seven years. At the time this included all material up to October 2007.
303. A physical check of the stored data supports this. There is nothing which would suggest that this action was in any way connected to the rumours or alleged incident in 2007. The only observation would be that it would appear that this is the only time weeding of stored data has been completed since that date in 2014.
304. The investigation team completed a manual search at the NCC where one disc was recovered which contained data between 9:15pm on 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2007 and 2:33pm on 27<sup>th</sup> June 2007. Although this date range is considered relevant when considering the statement of Mr Gilroy the first recording available is not until 9:15pm, when Mr Gilroy had finished his duty at 4:00pm, some five hours earlier. A review of the data made available identified no radio transmissions that could be connected to or attributed to the alleged incident. It is not possible to explain why this particular disc was not weeded with the others.
305. Both Mr and Mrs Craik deny making a call to the police. Telecommunications data from 2007 for the home address of Mr and Mrs Craik no longer exists.
306. In the absence of any recordings for the relevant period in 2007, the investigation team cannot determine whether a call was received in either communication centre or not.

307. The investigation team have obtained an audit of all internal communication centre short messaging log system data for the relevant time period.
308. Following a review of the content throughout the relevant time no messages between colleagues were identified that were in any way attributed to the alleged incident, not even the rumour.
309. The investigation team have interviewed ninety four police officers and staff who were working in the communications centres in 2007, these include all top table personnel and none have provided any first-hand knowledge of having received a telephone call or alarm activation causing them to create an incident requiring a police response to Mr Craik's address in Bamburgh.

#### Was an incident log (FWIN) created?

310. All Northumbria Police incident logs for June and July 2007 have been analysed. This yielded approximately 100,000 incident logs for review. Due to the amount of incident logs, targeted key word searching was conducted. This produced no results specifically relating to the home address of Mr and Mrs Craik, their residence in Bamburgh or elsewhere concerning Mr and Mrs Craik and Mr and Mrs Peacock. The review of all incidents recorded on the NPICCS system during the relevant time has shown that no incident logs exist on the system relating to any incident at either Mr Craik's house in Bamburgh or his property in Gosforth. (E PD 171018 1500)
311. In 2007 #PS 304 worked in the northern communication centre. At some point in June or July 2007 she had an incident log sent to her by a call taker that referred to a personal attack alarm at Mr Craik's address in Gosforth. #PS 304 recalled dispatching #PO 047. She spoke to the officer a few days after and he referred to 'the incident that never happened'.
312. #PS 304 was revisited and remained certain that she dispatched #PO 047 to the incident. She states that he may not have known that he was attending the Chief Constables address. Having researched press articles concerning the incident, she notes that it is reported to have happened in Bamburgh and so questions her own certainty.
313. In 2007 #PO 047 was a response officer based at Etal Lane police station. He was seen by the investigation team and denied attending any incident as described by #PS 304. Further, during that period he was on paternity leave. He was aware of the many rumours concerning the incident occurring at Seahouses. He recalled the rumour was that a dog handler had attended.
314. Duty records for #PO 047 show that between 7<sup>th</sup> June 2007 and 7<sup>th</sup> July 2007 he was either booked on annual leave, rest day in lieu or rest days. The duty records show that he was then on a training course between the 9<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> July 2007 before having a further four rest days. He returned to duty on 16<sup>th</sup> July 2007. The investigation team have obtained a systems audit for #PO 047 (E PD 130619 04a) which shows that he did attend a police station and accessed NPICCS during his leave period on the 16<sup>th</sup>, 21<sup>st</sup> and 28<sup>th</sup> June 2007. Details of the systems he accessed have been reviewed and do not match anything related to the alleged incident or any incident in Gosforth. His personal file was also reviewed but does not contain a record of any paternity leave during this period.
315. An examination of resourcing audit for #PO 047 (E PD 140520 09g) during the relevant time confirms that #PS 304 does not resource him to any incident during this time.
316. The investigation team obtained a systems audit for #PS 304 which has not identified an association with any deleted incident logs within the relevant time. (E PD 290319 03b) The review does show that

- #PS 304 has a repeated interaction with incident log 0632 of 2<sup>nd</sup> August 2007, which although just outside the relevant time is a deleted incident log and relates to a police officer who had been reported missing in Northumberland.
317. In 2007 #PS 303 covered the Northumberland area and states that she actually viewed the log of the alleged incident which contained details of there being an altercation between two senior officers one with the name Peacock at the Chief Constables house. The investigation team obtained a systems audit for #PS 303 which has not identified an association with any deleted incident logs within the relevant time. (E PD 060219 02c)
318. In 2007 #PO 057 was a dispatcher in the NCC. One evening during the summer he was aware of an incident coming in concerning the Chief Constable at his home. He overheard conversations that took place on the 'top table' referring to an alarm activation and names the top table as being #PO 062, #PO 063 and #PS 301 at that time. He does not look at the log. Both #PO 063 and #PS 301 say that they had no involvement in any incident and had no knowledge of such an incident occurring whilst they were on duty.
319. #PS 307 was a call handler in the NCC and his colleague #PS 309 took the initial call for the incident but does not think they were aware of this at the time. He did not see the log and does not know who attended.
320. The investigation team have interviewed #PS 309 (A395) had no knowledge at all of the alleged incident at all and never took any call relating to it. She had no idea why #PS 307 believed that she had.
321. #PS 302 was a resource controller in the NCC. Some years ago when he was working a weekend, during daylight hours, they were made aware of a panic alarm activation at the chief constable's house in Bamburgh. He dispatched a 24/7 response to the address and also thought an armed response resource was allocated to it. Following this he heard rumour and gossip that there had been an altercation at the address between Mr Craik and Mr Peacock.
322. The investigation team obtained a system audit for #PS 302 which has not identified an association with any deleted incident logs within the relevant time. (E PD 260220 08o)
323. In 2007 #PS 308 worked in the NCC as a resource controller and contact handler. He recalled that he had an incident switched to him for resourcing. The incident referred to a call from a neighbour of trouble at a barbeque next door at an address in Seahouses and there were police officers involved. He resourced #PO 015 to the incident. He never received any update, he never transferred the incident to the top table but when tidying up his incident queues at the end of the shift this incident was showing as 'text deleted'.
324. The investigation team obtained a system audit for #PS 308 which has not identified an association with any deleted incident logs within the relevant time. (E PD 011119 07pp) It is noted that #PS 308 is on a prolonged period of time off throughout June 2007 returning on 29<sup>th</sup> June 2007.
325. An examination of resourcing audits for #PO 015 from 2005 through to 2010 identifies only fourteen incidents that he was resourced to by #PS 308. None of these occur within the relevant time and none of these incidents are deleted, occur in Bamburgh or relate to Mr Craik or Mr and Mrs Peacock<sup>65</sup>.

---

<sup>65</sup> See appendix 14 for details from resource audit

326. In 2007 #PO 005 was a 24/7 acting inspector covering Northumberland area command. He remembers being called or contacted by the control room during a night shift and being asked to view an incident log. Once he arrived at the next station, he attempted to look at the log but all the content / text had been deleted. The following day he was informed that there had been an incident at the chief constables house and that firearms officers had attended. He believed this was the log he had been asked to view.
327. The investigation team obtained a system audit for #PO 005 which has not identified an association with any deleted incident logs within the relevant time. (E PD 140520 09b)
328. #PO 051 was a 24/7 response sergeant at Hexham. In 2006 or 2007 he was on a late shift or half nights when he received a phone call, he believed from #PO 005, to have a look at a particular incident. As he looked on the system he was told this was the chief's house. The log had something on it about a disturbance, an assault, a breach of the peace or shouting in the street and he was told that there were lots of resources on route to the incident. At the end of his shift the contents of the log had been removed or deleted.
329. The investigation team obtained a system audit for #PO 051 which has not identified an association with any deleted incident logs within the relevant time. (E PD 140520 09a)
330. #PO 011 was a 24/7 response constable at Alnwick. He was at work when an incident came in of a fight at a barbeque in Bamburgh and he saw the incident on his computer. He believes he may have offered to attend but didn't. He could not recall any further detail from the log but when he looked again later, the log had been deleted. He recalled a lot of talk that the names of Mr Craik and Mr and Mrs Peacock were being associated to the incident.
331. The investigation team obtained a system audit for #PO 011 which has not identified an association with any deleted incident logs within the relevant time. (E PD 260220 08j)
332. #PO 008 was a response officer at Berwick. She recalled coming on duty on a day shift and looking at the incident logs for her geographical area and recalls seeing a log from which the text had been removed. She has only seen this three or four times in her service. During the handover from the previous shift it was mentioned that the deleted log was an incident at Mr Craik's house in Bamburgh and that no one wanted to discuss the incident.
333. Duties relating to #PO 008 show that she was on a period of maternity leave throughout the relevant time period, in fact from at least 1<sup>st</sup> May 2007 to 31<sup>st</sup> August 2007.
334. Despite this the investigation team obtained a system audit for #PO 008. This does show that she was present in work on 8<sup>th</sup> June 2007 as she views a number of incident logs. It would not be uncommon for an officer on a period of maternity to have an occasional day when they would come into work, commonly referred to as keep in touch days. A review of her audit has not identified an association with any deleted incident logs within the relevant time. (E PD 140520 09d)
335. #PO 009 was a 24/7 response officer at Berwick. She had heard the rumour of an incident where Mr Peacock had confronted Mr Craik over an alleged affair, the police had attended and the log had been subsequently censored. She does not believe that she was on duty on the day but came in on day shift the following day and on searching incidents on the computer for her area (G7/G6) saw a log with limited details and deleted text.

336. The investigation team obtained a system audit for #PO 009 which has not identified an association with any deleted incident logs within the relevant time. (E PD 260220 08m)
337. #PO 049 was either a custody sergeant or patrol sergeant based in Sunderland/Washington. He recalled being on either half nights or nights. He was unsure if he was alerted to or was monitoring logs when he viewed a log concerning a personal attack alarm at the chief constable's home address. He does not recall the content of log other than it being a personal attack alarm and Mr Craik's name on the log. He viewed log on his own. Following this he recalled the rumours were rife about the alleged incident.
338. The investigation team obtained a system audit for #PO 049 which has not identified an association with any deleted incident logs within the relevant time. (E PD 140520 09c)
339. The investigation team also take note that #PO 049 was on a night shift on 23<sup>rd</sup> October 2009 when there had been an alarm activation at Mr Craik's house in Bamburgh earlier in the day. A review of the audit for that incident (E PD 130619 04g) does not show him as having accessed the incident log that day.
340. #PO 050 was either a sergeant or acting inspector on the neighbourhood team at Sunderland. She was on duty at the time when an officer told her about something having happened at the chief constable's house. She has viewed the incident log, which was an alarm activation at a location in the Northumberland area. When she looked again later the log had gone. She recalled that the rumour of an altercation between Mr Craik and Mr Peacock followed almost immediately after.
341. The investigation team obtained a system audit for #PO 050 which has not identified an association with any deleted incident logs within the relevant time. (E PD 050919 06a)
342. #PO 052 was a 24/7 response officer at Hebburn. He was on a night or late shift when he saw the incident log (over another officer's shoulder) along with other colleagues. The incident log related to a panic alarm and there was mention of a barbeque and a firearms unit attending. Some hours later he was again looking on NPICCS with another officer who was logged on and saw that the message 'deleted' or 'record deleted' had replaced the incident.
343. As #PO 052 had made it clear to the investigation team that on each occasion he was looking under another officer's logon details (over their shoulder) there was no audit available. #PO 052 was not able to recall who the officers logged on were, therefore no audits could be obtained to assist in identifying the log to which he refers.
344. #PO 054 was a 24/7 response officer based at Whitley Bay. He was in the front office at Whitley Bay police station when it was brought to his attention that there had been a panic alarm activation at chief constable's house and dogs and firearms resources were on route. He believed one of the dog handlers, but could not recall who, came back and said Mr Peacock had chinned the chief for having affair with his wife. He recalled that later the incident log had been deleted, it didn't exist anymore.
345. Like #PO 052, #PO 054 is clear that when he viewed the log he was not personally logged on to NPICCS but viewed it under another user's login whom he does not recall, therefore no audits could be obtained to assist in identifying the log to which he refers.

346. The table below identifies those officers who believe that they saw the incident log relating to the alleged incident whilst it was active on the NPICCS system, system audits have been obtained for all of them by the investigation team and these include a number of those listed above:

Name	Action / Statement number	NPICCS audit number
#PO 051	A593, S130	PD 140520 – 09a
#PO 011	A469	PD 260220 – 08j
#PO 005	A508, S129	PD 140520 – 09b
#PO 049	A120, S65	PD 140520 – 09c
#PO 012	A514, S116	PD 260220 – 08d
#PO 044	A96, S54	PD 960219 – 02b
#PO 009	A467	PD 260220 – 08m
#PO 008	A164, S88	PD 140520 – 09d
#PO 021	A325, S104	PD 011119 – 07a
#PS 303	A5, S1	PD 960219 – 02c
#PS 308	A393, S113	PD 011119 – 07pp
#PS 304	A39, S11	PD 290319 – 03b
#PS 302	A518, S117	PD 260220 – 08o
Gilroy		PD121218 – 01e
#PO 050	A250, S108	PD 050919 – 06a
#PO 010	A381, S120	PD 260220 – 08a

347. Officers included in the above table and not referenced in the preceding paragraphs namely, Mr Gilroy, #PO 021, #PO 010, #PO 012 and #PO 044 are analysed further on in this report.
348. Analysis of the duties of the above listed officers and staff has been conducted and provides the following information<sup>66</sup>:
- There is not one day within the relevant time period where all sixteen officers and staff are on duty on the same day. The investigation team acknowledge that although all of the above listed officers and staff believe they saw the incident log they do not all specifically state that they saw it at the time of the incident.
  - The one date when the highest number are on duty on the same date is 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2007, a Tuesday, where twelve are at work.
  - There are some significant periods of absence during the relevant time period when considering what the officers and staff say they saw. As already highlighted above #PO 008 is not in work throughout.
  - During the weekend of 23<sup>rd</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup> June 2007, when Mr Gilroy asserts this incident occurred in his evidence to the Tribunal only six of the sixteen officers and staff, including Mr Gilroy, are actually working.
349. The investigation team recognise that sixteen police officers and staff interviewed provide accounts in which they state they saw the alleged incident log live on the NPICCS system whether in a pre or post deleted state.

<sup>66</sup> See appendix 15 for full analysis

Name	Action / Statement number
#PO 051	A593, S130
#PO 011	A469
#PO 005	A508, S129
#PO 049	A120, S65
#PO 012	A514, S116
#PO 044	A96, S54
#PO 009	A467
#PO 008	A164, S88
#PO 021	A325, S104
#PS 303	A5, S1
#PS 308	A393, S113
#PS 304	A39, S11
#PS 302	A518, S117
Gilroy	
#PO 050	A250, S108
#PO 010	A381, S120

350. All audits associated to the sixteen have been cross compared to identify those incident logs which have been viewed or accessed by all or the majority of them in order to highlight the incident log to which they all believe they viewed<sup>67</sup>.
351. Out of a total of thirteen thousand four hundred and forty individual incident logs viewed by one or more of the above persons the highest count for any single incident log viewed was only five of the sixteen officers and staff listed. The below table shows the total counts:

Number of Incident Logs	Number of the sixteen officers/staff viewing
3	5
8	4
108	3
1070	2
12251	1

352. Analysis of the data identifies no single incident log that has been viewed or actioned by all sixteen officers and staff.
353. There is no incident log that even comes close to having appeared in all audits, the highest three incident logs have only five of the sixteen officers and staff being associated to it.
354. Having analysed the top eleven incident logs none are deleted or relate in any way to an incident in Bamburgh or involving Mr Craik and Mr and Mrs Peacock.
355. The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that all sixteen officers and staff could not have seen an incident log relating to the alleged incident or indeed any single incident log during the relevant time. The inference being therefore that no incident log existed within the relevant time period as alleged.

<sup>67</sup> See appendix 15 and 16 for analysis

### Did officers attend an incident at Mr Craik's home address?

#### Inspector Gilroy:

356. On 26<sup>th</sup> March 2016 Mr Gilroy signed a statement for the Employment Tribunal in which he provides the following information:
- He was on duty between 7:40am and 4:00pm on 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2007 as the operations inspector at Northumberland Area Command. Between these times he had force wide responsibility for the operational support resources which included dog section, motor patrols, area support groups and armed response patrols.
  - During that afternoon he received information from the force communication room supervisor that officers had been deployed to the home of the chief constable in Bamburgh following the activation of the personal attack alarm.
  - Prior to terminating his duty at 4:00pm that afternoon he viewed the computer generated incident log only to find that all text subject of it had been deleted.
  - He spoke to officers who had been dispatched to the incident.
  - At 8:30am on Monday 25<sup>th</sup> June 2007 he attended a supervisors meeting at Bedlington police station where the incident was discussed at the conclusion, as there appeared to have been a leak to the media.
  - He was instructed to make enquiries with officers who had attended the incident in an effort to establish who may have done so (enquiries he never made).
357. The investigation team have produced a profile for Mr Gilroy which combines his duties (ND 94 & 95), resource data (E PD 011119 07I), systems data (E PD 121218 01e) and GPS data (E PD 260220 08w) on a day by day basis for the relevant time<sup>68</sup>.
358. Analysis of the data attributed to Mr Gilroy has been completed<sup>69</sup>, the findings of this analysis are summarised as:
- Duties confirm that Mr Gilroy was working an 8:00am to 4:00pm duty on 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2007 and a 7:00am to 4:00pm shift on 25<sup>th</sup> June 2007.
  - With the exception of #PO 062 who could not be seen, all of the supervisors from both northern and southern communication centres that were working on 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2007 have been interviewed by the investigation team and none of them say that they had any primary knowledge of the alleged incident to suggest they were either on duty at the time, had any direct dealings with the incident or indeed notified Mr Gilroy about the incident.
  - During the relevant time Mr Gilroy is attributed to one hundred and sixty five incident logs within his system audit. On 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2007 Mr Gilroy is attributed to six incident logs, none of these relate to an incident in the Bamburgh area. Furthermore within the entire relevant time period Mr Gilroy does not have any incident logs in his audit that relate to the Bamburgh area and none that are 'deleted'.
  - Mr Gilroy's pocket notebook contains an entry at 7:25am on Monday 25<sup>th</sup> June 2007 that reads 'state 3 F3'. Alongside this entry is a post note stuck in which reads 'meeting @ Bedlington', this being the entry he refers to as relating to the supervisors meeting at Bedlington where this matter is discussed following a leak to the media.

---

<sup>68</sup> See appendix 17 for profile of Mr Gilroy

<sup>69</sup> See appendix 18 for full analysis of Mr Gilroy

- The entry 'state 3 F3' is repeated numerous times throughout his pocket notebook, almost a daily occurrence. For clarity the phrase 'state 3 F3' refers to a duty status and location, 'state 3' being 'on duty in station' and 'F3' identifies the police station, which in 2007 was Blyth, not Bedlington where Mr Gilroy states he was.
  - In 2007 Bedlington police station was 'F1'. On two dates in July Mr Gilroy records notes of 'state 3 F1' at 1:40pm on 17<sup>th</sup> July 2007 (suggesting he was at Bedlington police station at this time) and '#PO 030 at F1' at 11:00am on 18<sup>th</sup> July 2007 (suggesting he had a meeting with #PO 030 at Bedlington police station at this time). These dates are considered relevant to the investigation team as it is known that the media first enquire with Northumbria Police about the alleged incident on 16<sup>th</sup> July 2007. It is plausible therefore that Mr Gilroy attended a meeting on one of these dates where the incident was discussed at the conclusion.
  - Within his statement to the Tribunal Mr Gilroy was instructed to make enquiries with officers who had attended the incident in an effort to establish who may have done so, enquiries he says he never made. This statement itself appears in conflict with his earlier comment that he had spoken to officers dispatched to the incident, officers whom he does not identify.
  - Within the statement provided to the Employment Tribunal by Mr Gilroy he does not claim to have attended the incident himself. During interviews with other former officers a small number did believe that Mr Gilroy may have attended the incident, as this had been a part of the rumour they had heard.
  - In considering what other officers believed, analysis of Mr Gilroy's resource history and associated GPS data has been completed. There is no data evident within either Mr Gilroy's resource audit or GPS data to suggest he was resourced to any incident in Bamburgh or even went to the area between the relevant times.
359. In considering all of the evidence it is the conclusion of the investigation team that Mr Gilroy did not attend or manage any incident at the chief constable's address in Bamburgh during the relevant time. Furthermore the investigation team consider that what Mr Gilroy refers to within his statement to the Employment Tribunal is his recollection of what he heard at the time which was most likely rumour, not fact, and the management of that rumour following the media interest on 16<sup>th</sup> July 2007. This is supported by the lack of content in his pocket notebook which makes no reference to the incident at all and the vague entry he seeks to rely on in the statement to the Tribunal, which itself is discussed in detail in the paragraph above.
360. #PO 010 provides a statement to the investigation team in which he provides the following information:
- In 2007 he was a 24/7 response officer based at Berwick.
  - He recalled being on duty, during early evening, and static on the A1 monitoring traffic with #PO 007, who was acting Sergeant for that day as his usual sergeant – #PO 006 was off.
  - He recalls that they were tasked by radio to respond to a 'high 1' as an immediate response to an emergency panic alarm incident in Bamburgh. He was driving at the time travelling towards Bamburgh south on the A1 but was cancelled approximately five miles away from the location as firearms officers were in attendance.
  - He cannot recall how, but he was aware this call related to the chief constable's address.
  - He returned to Berwick Police Station and logged onto the computer and looked at incidents on NPICCS where he saw an incident log which had 'text deleted' inserted in place of the text. He recalled looking again either later that same shift or the following shift and the incident itself was no longer present.

361. The investigation team have produced a profile for #PO 010 which combines his duties (ND 94 & 95), resource data (E PD 260220 08a), systems data (E PD 260220 08b) and GPS data (E PD 260220 08c) on a day by day basis for the relevant time<sup>70</sup>.
362. Analysis of the data attributed to #PO 010 has been completed<sup>71</sup>, the findings of this analysis are summarised as:
- Within the relevant time period there are only six dates when #PO 010 is on duty with #PO 007 during a time when #PO 006 is not on duty. Only one of these dates, Tuesday 26<sup>th</sup> June 2007 is during the evening.
  - No GPS data associated to #PO 010 show him in the area of Seahouses or Bamburgh between 1<sup>st</sup> June 2007 and 15<sup>th</sup> July 2007.
  - No resource data supports #PO 010 being resourced to any incidents in the Bamburgh or Seahouses area between 1<sup>st</sup> June 2007 and 15<sup>th</sup> July 2007.
  - #PO 007 has been interviewed by the investigation team and states that he has never attended any incident at the chief constable's address and furthermore has never been deployed and cancelled from attending any incidents to his address. Further, at the time of the rumoured incident he received a number of calls from colleagues who asked him about the incident believing he had attended and he clarified to all that he had not attended any incident.
  - No GPS data associated to #PO 010 show him in the area of, or heading in the general direction of Seahouses or Bamburgh between 1<sup>st</sup> June 2007 and 15<sup>th</sup> July 2007.
  - GPS data associated to both #PO 010 and #PO 007 show them independently travelling south along the A1 to the area of Buckton on the afternoon of Tuesday 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2007 (which is just prior to the location of the turn off he described taking when on route to the alleged incident). Resource data and NPICCS show that both were resourced to incident log 0765 030707 which is a traffic collision at this location. Of note, one of the vehicles involved in this collision is registered to an address in Bamburgh. Both are engaged in traffic duties for a period of nearly two hours before returning to Berwick. This bears no resemblance therefore to the event he describes.
363. Upon examination of the account of #PO 010 the investigation team have found no evidence to support his assertion that he, together with #PO 007 responded to a call for service at the chief constable's address in Bamburgh during the relevant time period. In fact #PO 007 provides evidence to the contrary. The investigation team conclude that there is no likelihood that he responded to any incident.
364. #PO 012 provides a statement to the investigation team in which he provides the following information:
- In 2007 he was a 24/7 response officer and worked out of Alnwick Police station covering the northern part of Northumberland.
  - He recalled that in 2007 he heard an incident being passed over the radio to attend an alarm activation in Bamburgh.
  - He believed he was either on a 7:00am to 5:00pm day shift or 4:00pm to midnight late shift at the time.
  - Although he was not assigned or directed to the incident, he made his way towards it on an emergency blue light response. He never arrived as he heard other patrols being cancelled and so he returned to his normal duties.

---

<sup>70</sup> See appendix 19 for profile of #PO 010

<sup>71</sup> See appendix 20 for full analysis of #PO 010

- Later that same shift he was back at Alnwick Police station when #PO 016 informed him that under no circumstances was he to look at the incident in Bamburgh as it involved senior officers. The gossip around the station by this time was that there had been a domestic incident in Bamburgh at a barbeque involving the chief constable and Mr and Mrs Peacock.
  - He later viewed the incident log and saw that it related to some sort of domestic incident with a threat of violence. He vaguely recalled seeing the surname of Peacock within the body of the text. From what was being gossiped about in the station he became aware that the address on the incident log was the home address of the chief constable Mike Craik.
  - Later, still during that same shift, he drove to the address he had seen on the incident log. He described the address as being on the main road out of Bamburgh heading west towards the A1, it was situated on the left side of the road and was a grand house, set back off the road with lawn to the front.
  - The next morning when he returned to work the incident log was no longer there.
365. The investigation team have produced a profile for #PO 012 which combines his duties (ND 94 & 95), resource data (E PD 260220 08e), systems data (E PD 260220 08d) and GPS data (E PD 260220 08f) on a day by day basis for the relevant time<sup>72</sup>.
366. Analysis of the data attributed to #PO 012 has been completed<sup>73</sup>, the findings of this analysis are summarised as:
- Within the relevant time there are eleven dates when #PO 012 was working a day or late shift at a time when #PO 016 was also at work.
  - Within the relevant time there are sixteen incidents recorded in the Bamburgh area, #PO 012 is resourced to two of these incidents and is on duty when five others are reported that he does not attend. None of the sixteen incidents are associated to Mr Craik, his address or are deleted incidents.
  - GPS data associated to #PO 012 show him as being within the Bamburgh area on four occasions. He is not shown to enter the street where Mr Craik lived on any of these occasions. On two of these days, 4<sup>th</sup> June 2007 and 10<sup>th</sup> July 2007, he is attending an incident within the area, as referred above. On the other two dates, 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> June 2007, he passes through Bamburgh without stopping after attending an incident elsewhere, he is working a full night shift on these two days.
  - There is no GPS data that supports #PO 012 account that he drove up to the chief constable's address in the later part of any day or late shift.
  - The description that #PO 012 provides of the address he associated as being that of Mr Craik's does not correlate with the actual location or appearance of his address. Mr Craik's address is situated within a cul-de-sac, is a modern build property that has no 'lawned' frontage.
367. Upon examination of the account of #PO 012, the investigation team have found no evidence to support his assertion that he responded to a call for service at the chief constable's address in Bamburgh, or indeed followed up the incident by driving to Mr Craik's address during the relevant time period. Therefore the investigation team conclude that there is no likelihood that he responded to any incident.
368. #PO 021 provides a statement to the investigation team in which he provides the following information:

---

<sup>72</sup> See appendix 21 for profile of #PO 012

<sup>73</sup> See appendix 22 for full analysis of #PO 012

- In 2007 he was a 24/7 motor patrol officer and worked from Alnwick Police station covering all of Northumberland.
  - He recalled being on a half night or full night shift when an incident was passed over the radio asking for any available units to respond to a personal attack alarm in Bamburgh. He believed this having been around 10:00pm.
  - He responded to the call to attend the incident and was then passed either the address or alarm number and began to make his way towards the address as an 'immediate response'.
  - He never made it to the address as the control room cancelled him before he got there, he thought that he got as far as the A1 at Warenford. He did not continue into Bamburgh and he never heard any updates over the radio.
  - Later that same shift he was back at Alnwick Police station and he heard whisper amongst other officers of something having happened at the chief constable's house in Bamburgh.
  - He then looked at the incident log and he saw that it related to a panic alarm at the chief constable's house, who at the time was Mr Craik, he further states that Mr Craik's name was written somewhere in the log. He cannot recall any content of the log other than it being referenced that two firearms and two local uniform officers went to the incident, but he doesn't recall who they were.
  - The following day when he again looked at the incident all the text had been removed and replaced with a phrase similar to 'removed by supervision'. He could not recall if on each occasion he viewed the log that he was personally logged onto the system or whether it was another member of staff that was logged on at the time.
369. The investigation team have produced a profile for #PO 021 which combines his duties (ND 94 & 95), resource data (E PD 011119 07u), systems data (E PD 011119 07a) and GPS data (E PD 011119 07d) on a day by day basis for the relevant time<sup>74</sup>.
370. Analysis of the data attributed to #PO 021 has been completed<sup>75</sup>, the findings of this analysis are summarised as:
- Within the relevant time period #PO 021 works six dates where he is on full night shifts, these being 16<sup>th</sup> to 21<sup>st</sup> June 2007 inclusive. He does not work half nights on any date during the relevant time.
  - Within the relevant time there are sixteen incidents recorded in the Bamburgh area, #PO 021 is not resourced to any of these incidents. None of the sixteen incidents are as a result of any alarm activation and none are associated to Mr Craik, his address or are deleted incidents.
  - There is no record of #PO 021 being resourced to attend any incidents in Bamburgh during the relevant time.
  - During the relevant time GPS data shows #PO 021 is within Bamburgh on two occasions, these being on 11<sup>th</sup> June 2007 and 21<sup>st</sup> June 2007. He does not stop or enter the street were Mr Craik lived on either of these occasions, he simply passes through.
  - There is no record of #PO 021 accessing any deleted incident logs during the relevant time.
371. Upon examination of the account of #PO 021, the investigation team have found no evidence to support his assertion that he responded to a personal attack alarm at the address of Mr Craik in Bamburgh or that he viewed an incident log relating to an incident that was subsequently deleted during the relevant time period. Therefore the investigation team conclude that there is no likelihood that he responded to any incident.

---

<sup>74</sup> See appendix 23 for profile of #PO 021

<sup>75</sup> See appendix 24 for full analysis of #PO 021

372. #PO 023 provides a statement to the investigation team in which he provides the following information:
- In 2007 he was a motor patrol officer based at Bedlington Police station covering all of Northumberland.
  - He recalled an incident being passed over the radio to attend Chief Constable Craik's house in Bamburgh as a concern for the occupants and a fight taking place on the front garden.
  - He believed he was on a 2:00pm to 10:00pm late shift at the time and he responded to the incident as the protocol was that motor patrols and firearms patrols would attend any calls to the chief constable's address.
  - He never arrived as he was cancelled on route.
  - Later that same shift he was back at Bedlington Police station with Inspector Paul Gilroy who had attended the incident. Mr Gilroy told him that the incident had concerned a fight between Mr Peacock and Mr Craik because Mr Craik had been having an affair with Mrs Peacock. Mr Gilroy had printed a copy of the log off which he waved at him saying words to the effect of 'but there will always be a copy'. He never read it.
373. The investigation team have produced a profile for #PO 023 which combines his duties (ND 94 & 95), resource data (PD 260220 08bb), systems data (PD 260220 08aa) and GPS data (PD 260220 08cc) on a day by day basis for the relevant time<sup>76</sup>.
374. Analysis of the data attributed to #PO 023 has been completed<sup>77</sup>, the findings of this analysis are summarised as:
- Within the relevant time there are ten dates where #PO 023 works a late shift. Of these there are only four dates when Mr Gilroy is also on duty during the same evening, these being 29<sup>th</sup> June, 1<sup>st</sup> July, 10<sup>th</sup> July and 11<sup>th</sup> July 2007.
  - No GPS data associated to #PO 023 show him in the area of Bamburgh within the relevant time.
  - No resource data shows #PO 023 being resourced to any incidents in the Bamburgh area within the relevant time.
  - Examination of both the resource audits of #PO 023 and Mr Gilroy during the relevant time show that there are only three incidents to which both are resourced. None of these incidents are deleted or relate to the Bamburgh area, Mr Craik and Mr and Mrs Peacock.
  - In the evidence provided by Mr Gilroy, he does not state that he attended the incident and he does not state that he had printed a copy of the incident, in actual fact he stated that the incident had already been deleted when he tried to view it.
375. Upon examination of the account of #PO 023 the investigation team have found no evidence to support his assertion that he responded to a call for service at the chief constable's address in Bamburgh during the relevant time period. Furthermore his evidence is contradictory to that provided to the Employment Tribunal by Mr Gilroy. Therefore the investigation team conclude that there is no likelihood that he responded to any incident.
376. #PO 013 provides a statement to the investigation team in which he provides the following information:
- In 2007 he was a special constable working alongside officers at Alnwick Police station.

---

<sup>76</sup> See appendix 25 for profile of #PO 023

<sup>77</sup> See appendix 26 for full analysis of #PO 023

- He recalled being on duty at Alnwick and working with another officer, when they were dispatched to attend a report of a disturbance at either Bamburgh or Seahouses. He could not recall the address of the disturbance and believed this to have been evening time or later at night.
  - He believes this officer to have been motor patrol officer #PO 024 but could not be certain as he would also work with other motor patrols or dog section officers.
  - They never actually made it to the disturbance as they were cancelled whilst still on route and recalled other patrols had also been dispatched to the same incident. He returned to Alnwick Police station where he booked off duty.
  - When he returned to duty a few days, or up to a week later, the local officers were all talking about an incident that had happened at the then chief constable Mr Craik's house and it was inferred that the incident he had been cancelled from attending had occurred at his house. The talk was of a fight between Mr Craik and Mr Peacock.
  - He could not recall when this occurred but believed it may have been in the summer of 2007.
377. The investigation team have produced a profile for #PO 013 which combines his resource data (E PD 011119 07v), systems data (E PD 011119 07c) and GPS data (E PD 011119 07f) on a day by day basis for the relevant time<sup>78</sup>. It should be noted that there are no recorded duties on the duties system for special constables and therefore #PO 013 duties are estimated based upon his footprint on other systems.
378. Analysis of the data attributed to #PO 013 has been completed<sup>79</sup>, the findings of this analysis are summarised as:
- There are seventeen dates within the relevant time where #PO 013 is working during the evening and night, of these dates #PO 024 is also working six. Analysis of the data shows that #PO 013 did not work with #PO 024 on any of the seventeen dates.
  - Aside from #PO 039, from dog section, who #PO 013 is partnered with on 15<sup>th</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> June 2007, all other officers he partnered with are 24/7 response officers from Alnwick.
  - One of these officers is #PO 012, who also believes that he responded to the alleged incident and appears to be partnered with #PO 013 on 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> June and 15<sup>th</sup> July 2007.
  - Analysis of resource data relating to #PO 013 shows that during the relevant time periods he is never resourced to any incidents in G6S4 Bamburgh area.
  - There is only GPS data associated to #PO 013 for a short period of time on 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2007. This would be expected as it would be most probable that when he is mobile in a vehicle he would have been crewed with a regular officer trained to respond to emergency incidents.
379. Upon examination of the account of #PO 013, the investigation team have found no evidence to support his belief that he responded to a call for service at the chief constable's address in Bamburgh with #PO 024 or another. Therefore the investigation team conclude that there is no likelihood that he responded to any incident.
380. #PO 039 is interviewed by the investigation team and provides the following information:
- In 2007 he was a dog handler and worked out of Alnwick Police station covering all of Northumberland.
  - He recalled being on duty during the summer of 2007 or 2008 when he was deployed to a disturbance at the Victoria Hotel in Bamburgh. He described it as a large party that had spilled out from the pub into a large disturbance.

---

<sup>78</sup> See appendix 27 for profile of #PO 013

<sup>79</sup> See appendix 28 for full analysis of #PO 013

- He attended with his dog, dealt with the disorder and left, other officers from Berwick were also present but he could not specifically recall who.
  - He was later told that the incident he had attended was linked to an incident at Mr Craik's house where he had been assaulted by Mr Peacock.
  - He confirmed that he never saw either Mr Craik, Mr Peacock or any off duty officers at the incident he attended at the Victoria Hotel.
  - When he logged onto the computer the following day to update the log he could not recall the log being present anymore to update.
381. The investigation team have produced a profile for #PO 039 which combines his duties (ND 94 & 95), resource data (E PD 011119 07t), systems data (E PD 011119 07b) and GPS data (E PD 011119 07e) on a day by day basis for the relevant time<sup>80</sup>.
382. Analysis of the data attributed to #PO 039 has been completed<sup>81</sup>, the findings of this analysis are summarised as:
- There are fifteen dates within the relevant time period where #PO 039 is on duty working a late or night shift.
  - There is no record within his resource audit of him being resourced to any incident at the Victoria Hotel within the relevant time.
  - There are no recorded incidents at the Victoria Hotel, Bamburgh within the relevant time.
  - Between 1<sup>st</sup> January 2005 and 31<sup>st</sup> December 2009 there are fourteen incidents recorded on NPICCS at the Victoria Hotel, Bamburgh, only two of these occur in 2007 and both are outside of the relevant time period and do not involve any disturbance. However, incident log 1365 100109 is a report of trouble with a male at this location. This incident is reported at around 10:48pm on 10<sup>th</sup> January 2009 and initially attended to by two traffic officers reporting a large party ongoing and cancelling other officers attending. There is then a further call at around 11:47pm to the fight having now started outside of the pub to which the two traffic officers return along with two Berwick officers and #PO 039. The circumstances of this incident are not dissimilar to those described by former #PO 039.
  - Resource data associated to #PO 039 show that he was resourced to only one incident in Bamburgh within the relevant time. Incident log 0321 140707 is a report of a concern for a male who had possibly been assaulted and was in the road outside of the Copper Kettle Tea Rooms in Front Street, Bamburgh. #PO 039 attended and dealt with this incident. This occurs during the early hours of the morning and has no relation to the alleged incident.
  - No GPS data associated to #PO 039 show him being within the Bamburgh area on any date, not even on 14<sup>th</sup> July 2007 when he attends the above incident outside the Copper kettle Tea Rooms in Bamburgh, albeit the data does show him in Seahouses, a short distance away, at around the time of this incident.
383. Upon examination of the account of #PO 039, the investigation team have found no evidence to support his assertion that he responded to an incident at the Victoria Hotel in Bamburgh that was associated to the alleged incident involving Mr Craik and Mr Peacock. Therefore the investigation team conclude that there is no likelihood that he responded to any incident between the relevant times.
384. Anecdotally it has been reported by a number officers interviewed by the investigation team that #PO 014 attended the incident at the chief constable's house in Bamburgh.

---

<sup>80</sup> See appendix 29 for profile of #PO 039

<sup>81</sup> See appendix 30 for full analysis of #PO 039

385. #PO 014 was a neighbourhood beat manager for Seahouses in the summer of 2007, prior to this he had been a firearms officer, a role which he returned to again after 2007.
386. #PO 014 has been interviewed by the investigation team and provides the following information:
- During 2006 and 2007 he was based at Seahouses police station.
  - He recalled a time he believed in June 2007 that he had been working a 4:00pm to 2:00am shift on a Saturday and Sunday.
  - During his shifts he would have routinely checked the police computer system (NPICCS) for incidents in the area he was covering – Seahouses, Rothbury and Wooler (G6).
  - On the following Monday and Tuesday he was on his rest days.
  - He received a phone call from his sergeant – #PO 017 – where he was talking secretly and in riddles but ended the call saying he would speak to him in person on his return to work on the Wednesday.
  - On the Wednesday he saw #PO 017 who asked him if he had been to the chief constable's house over the weekend and went on to tell him there had been an incident whereby Mr Peacock had assaulted Mr Craik and asked if he had been to the incident. He told #PO 017 he had not.
  - He confirms that over that weekend he had no knowledge of and did not attend any incident at the chief constable's address and further saw no incident log.
  - Since that time up until the day he retired this story had followed him around with officers telling him that he had been the officer that attended the incident which he categorically denies.
387. The investigation team have produced a profile for #PO 014 which combines his duties (ND 94 & 95), resource data (E PD 011119 07m), systems data (E PD 290319 03a) and GPS data (E PD 290319 03e) on a day by day basis for the relevant time<sup>82</sup>.
388. Analysis of the data attributed to #PO 014 has been completed<sup>83</sup>, the findings of this analysis are summarised as:
- There are two weekends during the relevant time where #PO 014 works a similar pattern to that he describes in his account, these being 15<sup>th</sup> to 17<sup>th</sup> June 2007 and 13<sup>th</sup> to 15<sup>th</sup> July 2007.
  - During these two weekends #PO 014 does indeed review numerous incident logs on each day, particularly those in the Northumberland area. Upon reviewing all the incident logs, aside from those historical ones which data has not be retrieved for, none relate to any incident as alleged and none are deleted logs.
  - Analysis of resource data relating to #PO 014 shows that during the relevant time periods he is resourced to three incidents in G6S4 Bamburgh area, none of these are deleted or relate to Mr Craik or Mr and Mrs Peacock.
  - From GPS data associated to #PO 014 during the relevant time periods he appears to patrol around the Bamburgh area on a regular basis, which would be expected of a neighbourhood officer based at Seahouses as he was.
  - When specifically focussing on the street where Mr Craik lived in Bamburgh, GPS data associated to #PO 014 suggests that he entered this street on three dates, these being 12<sup>th</sup>, 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> June 2007. On each of these occasions the data captures only two points, one minute apart, suggesting that the vehicle simply drives around the estate and leaves without stopping indicative of routine police patrol of the area.
  - There is no GPS data associated to #PO 014 to suggest that he attended any incident within the street where Mr Craik lived in Bamburgh during the relevant times.

---

<sup>82</sup> See appendix 31 for profile of #PO 014

<sup>83</sup> See appendix 32 for full analysis of #PO 014

389. Upon examination of the account of #PO 014 and analysis of the available data the investigation team have found no evidence to contradict his account, in fact the evidence is supportive. The investigation team have found no evidence to support the assertion of others that #PO 014 attended a call for service at the chief constable's address in Bamburgh during the relevant times and therefore conclude that there is no likelihood that he responded to any incident. The investigation team note the relevance of the fact that #PO 014 was on duty, covering the G6 area, over the weekend immediately before the press made their first enquiries about an alleged incident with Northumbria Police.
390. Anecdotally it has been reported by a number of officers interviewed by the investigation team that #PO 015 attended the incident at the chief constable's house in Bamburgh.
391. #PO 015 was a neighbourhood beat manager for Seahouses in the summer of 2007 and had been so for a number of years.
392. #PO 015 has been interviewed by the investigation team and provides the following information:
- From 2003 to 2013 he was a neighbourhood beat manager based at Seahouses police station.
  - He recalled a time during a summer that rumours began to circulate that there had been some domestic incident at the chief constable's house in Bamburgh and colleagues began asking him questions about what had happened.
  - He recalled being clueless as to what they were going on about as he had not been to any incident or seen any incident being recorded.
  - He would have expected to have had knowledge of an incident if it had occurred, especially if he had been on duty at the time as he would have expected to have been resourced to attend and confirms that he has never attended any incident in which Mr Craik was involved.
  - He recalled having attended three incidents during his time at Seahouses that were associated to Mr Craik.
  - He first recalled attending a house alarm at Mr Craik's but this was around the time he had first started at Seahouses and around the time that Mr Craik had first moved to the address in Bamburgh.
  - He recalled a second incident whereby he responded to a direct report from Mr Craik concerning bogus fish sellers having been in his street.
  - The third incident he recalled had been some sort of domestic incident which he had come across in the street near to Mr Craik's house. Having dealt with the incident he became aware that Mr Craik had contacted the police as the female involved in the incident was now at his property. He recalled that the female had been attending Mr Craik's property originally as she was an estate agent and was there to value his house.
393. The investigation team have produced a profile for #PO 015 which combines his duties (ND 94 & 95), resource data (E PD 130619 04c, PD 050919 06b & PD 011119 07p), systems data (E PD 260220 08s) and GPS data (E PD 260220 08t) on a day by day basis for the relevant time<sup>84</sup>.
394. Analysis of the data attributed to #PO 015 has been completed<sup>85</sup>, the findings of this analysis are summarised as:
- Within the relevant time period #PO 015 is only at work on six occasions, all between 18<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> June 2007.

---

<sup>84</sup> See appendix 33 for profile of #PO 015

<sup>85</sup> See appendix 34 for full analysis of #PO 015

- Within the relevant time #PO 015 is resourced to eight incidents in total, none of which are within the G6S4 Bamburgh area.
  - GPS data only exists for #PO 015 on 24<sup>th</sup> June 2007. The data for this date shows the vehicle associated to #PO 015 travelling from the direction of Wooler back into Seahouses and passing through Bamburgh, without stopping, at around 9:25pm. This same vehicle, albeit not associated to #PO 015 at the time, leaves Seahouses at 5:45pm and travels towards Wooler, again passing through Bamburgh without stopping. It is believed, although not reflected in his resource audit, that #PO 015 at this time is in company with #PO 017 and attends to incident log 1068 230607. This incident log is associated to a number of others that had been reported to the same address in Ewart, Newtown, near Wooler, involving a 'Mrs Peacock' and is a complaint of 'trouble with neighbours'. This is in no way associated to the former assistant chief constable Mrs Peacock.
  - There is no GPS data associated to #PO 015 to suggest that he attended any incident within the street where Mr Craik lived in Bamburgh during the relevant times.
  - No record of any alarm activation at Mr Craik's house in Bamburgh have been found within the extended resource history of #PO 015. Incident log 0680 231009 was a personal alarm activation at Mr Craik's home address in Bamburgh at 2:10pm on 23<sup>rd</sup> October 2009 that did result in a police response, however #PO 015 was on a rest day at the time and therefore could not have responded.
  - No record of a domestic incident as detailed by #PO 015 which he deals with in a street near to Mr Craik's house has been located by the investigation team within his extended resource history.
  - Incident log 0642 060606 has been identified from the resource history of #PO 015 as being an incident he responds to concerning illegal fish sellers. This incident is reported by the superintendent in the 'staff office' and is located as Radcliffe road, Bamburgh. It is most probable that this is the incident to which #PO 015 refers and Mr Craik reported this through his 'staff office'
395. Upon examination of the account of #PO 015 and analysis of the available data the investigation team have found no evidence to contradict his account, in fact the evidence is supportive. The investigation team have found no evidence to support the assertion of others that #PO 015 attended a call for service at the chief constable's address in Bamburgh during the relevant times and therefore conclude that there is no likelihood that he responded to any incident.
396. Anecdotally it has been reported by a number officers interviewed by the investigation team that #PO 007 attended the incident at the chief constable's house in Bamburgh.
397. #PO 007 was a 24/7 response officer based at Berwick in the summer of 2007 and would occasionally fill the role of acting sergeant for his shift. He transferred to Tayside Police in Scotland in March 2008.
398. #PO 007 has been interviewed by the investigation team and provides the following information:
- In 2007 he was a 24/7 response officer based at Berwick Police Station on 'D' shift.
  - He recalled a time he believed in the summer of 2007 that he had been working a night shift week when, whilst in Berwick Police Station, he received a call from another officer who had had joined the police with him ten years earlier. The officer asked him directly if he had been to a domestic incident at the chief constable's house in the Seahouses area.
  - He told the officer that he hadn't been to any incident and recalled this being the first that he had heard of it.
  - He recalled telling other members of his shift what he had been asked and none of them expressed any knowledge of the incident.
  - Within the same week he received a further two phone calls, again from colleagues he hadn't spoken to for years, asking him the same question and he reiterated to these that he had not been to any incident.

- Within the following couple of weeks he then heard rumour that the alleged domestic involving Mr Craik had occurred at Assistant Chief Constable Mathieson's house in the Hexham area but did not learn any detail of what had allegedly occurred.
  - He clarifies that there were occasions, including around the time of the alleged incident, that he did perform acting sergeant duties.
  - He has no recollection of ever being deployed to an incident in Bamburgh or Seahouses where he was cancelled on route, returned to Berwick Police Station and had telephone conversations behind closed doors relating to a deleted log – to his knowledge this never happened.
  - He confirms that he has never attended or been deployed to any incident at Mr Craik's address or the address of Mr Mathieson.
399. The investigation team have produced a profile for #PO 007 which combines his duties (ND 94 & 95), resource data (E PD 011119 07o), systems data (E PD 260220 08q) and GPS data (E PD 260220 08r) on a day by day basis for the relevant time<sup>86</sup>.
400. Analysis of the data attributed to #PO 007 has been completed<sup>87</sup>, the findings of this analysis are summarised as:
- There are two weeks within the relevant time where #PO 007 is working night shift, these being 1<sup>st</sup> to 8<sup>th</sup> June 2007 and 6<sup>th</sup> to 12<sup>th</sup> July 2007. He also works a period of late and half night shifts from 19<sup>th</sup> to 22<sup>nd</sup> July 2007, considered relevant as we know that the media interest commences on 16<sup>th</sup> July 2007.
  - During the relevant time periods he is never resourced to any incidents in G6S4 Bamburgh area.
  - During the relevant time periods GPS data associated to #PO 007 shows he appears in Bamburgh on only one occasion this being at 4:20am on 6<sup>th</sup> June 2007 – the vehicle associated #PO 007 travels south to Seahouses and passes through Bamburgh on its way. At 4:48am the same morning the vehicle returns north from Seahouses again passing through Bamburgh without stopping on either occasion within Bamburgh. When considered against his resource data it is noted that #PO 007 is resourced to incident log 0118 060607, his part in this incident is to conduct a check at a vehicles keepers address in Seahouses associated to an assault incident in Newcastle.
  - There is no GPS data associated to #PO 007 to suggest that he attended any incident within the street where Mr Craik lived in Bamburgh during the relevant times.
401. Upon examination of the account of #PO 007 and analysis of the available data the investigation team have found no evidence to contradict his account. The investigation team have found no evidence to support the assertion of others that #PO 007 attended a call for service at the chief constable's address in Bamburgh during the relevant times and therefore conclude that there is no likelihood that he responded to any incident.

### Firearms and Air Support

402. Over a 24/7 period in 2007 Northumbria Police have two firearms teams operating. Officers working in firearms support would be used to support day to day resourcing of incoming incidents and when resourced to none firearm incidents they would simply be resourced under their individual collar numbers. In the event of an incident requiring a 'firearms deployment' the officers would be resourced as a 'team'. The two teams operated under the generic identification numbers of '8888' and '8899'.

---

<sup>86</sup> See appendix 35 for profile of #PO 007

<sup>87</sup> See appendix 36 for full analysis of #PO 007

403. The investigation team obtained the resourcing data for the two firearms teams over the relevant time (E PD 290319 03h & PD 290319 03i) and within this time the teams are resourced to two hundred and twenty four incidents across the entire force area. Having isolated incidents that cover the G5, G6 and G7 areas (north Northumberland) there are thirteen incidents within the relevant time.
404. In addition to the thirteen incidents located within the north Northumberland area it is also established from the data that firearms team '8899' is resourced to incident log 1563 210607 (on 21<sup>st</sup> June 2007) which is the identified deleted log within the relevant time.
405. Northumbria Police had two air support units in 2007 and for the purpose of resourcing they operated under the identification numbers '55' and '99'.
406. The investigation team have obtained the resourcing data for the two air support units over the relevant time (E PD 290319 03j & PD 140520 09f). Within this time the teams are resourced to two hundred and thirty three incidents across the entire force area. Having isolated incidents that cover the G5, G6 and G7 areas (north Northumberland) there are ten incidents within the relevant time.
407. There is no record in the audits of either firearms team or air support units being resourced to any incident in Bamburgh or associated to the chief constable during the relevant time<sup>88</sup>.

#### Duty audit comparisons


408. The investigation team recognise that out of all the police officers and staff interviewed during the course of this enquiry, twenty provide accounts in which they state they were on duty on the day of the alleged incident by virtue of either having viewed the incident log in a live state, been resourced to attend the incident or heard about it as it was allegedly occurring or being managed.

Name	Action / Statement number
Gilroy	-
#PO 023	A522, S123
#PO 021	A325, S104
#PO 040	A93, S51 & S107
#PO 039	A291
#PO 005	A508, S129
#PO 051	A593, S130
#PO 010	A381, S120
#PO 012	A514, S116
#PO 011	A469
#PO 052	A121, S66
#PO 049	A120, S65
#PO 54	A377, S114
#PO 050	A250, S108
#PO 057	A101, S57
#PS 303	A5, S1
#PS 308	A393, S113
#PS 304	A39, S11
#PS 302	A518, S117
#PO 013	A359, S111

<sup>88</sup> See appendix 37 for firearms and air support analysis

409. Analysis of their duties has been undertaken to identify those dates where all were on duty. It should be noted that special constable duties (in this case for #PO 013) are not recorded on the system and for the purpose of this comparison has not been included<sup>89</sup>.

410. The below graph shows the results:



411. The results highlight the following:

- There is not one day where all nineteen people are on duty.
- The two days in which the majority are on duty are Tuesday 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2007 (fifteen out of the nineteen) and Wednesday 4<sup>th</sup> July 2007 (fourteen out of nineteen). These numbers themselves would reduce further when considering those being at work at the same time.

412. The overall conclusion from the above analysis is that, taking into account the relevant time, it is not possible that all twenty officers and staff were on duty at the time of the alleged incident as they believe.

413. Five officers interviewed by the investigation team believe that they were resourced to or responded to the alleged incident.


Name	Action / Statement number
#PO 023	A522, S123
#PO 021	A325, S104
#PO 010	A381, S120
#PO 012	A514, S116
#PO 013	A359, S111

414. Analysis of their duties has been undertaken to identify those dates where all were on duty. It should be noted that special constable duties (in this case for #PO 013) are not recorded on the system and

<sup>89</sup> See appendix 38 for analysis of their duties

for the purpose of this comparison his duties have been estimated based on his footprint being present on the resourcing and systems audits<sup>90</sup>.

415. The below graph shows the results:



416. The results highlight the following:

- There is only one day where all five people are on duty, this being 4<sup>th</sup> June 2007.
- There are ten dates when four of the five are on duty.
- When considering the above eleven dates and looking at the actual times of the duties performed by these officers on 4<sup>th</sup> June 2007 only four officers are on duty at the same time (with slight cross over between 10:00pm and midnight) and of the other ten dates no more than three officers are on duty at the same time.

417. The overall conclusion drawn from the above is that all five officers could not have responded to the alleged incident, or indeed any incident as an initial response during the relevant time.

#### GPS audits

418. Individual officer GPS data has been analysed as part of the profiling of those officers that recalled having been deployed to the alleged incident, or indeed those officers who had been named by others as 'having attended' and is summarised in their respective paragraphs earlier within this report.

419. In addition to that data the investigation team also obtained data for all GPS in the G6S4 Bamburgh area to specifically analyse all activities within the street where Mr Craik lived during the relevant time (E PD 290319 03I).

<sup>90</sup> See appendix 39 for analysis of their duties

420. Analysis of the GPS data within the street where Mr Craik lived shows no significant attendance of any multiple resources. It should be reiterated at this point that during this time period (June and July 2007) GPS tracking was only associated to police vehicle radios and not to personal issue radios. The police vehicle radios will only associate to an individual officer if they had been assigned to that set.
421. Furthermore there is no data that supports any police resource attending to an incident at Mr Craik's address during the relevant time<sup>91</sup>.

Was an incident log (FWIN) or text within deleted following this alleged incident?

422. There are no incident logs created on NPICCS that match the home address of Mr and Mrs Craik in 2007. The first record of an incident log at their address is in October 2009.
423. In respect of deleted logs, the investigation team conducted a physical search of the safe and chief superintendent's office in the NCC where all deleted logs had been printed off and retained as per force policy. Audit data from NPICCS provided a list of logs that were recorded as deleted on the system from 1<sup>st</sup> May 2007 to 31<sup>st</sup> October 2007. All but one of the hard copy deleted logs for 2007 were recovered and seized.
424. It should be noted that the storage of these deleted logs was haphazard with the logs being stored in different locations. In a few cases the investigation team identified logs placed in envelopes that did not match what was written on the sealed envelope and indeed a number of the envelopes were not sealed or had been opened and there did not appear to be an auditable system for access.<sup>92</sup> There was some discrepancy found between the hard copy logs and those listed on the audit, the below table looks at those deleted incidents between 1<sup>st</sup> May 2007 and 31<sup>st</sup> August 2007:

Incident log	Printed incident log located	Appears on audit
FWIN 1193 of 10/05 2007 – deleted by #PO 064	No	Yes
FWIN 633 of 24/05 2007 – deleted by #PS 313	Yes	No
FWIN 1381 of 27/05 2007 – deleted by #PS 301	Yes	Yes
FWIN 74 of 31/05 2007 – deleted by #PO 065	Yes	Yes
FWIN 1563 21/06 2007 – deleted by #PO 066	Yes	Yes
FWIN 1600 of 19/07 2007 – deleted by #PO 066	Yes	Yes
FWIN 0571 of 24/07 2007 – deleted by #PO 044	Yes	Yes
FWIN 0632 of 02/08 2007 – deleted by #PO 067	Yes	Yes
FWIN 0501 of 28/08 2007 – deleted by #PS 305	Yes	Yes

425. None of the deleted logs listed in this table relate to an incident in Bamburgh, concern a panic alarm activation or involve Mr and Mrs Craik or Mr and Mrs Peacock. Whilst it would not be appropriate to comment in detail about the content of the incident logs, a brief narrative will be provided concerning the incident location for each log.
426. Incident log 1193 of 10<sup>th</sup> May 2007 is deleted by #PO 064. Whilst no hard copy was recovered from the communication centre, retained data on the incident log show that this incident is located in the E4 L4 beat area of Newcastle area command in the post code area of Denton. Further, this incident

<sup>91</sup> See appendix 40 for GPS analysis

<sup>92</sup> The investigation team understand that this process has since been changed and all deleted logs are now sent to PSD for safekeeping

log is created and deleted on the 10<sup>th</sup> May 2007, realistically a month before the alleged incident is reported to have occurred. It should further be noted that this was not a unique occurrence as between 1<sup>st</sup> January 2007 and 30<sup>th</sup> April 2007 there were a further five incident logs that are deleted through the I30 process where hard copy logs were not recovered from the communication centre, again none of these are located within the G6 area<sup>93</sup>.

427. Incident log 633 of 24<sup>th</sup> May 2007 is deleted by #PS 313 from the IT department on 20<sup>th</sup> January 2009. A hard copy of this incident log was printed in the northern communication centre by #PS 305 and is retained. This log is deleted as part of Op Ceremony – an investigation undertaken by Northumbria Police. The deletion of the incident log is authorised by #PO 068. The investigation team have spoken to #PO 069 who was part of the Operation Ceremony investigation team in 2007. In this case it became necessary to delete the incident log 18 months after it was created.
428. This incident log is relevant to the accounts provided by #PS 313 in which he states that he was told by his line manager to delete a log at time the rumours concerning the alleged incident were strong.
429. Incident log 1381 of 27<sup>th</sup> May 2007 is deleted by #PS 301. This was authorised by #PO 070 on 28<sup>th</sup> May 2007. This incident log related to an incident in Washington and was appropriately authorised to have the text removed.
430. Incident log 74 of 31<sup>st</sup> May 2007 is deleted by #PO 065. This was authorised by #PO 071 on the same day. This incident log related to an incident in North Tyneside and was appropriately authorised to have the text removed.
431. Incident log 1563 of 21<sup>st</sup> June 2007 is deleted by #PO 066. This was authorised by #PO 003 on 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2007. This incident log related to an incident in South Tyneside and was appropriately authorised to have the text removed.
432. Incident log 1600 of 19<sup>th</sup> July 2007 was deleted by #PO 066. This was authorised by #PO 003 on 20<sup>th</sup> July 2007. This incident log related to an incident in North Tyneside and was appropriately authorised to have the text removed.
433. Incident log 0571 of 24<sup>th</sup> July 2007 is deleted by #PO 044. This was authorised by #PO 071. This incident log related to a report in North Tyneside of a suspicious vehicle (identified as a covert police vehicle) and was appropriately authorised to have the text removed. A review of #PO 044's duties show that he was not on duty on the 24<sup>th</sup> of July 2007 when the incident came in but was on duty on the 25<sup>th</sup> July 2007 when he deleted the log. This would have been about a week after the rumours of the alleged incident were very strong around the force. In his statement #PO 044 states that he was not on duty when the incident came in but deleted the text from the log the following day. He is specific that the incident related to an incident at Mr Craik's house in Bamburgh which involved Mr Peacock. He states that although difficult to separate fact from fiction, his recollection was that a panic alarm had been pressed.
434. Of note is the fact that on 23<sup>rd</sup> October 2009 #PO 044 was on duty and oversaw an incident where there was an alarm activation at Mr Craik's address where a panic alarm had been installed. The alarm had been installed on 16<sup>th</sup> October 2009. This incident was not deleted.

---

<sup>93</sup> See appendix 41 for full list

435. The investigation team consider that it is not unreasonable that #PO 044 may have become confused about this which may be exacerbated by the fact that in October 2009 he oversaw the incident where an alarm, which had been installed at Mr Craik's house, was activated and patrols did attend albeit this was a false activation.
436. Incident log 632 of 2<sup>nd</sup> August 2007 was deleted by #PO 067 on 3<sup>rd</sup> August 2007. This was authorised by #PO 075. This incident log related to an incident in Morpeth and was appropriately authorised to have the text removed. The investigation team consider this incident relevant as it would have occurred at the time when rumour was widespread and sits just outside the relevant time for the alleged incident and occurs within the Northumberland area. This particular incident relates to a serving police officer for whom there was concern. This incident attracted a lot of intense resourcing from varying sources and included traffic officers, dog support and air support deployments. Of further significance is that a location referred to within the recovered log is 'Craik Park'.
437. Incident log 501 of 28<sup>th</sup> August 2007 was deleted by #PS 305 on 29<sup>th</sup> August 2007. This was authorised by #PO 072. This incident log related to an incident in South Tyneside and was appropriately authorised to have the text removed.
438. Based on the above analysis, there are no incident logs identified where the text has been deleted which are unaccounted for or contain any information relating to the alleged incident in any form.
439. #PO 003 was head of the communications centres during the relevant time. He was silver commander over the weekend of 22<sup>nd</sup> to 24<sup>th</sup> June 2007, the time Mr Gilroy states the incident occurred and the incident log was deleted, and no such incident was brought to his attention. Furthermore, as head of communications at the time he did not authorise and was not aware of the deletion of any incident log that bore any resemblance to the rumours.
440. In considering the inference of a complete deletion of the incident log and a suggestion that the remaining incident logs for the 24 hour cycle were resequenced and renumbered in conjunction with #PO 283's reference of an unplanned computer outage around the relevant time. The investigation team have examined NPICCS system planned and unplanned downtimes. (E PD 121218 01m)
441. Examination of this data shows there was no planned or unplanned downtime of the system within the relevant time.

Date/Time Down	Date/Time Back	Down Minutes	Planned / Unplanned
18/02/2007 23:19	18/02/2007 23:51	32	Unplanned
19/02/2007 08:25	19/02/2007 08:35	10	Unplanned
19/02/2007 15:50	19/02/2007 15:55	5	Planned
14/04/2007 09:00	14/04/2007 12:30	210	Planned
13/05/2007 08:00	13/05/2007 08:45	45	Planned
13/05/2007 13:04	13/05/2007 14:05	61	Planned
02/09/2007 11:00	03/09/2007 00:00	780	Planned
03/09/2007 13:40	03/09/2007 13:50	10	Unplanned
04/09/2007 04:45	04/09/2007 04:55	10	Unplanned

442. As the data capture above shows, there is actually no downtime between 13<sup>th</sup> May 2007 and 2<sup>nd</sup> September 2007.
443. The investigation team further completed an incident number cross check with the North East Ambulance Service as detailed earlier in the report. The aim of this was to identify any differences in recorded numbers to highlight any subsequent resequencing of the Northumbria Police incident logs.

444. When considering the results of this enquiry it is important to realise that the latest incident within each day would be the most relevant. This is because if there had been any resequencing of logs then this would have to be done from the point of the incident all the way through to the end of that particular day, at which point the new date would reset to incident log 0001. For example if the incident had been incident log 1250 and there had been 1800 incident logs that day then all incident logs from 1251 through to 1800 would have to be reduced by one to fill the void of removing 1250.
445. Analysis of the data showed there are no discrepancies, other than human error, to suggest that Northumbria incident logs have been resequenced on any date within the relevant time<sup>94</sup>.
446. The investigation team have conducted extensive enquiries and analysis of the account of #PS 313, who believes that he wrote a program to delete the content within an incident that he believed to be associated to the alleged incident<sup>95</sup>.
447. In considering the account of #PS 313 against the relevant time period for this investigation, a review has been undertaken of his system audit from 1<sup>st</sup> June 2007 to 15<sup>th</sup> August 2007, thereby allowing an additional month beyond the relevant time to cover the process which he describes as having to have been within the first month of the incident being created (i.e. still on the Enscribe tables).
448. There is no record in the audit of #PS 313 accessing any incidents that are either deleted or in the north Northumberland area within the extended relevant time period as defined above. There are only seven incident logs in total on his audit during this time all of which are accounted for as actions on his personal logs.
449. The investigation team found evidence that #PS 313 deleted two incident logs completely from the system. This was an appropriately authorised and audited task and related to incident logs from 2002 which he deletes off the system in October 2008, having been tasked by #PS 312. He did not recall having carried out this task.
450. The investigation team found evidence that #PS 313 had also deleted the text from an incident following a sanctioned request in January 2009. The incident log from which he deletes the text dated back to 24<sup>th</sup> May 2007, just prior to the relevant time for this investigation, this being incident log 0633 240507. For this task #PS 313 had to write a specific program targeted at that incident as the request to delete it was considerably outside the thirty day period that would have allowed front end users to perform an I30 deletion. He did not recall having carried out this task.
451. Enquiries were conducted into the history contained within the IT software development areas, where programs as that described by #PS 313 would be built and remain. Searches of this system again identified the program written by #PS 313 to action the deletion of text from incident log 0633 240507 which was entitled 'INCDEL', which was not written until 20<sup>th</sup> January 2009. No programs were located that related to what #PS 313 had described in his statement.
452. #PS 313 was provided with the data obtained and he was unable to identify the program to which he referred within the data captured.

---

<sup>94</sup> See appendix 42 for Police and Ambulance incident cross check analysis

<sup>95</sup> See appendix 43 for data analysis relating to #PS 313

453. The investigation team conclude that there is no likelihood that #PS 313 wrote a program to delete the contents of an incident relating to an event involving the chief constable during the relevant time period.

#### Media enquiries July 2007

454. It is evident within documents provided to the investigation team by Northumbria Police that they commenced some enquiries into a potential media leak of the story of the alleged incident (ND 30). A record of this enquiry was created on 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2007 and closed without resolution on 17<sup>th</sup> October 2007 following a number of enquiries.

455. A review of this information establishes the following facts:

- The first media enquiry is made on 16<sup>th</sup> July 2007 and asks the question as to whether there was an incident on Friday 13<sup>th</sup> July 2007 at Bamburgh involving the chief constable and his wife.
- A number of similar enquiries follow from other media representatives throughout that week, some of the elements of the story being asked about include this being two weeks ago, an armed response unit attending, an altercation between Mr Craik and Mr Peacock, and Mr Craik having handed in his notice to the Police Authority.
- A number of reporters were knocking on Mr Craik's neighbour's doors asking about the incident.
- Northumbria Police's response to these enquiries was that 'there is a malicious rumour circulating about the chief constable, it has no foundation whatsoever'.

456. #PO 048 was staff officer to Mrs Peacock and remained in the executive office after Mrs Peacock's retirement recalled being asked by Mr Craik to search NPICCS for incidents within the Seahouses area at the time that she became aware of the rumoured incident. A review of the systems audit of #PO 048 show that on 16<sup>th</sup> July 2007 at 5:37pm she accessed five incident logs. Upon looking at the incident logs accessed all date between 2<sup>nd</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> July 2007 and are located in Bamburgh, as detailed:

FWIN	Incident description	Incident location
1554 020707	Road flooded	Bamburgh Castle, Bamburgh
0480 050707	Suspicious male in vehicle	The Wynding, Bamburgh
1027 070707	Fail to stop traffic collision	Links road, Bamburgh
0176 100707	Cow on road	Bamburgh
0321 140707	Concern for male	Copper Kettle Tea Rooms, Bamburgh

457. It is relevant that these are the only incident recorded in Bamburgh on NPICCS if a search were to have been conducted for all incidents within G6S4 (Bamburgh) between 1<sup>st</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> July 2007. None of these incident logs are 'deleted'. This shows that there is no discrepancy in the data available to the investigation team today as there was at the time in July 2007. This is therefore fully supportive of #PO 048's recollection of Mr Craik asking her to conduct such a search, accepting that the area is Bamburgh and not Seahouses as she believed. The timing of this search being conducted is also on the date that it is known the first media enquiries are made.

458. The account of #PO 048, corroborated by the supporting data in her audit, indicates that on 16<sup>th</sup> July 2007 Mr Craik may also have been making enquiries to identify any incident that may have provided the platform from which the rumour of the 'alleged incident' derived.

459. It is also evident that during that week of 16<sup>th</sup> to 20<sup>th</sup> July 2007 there are a number of reporters making enquiries with Mr and Mrs Craik's neighbours asking questions of the alleged incident and yet

no story is ever published. The inference here being that it most likely no supportive information was obtained from any source within the street where there had been an alleged police response.

#### Operation Elveden enquiries

460. From information provided by the Metropolitan Police Service it has been established that the Operation Elveden enquiry submitted to Northumbria Police in 2012 was as a result of an email that their enquiry uncovered dated 19<sup>th</sup> July 2007 relating to the alleged incident.
461. No formal response from Northumbria Police has been identified and it is the recollection of the Metropolitan Police detective who undertook this enquiry that there was no assistance forthcoming in response to his enquiry.
462. The enquiries conducted by #PO 278 highlighted a number of recommendations for further avenues of enquiry but it would appear that these were stalled at an executive level. It is noted that at the time of this enquiry those involved – #PO 278, #PO 075 and #PO 279 all moved on to new positions and it is not clear whether this matter was picked up by those taking over their roles.
463. At the time of this enquiry #PO 292 was the incumbent chief constable. They recall being made aware that the enquiry had come into Northumbria Police from the Metropolitan Police concerning the reporting of an alleged affair between Mr Craik and Mrs Peacock. Their recollection was that the matter was investigated by #PO 278 and he reported to the deputy chief constable and they were not made aware of any outcome or reporting back to the Metropolitan Police.
464. It was within the following two to three months that the investigations commenced into the alleged breaches by the former employee concerning the same matter.

#### Other information

465. #PO 284 provided evidence to the Employment Tribunal in 2016. Within his evidence there was no first-hand information of any incident having occurred between Mr Craik and Mr Peacock.
466. #PO 284 repeated the rumour he had heard to the Tribunal and also referred to briefings and meetings taking place around the force at the time where officers were being informed of the alleged incident being talked about but were told that no incident had occurred. In his statement to the investigation team Mr Craik confirms that at the time he did indeed provide general instruction that this matter was not to be discussed or gossiped about and there may be consequences as it was untrue, defamatory and was a source of distraction.
467. When the investigation team met with #PO 014 he commented that he had been contacted by #PO 284 at the time of the Tribunal and #PO 284 tried to encourage him to give evidence to the Tribunal of his knowledge of the incident, inferring to him that he had attended.
468. The investigation team met with #PO 284 and he confirmed that he did not have any personal knowledge of the incident. During this interview #PO 284 provided the following information:
  - He named the traffic resource who attended as #PO 014 and #PO 013. These officers have been seen by the investigation team, neither were traffic (motor patrol) officers. #PO 014 had no involvement in any incident and #PO 013 believes he may have been resourced to the incident with a traffic officer but never arrived or saw the log to which he was resourced.

- He named two solicitors, #MP 401 and #MP 402, as having seen the incident log. Both have been seen by the investigation team and neither saw the incident log
  - He named #PS 306 as having seen the log. #PS 306 was interviewed by the investigation team, he confirmed that at around the time of hearing the rumours he saw a blanked out log on the system, he did not know what this was about and clarified that he had seen numerous blanked out logs during his service.
  - He named #PO 049 as having passed comment on social media indicating some knowledge. #PO 049 had already been interviewed by the investigation team. He is unsure if he were alerted to or was monitoring logs when he viewed an incident log concerning a personal attack alarm at the chief constable's home address. He does not recall the content of log other than it being a personal attack alarm and Mr Craik's name on the log.
  - He named #PO 045 as recently posting something on social media. #PO 045 was interviewed by the investigation team, he recalled going into work and hearing talk of an incident which had occurred between Mr Craik and Mr Peacock. He also recalled more senior officers telling them not to discuss it. He had no direct knowledge or involvement.
  - He named #PO 056 as being the person that told him that #PO 014 had attended. #PO 056 contacted the investigation team and is discussed below.
469. #PO 056 contacted the investigation team directly by letter and was spoken to by telephone thereafter. #PO 056 confirmed that he had no direct involvement in the alleged incident and had not seen the alleged incident log.
470. #PO 056 provided the following information to the investigation team:
- He had been contacted at home, whilst off duty, in early July 2007 by an officer, who he does not name. This officer informed him of the alleged incident at Mr Craik's address and refers to this incident having occurred on 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2007. He reported that the officer was reading from the incident log and that firearms, traffic and local officers were all called to the scene and their details added to the log. #PO 056 has not provided any details of this officer to the investigation team so it cannot be commented upon as to whether the officer to whom he refers has been interviewed or not. The investigation team have conducted extensive enquiries to identify, trace and interview all traffic, firearms and local officers that were working that day and none report attending the scene of the alleged incident. There is no record of an incident at Mr Craik's address at any time in 2007 and there is no evidence of a deleted log from 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2007. There is no GPS data to suggest any officer/s attended an incident at the address of Mr Craik on 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2007.
  - The following week this same officer contacted him again saying that the incident log had been removed from the computer. This officer told him that the main computer server had been switched off, the incident removed and that all incidents after the call to Mr Craik's house had been re numbered, reduced by one number, to hide the removal of the incident. The enquiries conducted by the investigation team with the North East Ambulance Service shows no evidence of re numbering of incident logs.
  - #PS 311 had confirmed to him that the computers had been turned off for over four hours on the morning of Monday 25<sup>th</sup> June 2007 to facilitate this. An audit of the NPICCS system shows there having been no planned or unplanned downtime during June or July 2007.
  - In 2008 he was contacted by #PO 013 who told him that he had attended the incident at Mr Craik's house on 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2007. This officer informed him that he had been partnered with a traffic officer at the time and on arrival at Mr Craik's home another police officer was present and told them that the matter was in hand. This officer further told him that he had his pocket book seized from him by an inspector before finishing duty that day. #PO 013 has been interviewed by the investigation team and believes that he responded to the alleged incident with another officer who he could not

recall, the officer does not report having either arrived or having had his pocket notebook seized and disposed of. The investigation team have established that #PO 013 was on duty on 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2007 and most likely partnered with #PO 011, this officer believed they were on duty when the incident was reported but was never resourced to attend. There is no record of them attending any incidents in Bamburgh on this day.

- In 2018 he was informed personally by #PO 053 that he had been the duty detective inspector on the weekend of 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2007 and had been tasked to assist the professional standards department after the event and was provided with a copy of the incident log. Having provided his details to the investigation team #PO 056 contacted and informed #PO 053 that he had done so. #PO 053 made direct contact with the investigation team expressing concern at what #PO 056 had alleged. He informed the investigation team that he had no personal knowledge or involvement in the alleged incident and that what #PO 056 had told the team was not true. (A386, S110)

471. It is evident that #PO 056 has a strong belief that the alleged incident occurred and was covered up, however, he has no direct personal knowledge of any of the events that he alleges and no evidence has been identified to support any of his assertions. #PO 056 makes clear in his communication with the investigation team that he believes that he was the victim of a corrupt enquiry and disciplinary process conducted by Northumbria Police professional standards department which resulted in Mr Craik demoting him from sergeant to constable whilst in service in 2006.
472. Although the former employee has not responded to the request of the investigation team to meet or answer questions they did communicate with the team by email in August 2018. In the absence of an opportunity to speak personally with the former employee the investigation team take note of the information provided within the email. (SD 36)
473. The former employee states that, as head of legal services at the time, they provided legal advice to Mr Craik over the media attention following the alleged incident. They maintained a file on this matter and that all legal advice was provided on the predication that no incident had occurred as this is what Mr Craik had told them. Northumbria Police granted the investigation team access to review the file to which the former employee refers. (A302) The documents contained within the file were supportive of what the former employee states, in that legal advice was obtained and provided to Mr Craik on the grounds that no incident had happened. A specific email dated 24<sup>th</sup> July 2007 authored by the former employee documents that Mr Craik's instructions are that 'allegations are false'. There is evidence of a meeting on 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2007 which involved discussions around Mr Craik issuing and internal statement to quell the rumour and to advise of action being taken if it were to be repeated.
474. The former employee provides a rationale as to why they later believed that the incident had occurred and that Mr Craik had lied to them. This is primarily based upon what others have said. The former employee has been invited to provide the personal details of some of those to whom they refer but does not name, no details have been forthcoming. It is therefore difficult for the investigation team to comment as to whether they have interviewed these persons as a part of this enquiry. None of this information directs the investigation team to areas outside of those already explored under the investigations parameters.
475. The former employee also raises concerns of a continued cover up by Northumbria Police and quotes evidence that #PO 278 gave at the misconduct hearing of his instructions during his investigation in 2012/2013 relating to Operation Elveden. The investigation team have conducted enquiries into this matter which is recorded earlier in this report.

## Conclusions

---

476. In accordance with the scope of this report it has been necessary to firstly establish if an incident, as alleged, actually occurred.
477. The information available to the investigation team from the outset and that which was heard at the Employment Tribunal in 2016 was that this incident occurred on 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2007. It was also apparent, having reviewed communications recovered from 2007, that the media were of the belief this incident had occurred during the weekend before 16<sup>th</sup> July 2007. The team primarily focussed their investigations on the relevant time of 1<sup>st</sup> June 2007 to 15<sup>th</sup> July 2007 inclusive, to provide sufficient scope.
478. The investigation team have conducted extensive enquiries with all officers and staff who were likely to have been directly involved if an incident had occurred as well as an in depth examination of the Northumbria Police IT systems.
479. It is evident that the majority of officers and staff, of all ranks and in all areas of the force, had been aware of the talk and gossip of the alleged incident in 2007 and may have been exposed to the media reporting and headlines that emanated from the Employment Tribunal in 2016.
480. The investigation team are mindful that the accounts of all the officers and staff should be tempered as to their reliability and credibility based on the following factors:
- The alleged incident occurred thirteen years ago. Without exception, no officer or member of staff has made or recorded any contemporaneous notes of the alleged incident at the time or soon after. The accounts are therefore based on memory.
  - The reliance on memory in this case is further affected by the fact that a lot of what is reported is rumour. However, more importantly, the misconduct hearing of the former employee took place in 2013. Although not widely publicised at that time, this was subject to extensive local and national media coverage as recently as 2016 with sensationalist headlines following the Employment Tribunal. More recently attention has been focussed on this topic in the local and national press following the commencement of this investigation.
  - False memory. This investigation does not intend to provide any expert or scientific evidence on this subject but research on the topic is widely documented and readily available across the internet. Put plainly, false memory may occur where a person recalls something that did not happen or they recall something happening in a different way to what actually happened. The person will believe this memory to be true and their recall can be formed from hearing others reporting information about an event. The investigation team consider that this phenomenon may have relevance given the amount of talk and rumour that has circulated within Northumbria Police over the many years since the incident is alleged to have occurred and should not be discounted.
481. It has been necessary throughout this investigation to balance people's recollections alongside what others say and in conjunction with factual evidence including data contained within IT systems to establish corroboration.
482. The investigation identified a number of Northumbria Police employees who recall being sent to or attending the incident and / or seeing an incident log during the summer of 2007. The analysis section of this report highlights a number of concerns with their recollections, not least the fact that when

considering all of their duties within the relevant time period it was not possible that all could have done or seen what they believe they did. The conclusion has to be that at least some are mistaken. Furthermore, there is no evidence (as would be expected if an incident had occurred) of consistency between different areas of business across the organisation. Rather, the investigation team is left to rely on individual recollections which effectively operate in silo of each other.

483. The investigation has not identified any credible evidence to support the allegations that an incident occurred at Mr and Mrs Craik's house, nor that a panic alarm was installed at either his house in Bamburgh or his flat in Gosforth in 2007 which may have been activated.
484. The investigation has not identified any credible evidence to show that an incident log relating to such a rumour was ever created or subsequently deleted.
485. The investigation has not identified any officer who attended the address.
486. In drawing conclusions the investigation team have considered the following findings:
- There is no record of a panic alarm being installed at either of Mr Craik's properties in 2007.
  - There is no incident log on NPICCS for an incident at either of Mr Craik's properties in 2007.
  - No member of staff in either communication centre seen by the investigation team report having taken a call relating to a call for service at Mr Craik's address in Bamburgh.
  - No member of the 'top tables' in either communication centre report receiving or managing an incident at Mr Craik's address.
  - A number of officers and staff report having 'seen the log' on NPICCS. System audits have been completed and examined for these staff and officers and there is no common single incident log accessed by them.
  - There is only one 'deleted incident log' on NPICCS during the relevant time, this being on 21<sup>st</sup> June 2007, the original paper copy log was recovered and has no association to Mr Craik or any incident at his address in Bamburgh.
  - There is no evidence of the complete deletion of any incident log from NPICCS during the relevant time. The cross check audits conducted with the North East Ambulance Service show no renumbering of incidents to cover this up, had it been done.
  - There is no recorded 'system downtime' within the relevant time.
  - All possible resources have been considered, traced and where achievable interviewed by the investigation team and none state that they actually attended to the incident.
  - A small number of officers believe that they were resourced to 'the incident' yet at no time during the relevant time are they all on duty together.
  - GPS data shows no resources attending an incident at Mr Craik's address in Bamburgh during the relevant time.
  - Documents reviewed indicate that media reporters conducted enquiries with the neighbours of Mr Craik in July 2007 and no story was published, the inference being that their enquiries drew a negative response.
  - The evidence of Mr Craik, Mrs Craik, Mr Peacock and Mrs Peacock is that no incident happened and no police were resourced to any incident.
487. The investigation team concludes that no panic alarm was installed or was activated, there was no incident, no incident was reported to the police and no police resources attended an incident at Mr

Craik's address as alleged. It follows therefore that no log was ever created or deleted in an attempt to cover this up.

488. In considering the allegations and complaints recorded on pages 7 – 9 of this report the investigation draws the following conclusions.
489. Allegation 1: It is alleged that former Chief Superintendent James Peacock assaulted former Chief Constable Michael Craik.
490. The investigation has found no evidence of an assault upon Mr Craik by Mr Peacock.
491. Allegation 2: It is alleged that the assault on former Chief Constable Michael Craik was, on his instruction, not investigated. It is further alleged that all related incident logs were removed from the force system and that efforts were made to prevent any individual speaking to the media regarding the assault/ affair.
492. The investigation has found no evidence of an incident occurring, no evidence of a log existing and therefore no evidence of such a log being removed from the system. The investigation did find evidence that messages were put out, under Mr Craik's own instructions, that the matter should not be discussed and that there would be consequences for anyone found to be discussing the matter or 'gossiping'. On the basis of the rumour being untrue and defamatory, this was entirely reasonable when considering reputational damage to the force.
493. Allegation 3: It is alleged that former Chief Constable Michael Craik inappropriately used force resources to prevent the incident from being made public.
494. The investigation has found no evidence of an incident occurring. On this basis the investigation team conclude that Mr Craik's actions were entirely reasonable in using such resources to maintain public confidence and protect the reputation of the office of chief constable and that of Northumbria Police.
495. Allegation 4: During the Employment Tribunal, a former employee made very public allegations that they believed that Michael Craik had lied about the rumours involving himself and the Peacocks and clearly stated that in order to 'cover-up' what had taken place he used public funds to pay for advice from an independent barrister regarding the matter. It is believed that such legal advice was obtained and if it were proven that the alleged events had taken place in the manner described, it is alleged that former Chief Constable Michael Craik's actions would amount to gross misconduct and potentially criminal behaviour.
496. The investigation has found no evidence of an incident occurring. On this basis the investigation team conclude that Mr Craik's actions were entirely reasonable in using such funds to obtain legal advice to maintain public confidence and protect the reputation of the office of chief constable and that of Northumbria Police.
497. Allegation 5: It is alleged that former Inspector Paul Gilroy, together with other serving and former police officers and/or staff did attempt and/or conspire to pervert the course of justice, by submitting a statement to the proceedings of the Employment Tribunal, knowing or believing that statement to be false and untrue and/or providing testimony to the Employment Tribunal.
498. Notwithstanding other officers, the allegation concerning Mr Gilroy is no longer relevant as he has died. The accounts of other officers indicate that very few people were aware that Mr Gilroy had

made a statement for the Employment Tribunal. The investigation team consider that whilst the statement of Mr Gilroy to the Tribunal is erroneous and vague, there is no evidence of deliberate malice towards those affected by it.

499. As far as the investigation team have been able to establish, no other serving or former police officers and/or staff provided evidence at the Tribunal regarding the truthfulness of the alleged incident. Their testimony is documented in the section titled 'Employment Tribunal – a former employee' at pages 12 to 15.
500. Allegation 6: It is alleged that former Inspector Paul Gilroy submitted to a Judicial hearing an instrument, namely a Northumbria Police pocket note book that appears to have been altered or amended and which he was in any event not entitled to possess.
501. The allegation concerning Mr Gilroy is no longer relevant as he has died. However, the pocket note book of Mr Gilroy was recovered from his home address. Examination of this note book clearly show that this has not been altered or amended, simply a post it note attached to a relevant date.
502. Mr Gilroy may have been in breach of force policy concerning the retention of his pocket note book once he had retired. At the very most, this may have been considered misconduct. However, other enquiries by the investigation team tend to show a blasé approach by the force in enforcing this policy.

## Recommendations

---

503. The investigation team had concerns about the management and security of incident logs that are subject to the deletion process. It is understood, however, that there is now policy in place within Northumbria Police and that all logs that are deleted are now managed and stored securely by the professional standards department.
504. The investigation team had concerns about the management and storage/retention of pocket notebooks but recognise that this has been a similar issue affecting many police forces nationally. However, it is expected that the need for the use and retention of pocket notebooks will fall away as digital notebooks are introduced and used more frequently nationally.
505. The investigation team recognise that these allegations have had a significant impact on the personal and professional lives of former senior officers within Northumbria Police. Whilst it is understood that this is not as a result of an intentional act by the organisation, or any individual, it is clear that Northumbria Police could have done more to support them and address their concerns earlier. It is recommended that due consideration be given to acknowledging this with those affected, Mr and Mrs Craik and Mr and Mrs Peacock.
506. Northumbria Police have responded to this recommendation. In summary, the force believe that they responded swiftly and robustly when it became clear that the alleged incident was to be referenced in the tribunal (which was not long before the employment tribunal was due to commence). They notified Mr and Mrs Craik and Mr and Mrs Peacock, sought to have the relevant material excluded and provided immediate short term legal representation in the form of initial advice and preparation of a statement in order to challenge the application. The force did not agree to pay for representation.
507. Northumbria Police has acknowledged and continues to acknowledge the impact and distress the allegations made during the employment tribunal have had on Mr and Mrs Craik and Mr and Mrs Peacock. The current chief constable intends to write to both parties now that the investigation has concluded.
508. The investigation team recommend that a copy of this report (subject to the harm test) is provided to the complainants, Mr and Mrs Craik and Mr and Mrs Peacock.
509. The investigation team recommend that consideration is given to publishing this report. Whilst it is acknowledged that publishing the report does risk igniting some initial headlines and bring the subject back into the spotlight, given the outcome it is likely that this would soon diminish. The investigation team recognises that there are numerous interested parties who will, upon knowledge of the completion of this investigation, seek to make formal requests for access to the report and material obtained during the course of the investigation. By publishing the report any requests could be sign posted directly to the published document negating the need for multiple individual responses to ongoing bitesize freedom of information requests. A published report will show transparency and provide closure to a matter that, to date, has never gone away and remained a blight upon the reputation of Northumbria Police and individuals who served there.

## Appendices

---

Appendix 1	Northumbria Police totals of staff and officers in July 2007
Appendix 2	Investigation team generic questionnaire
Appendix 3	Northumberland area command inspectors list
Appendix 4	Officers list for the Berwick (G7) area
Appendix 5	Officers list for the Alnwick (G5) area
Appendix 6	Officers list for rural north Northumberland (G6) area
Appendix 7	Officers list for Firearms Support Unit
Appendix 8	Officers list for Traffic
Appendix 9	Officers list for Dog Support Unit
Appendix 10	Communication Centres 'top tables' and other staff seen list
Appendix 11	List of all individual officers and staff NPICCS system audits obtained
Appendix 12	List of all NPICCS resource audits obtained
Appendix 13	List of all GPS audits obtained
Appendix 14	Incidents in which #PS 308 resources #PO 015 (2005 – 2010)
Appendix 15	FWIN commonality review document
Appendix 16	FWIN commonality data
Appendix 17	Officer Profile slides for Mr Gilroy
Appendix 18	Officer Analysis review document for Mr Gilroy
Appendix 19	Officer Profile slides for #PO 010
Appendix 20	Officer Analysis review document for #PO 010
Appendix 21	Officer Profile slides for #PO 012
Appendix 22	Officer Analysis review document for #PO 012
Appendix 23	Officer Profile slides for #PO 021
Appendix 24	Officer Analysis review document for #PO 021
Appendix 25	Officer Profile slides for #PO 023
Appendix 26	Officer Analysis review document for #PO 023
Appendix 27	Officer Profile slides for #PO 013
Appendix 28	Officer Analysis review document for #PO 013
Appendix 29	Officer Profile slides for #PO 039
Appendix 30	Officer Analysis review document for #PO 039
Appendix 31	Officer Profile slides for #PO 014
Appendix 32	Officer Analysis review document for #PO 014
Appendix 33	Officer Profile slides for #PO 015
Appendix 34	Officer Analysis review document for #PO 015
Appendix 35	Officer Profile slides for #PO 007
Appendix 36	Officer Analysis review document for #PO 007

Appendix 37	Firearms and Air Support resourcing analysis document
Appendix 38	Officers on duty analysis document
Appendix 39	Duty comparison of officers who believe they responded to the alleged incident
Appendix 40	GPS data analysis document
Appendix 41	Deleted FWINs document
Appendix 42	Northumbria Police and North East Ambulance Service incident number cross check analysis document
Appendix 43	Analysis document relating to #PS 313
Appendix 44	List of other system audits
Appendix 45	Other exhibits
Appendix 46	Statement list

## Glossary

---

### Police Ranks:

CC	Chief Constable
DCC	Deputy Chief Constable
ACC	Assistant Chief Constable
C/Supt	Chief Superintendent
Supt	Superintendent
C/Insp	Chief Inspector
Insp	Inspector
Sgt	Sergeant
PC	Police Constable
DC	Detective Constable
SC	Special Constable
PCSO	Police Community Support Officer

### Police Departments:

PSD	Professional Standards Department
CCU	Counter Corruption Unit
CID	Criminal Investigation Unit
LPT	Local Policing Team
NBM	Neighbourhood Beat Managers
ARV	Armed Response Vehicle (unit)
NCC	Northern Communication Centre
SCC	Southern Communication Centre
DSU	Dedicated Surveillance Unit
PPU	Public Protection Unit
TSU	Tactical Support Unit

Information Technology:

ICT	Information, Communication and Technology
IT	Information Technology
IS&T	Information Services and Technology
NPICCS	Northumbria Police Integrated Computer and Communications System
FWIN	Force Wide Incident Number
SQL	Sequential Language Logs
Enscribe	Operating platform
RFC	Request for Change
GPS	Global Positioning System
ISSI	Individual Short Subscriber Identity
DP	Data Protection
RFC	Request for Change

Miscellaneous:

OPCC	Office of Police and Crime Commissioner
IOPC	Independent Office for Police Conduct
IPCC	Independent Police Complaints Commission
MOPI	Management of Police Information
CIM	Critical Incident Manager
SIO	Senior Investigating Officer
BME	Black Minority and Ethnic group
NEAS	North East Ambulance Service
S	Statement reference number
A	Action reference number
ND	Northumbria Police Document reference number
SD	Staffordshire Police Document reference number
E	Exhibit